Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 57 F 72: 320 NATO/MEC 1951 Oct–Dec

Record of the Conference of United States, United Kingdom, and French Representatives With Turkish Prime Minister and Staff at Ankara on October 13 and 14, 1951¹

top secret

[Ankara ?, undated.]

Present were:

• U.S.:
  • Ambassador Wadsworth
  • General Bradley
  • General Arnold
• U.K.:
  • Ambassador Sir Noel Charles
  • Field Marshal Slim
  • Major General Packard
  • Brigadier General Swynnerton
• French:
  • Ambassador Jean Lescuyer
  • General Lecheres
  • General Vernoux
  • Vice Admiral Misoffe
• Turkey:
  • Prime Minister Menderes
  • Foreign Minister Koprulu
  • Defense Minister Yalnan
  • General Yamut
  • General Okan
  • General Egeli
  • Admiral Ulusan
  • and Staff Officers

The Prime Minister convened the conference at 10:10 with brief words of welcome to the U.S., U.K. and French representatives.

General Lecheres explained briefly the purpose of the visit to Ankara, pointing out that it was of an exploratory nature in connection with the admission of Turkey to full membership in NATO, that the meeting would be mainly concerned with the military aspects of the membership of Turkey in NATO, particularly the question of the proper command arrangements which would be made with respect to Turkey, and that it was not intended that any decisions be made at this conference but that the discussions and exchanges of views would be used later in the preparation of a staff study or an initial draft paper on the command arrangements for Turkey.

Marshal Slim then gave an explanation of the NATO organization, referring to a wall chart on which the organization was set out diagrammatically. He explained the places in which there would be a Turkish representative following the formal admission of Turkey to NATO. He emphasized the three nation character of the Standing Group and pointed out that the main purpose of the Standing Group was to conduct the strategic direction of NATO and to issue commands to the several military commands of NATO.

General Bradley then gave an exposition explaining in more detail the various commands (supreme commanders) of NATO and the strategic problems which influence NATO. First, he reviewed the threat which demanded a common pact to prepare to defend against possible aggression. Soviet Russia has 175 divisions in existence and can expand to over 300. Their Satellites in the West can furnish 60 to 65 divisions, China 200 to 300 divisions, with varying degrees of efficiency, training and equipment. The Soviet Air Force has an estimated 20,000 planes of various types available. The Soviet Navy is not so formidable, but is placing its main emphasis on submarines designed to threaten LOC’s.

He then discussed the Pacific Area generally, admitting that the Russian threat in the Pacific did not directly involve NATO but was of interest to NATO in view of present U.S. commitments there to meet the threats, particularly in Japan, Okinawa and Korea. Although the war in Korea is serious, the U.S. has allocated there only the bare minimum of forces needed. In FEC, U.S. has approximately 250,000 Army troops, 70,000 Navy personnel and 90,000 Airmen; of course, part of these forces could be shifted quickly to other theaters, such as the NATO area, if necessary. In the rest of the Pacific, he pointed out the Naval Command at Honolulu which commands all naval vessels in the Pacific not allocated to FECOM. Also, the U.S. has recently entered into bilateral pacts with the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia.²

General Bradley also pointed out present commitments of the French in Indo China and the U.K. in Hongkong, Singapore, Malaya and Borneo, all of which sap the overall strength of those nations.

General Bradley then discussed general relations between the U.S. and its western hemisphere neighbors, including the close coordination with Canada and the Interamerican Defense Board,³ handling U.S. relations with South America.

In discussing the Canada–U.S. Regional Planning Group,⁴ General Bradley pointed out that in the last two world wars the U.S. had joined late, but in a third world war, an aggressor might well hit the U.S. first, using air to knock out the U.S. production capacity so important to NATO and the world, if Russia has several hundred planes which might be so used, on two-way missions, or on one-way non-return or refueling missions. A main feature of our defense arrangement with Canada, therefore, involves defense against this long range air as well as U.S. bases from which we can hit back, as, for instance, in Alaska. Also the U.S. and Canada closely coordinate coastal patrols against possible hostile submarines.

The North Atlantic Ocean Command (SACLANT) is, except for a few bases, almost entirely a naval command, and as such is closely tied in with the U.K. Home Command and all other NATO nations bordering on the Atlantic.

The European Command under General Eisenhower, stretching from Norway to the Mediterranean, is designed to meet aggression through the Baltic, Germany, or through the Alps into Italy. Until Turkey and Greece join NATO, SACEUR’s right flank will be protected only by the independent forces of Turkey, Greece, Egypt and the Middle East. Also, Yugoslavia may be on our side, thus permitting close coordination of the NATO right flank with the rest of the NATO forces in Europe. This is very important because of the possible routes of attack through the Black Sea and through the Middle East, which would threats [sic] against the whole Mediterranean, North Africa and the rest of the African Continent. A suitable organization against those threats is necessary not only in hot war but also in the cold war. Also the U.S. needs certain North African bases for its long range strategic bombers.

General Bradley stated that the question before the conference was how to best meet those problems in fitting Greece and Turkey into NATO. He emphasized that no decisions were to be made here, but that we should discuss all angles of the problems, setting out their various advantages and disadvantages.

For example, maybe it would be advantageous to extend SACEUR’s right flank. We must coordinate the defense of the Black Sea exits. On the other hand, that extension presented some serious disadvantages. SACEUR already has a front of maximum effective width. General Bradley stated that at the end of World War II he had a 600 mile front under his command (narrow compared to SACEUR’s front) and that was a very serious job for one commander to handle. He was very doubtful that SACEUR’s right flank should be overextended to include Greece and Turkey.

He then discussed broadly the need for a command in the Middle East to guard against thrusts to the Middle East and to the Black Sea. We must realize that a Middle East Command involving NATO and also Non-NATO nations would be complicated, mainly because all NATO forces such as U.K. forces must be under NATO, but that Non-NATO nations such as the Commonwealth Nations and other nations in the Middle East should not be under NATO responsibility. But for the maximum unified effect of Army, Navy and Air Forces in the Middle East, those forces must be under some unified command.

Another reason prompting a MEC is the present situation in Egypt. The Egypt-Suez Area is a vital necessity for the defense of North Africa and Africa. Unless Egypt joins a MEC and the forces therein become Middle East forces, not merely U.K. forces, we may at some time be threatened on our and Turkey’s right flank and rear. This MEC would certainly offer a mutual defense arrangement for all, and maybe the only way to salvage the present situation in important Egypt.

General Bradley emphasized that whatever command organization is set up, the present method of sending U.S. supplies to Turkey must continue under present arrangements there, not through SACEUR or SACME, both in peace and in war.

Marshal Slim stated that whatever command Turkey is in, ME security is vital for Turkey’s continuing supply. He pointed out that if any Eastern Mediterranean country, such as Palestine, was taken by the enemy, enemy air bases there would very much complicate supply to Turkey.

General Lecheres agreed with all that had been said on the importance of the Middle East, especially the Suez Area, in Turkey’s defense of itself.

General Bradley suggested that many ideas had been advanced and that it might be a good idea to adjourn now, in order that the Prime Minister could discuss those ideas in private with his staff. He also made a suggestion, that, in order to consider all possible views, it would be desirable for a Turkish representative to report to the Standing Group in Washington for continuing work with them from day to day. He pointed out that the military representatives there were of about two star rank and suggested that maybe the Turkish Military Attaché could so serve.

Marshal Slim advised that the Turkish officer sent be the one who would eventually be the official military representative for Turkey, for continuity.

General Lecheres agreed on the necessity for taking time to study from all angles the complicated command aspects.

The Prime Minister concurred in postponing further discussions of such deep matters until this afternoon. He, however, needed some clarification after hearing the various points for and against Turkey joining either MEC or the European Command, and that this presented a unique arrangement which would include both NATO and Non-NATO forces in the MEC. This presented certain difficult legal and political points. He agreed on the need for defense in the Middle East.

Marshal Slim stated that we had no firm proposal on the MEC structure, but pointed to the necessity for setting up a general MEC first, and then at a later time discussing with Turkey the details of this structure and at the same time consider the complicated legal, political, etc. points which the Prime Minister had mentioned. He stated that he did feel that SACME must be under the Standing Group, which body would have a dual function, both in and out of NATO. Also, he pointed out that in a MEC there should be a military committee similar to that of NATO, with all member chiefs of staff represented. He emphasized the happy position of Turkey in such an arrangement, since it could play a leading part in each military committee. Of course, Turkey, since it would be providing most of the forces for MEC, would have the right to suitable rank in that command.

The Prime Minister then emphasized that two different problems, entirely apart in time and nature, were presented. He explained that the question of Turkey’s entry into NATO was different from that of setting up a pact in the Middle East. The first question was of immediate importance, but the question of Turkey in the Middle East could wait.

Marshal Slim agreed generally but stated that Turkey’s entry into NATO is an accomplished fact, and what remained was the question of how best Turkey could support the other nations in NATO. If for her own defense, Turkey can accomplish this best by retaining full NATO membership and at the same time support or join a MEC, this might be the best thing for Turkey and all of us.

The Prime Minister pursued the point. Turkey had already expressed approval of its part in guarding Middle East defense by some MEC. He believed that Turkey’s entrance into NATO had strengthened that organization, while on the other hand, by agreeing to set up a MEC Turkey had contributed to the peace of that area, because thus Turkey would be in the position of covering certain vital Arab parts of that area.

Marshal Slim agreed with the Prime Minister but reminded him of his statement that Turkey would protect some nations south of it, but he pointed out that if those countries were invaded it would be from the east, and therefore best protection for them would involve Turkish forces coming into that area south of Turkey or at least maintaining very close liaison. Therefore, it would be of great advantage to Turkey to be in a MEC, where Turkey could give its full views on the operation of that command. Also, the Prime Minister should consider the undoubted advantages to Turkey of being in NATO, which in no way affects the Middle East. Turkey would also be one of the main and founding members of this MEC.

The Prime Minister replied that Turkey’s position offered good defense for any aggression from the north. However, he agreed that Turkey must also consider attacks from the east which might surround her, and was therefore much interested in this MEC. Yet, this was a separate problem from Turk membership in NATO. Apart from that, Turkey could deal with setting up a MEC, and could go carefully into the matter of considering the contractual engagements of the Middle East Non-NATO nations.

Marshal Slim pointed out that military forces in MEC would be almost entirely from Turkey, U.K. and U.S. U.K. would furnish the bulk of the Navy, U.S. and U.K. the air, and Turkey, U.K and Commonwealth Nations the land forces. He reiterated that the best possible way to get started was to set up a major-nation committee (U.S., U.K., France and Turkey) and then invite other ME nations to join.

General Lecheres stated that he supported Slim’s points. There were many preliminary political approaches and démarches to consider with respect to a MEC, but militarily it is urgent that an efficient command be organized in the Middle East, in view of General Bradley’s strategic survey. He reemphasized the urgency and pointed out that, if we can all agree to a military solution, we would facilitate and accelerate the political solution which must follow.

The Prime Minister answered simply that we were discussing a project of interest to both NATO and Non-NATO nations in the Middle East and that the major nations specified by Marshal Slim were all members of NATO. Therefore, the immediate consideration should be separate from a MEC which would contain both NATO and Non-NATO nations. How did NATO plan to set up such an organization? Again he said that the setting up of a command in NATO involving only NATO nations was the immediate problem; the other was a long range problem.

Marshal Slim stated that he had been trying to say what the Prime Minister had just said but emphasized that it was urgent to set up a MEC. We major nations could set this up quickly with the NATO nations, plus Commonwealth, and then we could invite the others to join.

General Bradley suggested that a question of the Prime Minister was as yet unanswered: What did the other NATO nations think of setting up a MEC?

The Prime Minister explained that he had asked would the other NATO nations agree to this uniting in a MEC.

General Bradley explained that this facet was discussed at length at Ottawa. It had been realized by all there, especially the north flank NATO nations, that the problem presented many difficulties, but all agreed that the best way to protect the right flank of Europe was by a unified command in the Middle East. He suggested that he would be glad to discuss from a blackboard a tentative MEC which had been considered at Ottawa; again he emphasized that this would be on a basis of discussion only, with no agreement intended.

The Prime Minister agreed to General Bradley’s suggestion.

It was agreed to adjourn and to reconvene from 1700 to 1900 this evening.

The conference recessed at 1330.

Saturday Afternoon, 13 October

The meeting was called to order at 1700.

Present were those listed above.

General Bradley presented on the blackboard the proposed Command Organization and presented it strictly as a possible basis for discussion. He outlined the various aspects under which the Standing Group would act in a dual capacity, the fact that the Turks would be represented on both military committees, and the difficulties inherent to setting up an ideal solution.

The Foreign Minister stated that it was apparent that the principal difference between the two organizations outlined on the chart resides in the fact that, in its suggested Middle East arrangement, there is no higher political body similar to that in NATO. He stated his belief that all nations participating in such a defense arrangement would express the desire for a similar political body to be set up. He stated his belief that the sooner a command arrangement was set up the better, in view of the important advantage it presented to all concerned. He went on to state that this belief was based on the fact that this arrangement would have to include extra NATO as well as NATO countries. He then said that in view of the fact that the NATO Organization already existed, whereas the Middle East Command was only a project, it would be logical for Turkey, upon admission into NATO, to take her place within an existing Command Organization of NATO. Any other solution would cause Turkey to feel that she was being treated in a different manner.

General Bradley expressed appreciation of the expression of these views and realized the weaknesses of the proposal (no equivalent political body). He went on to explain the manner by which a solution might be arrived at by means of a Mediterranean Pact. He explained the reasons because of which, at this moment, the U.S. did not feel it desirable to participate in such an arrangement. He assured the Turks that no idea existed to give them any position different to that of any other country in view of their key position in the Organization.

He raised the point of the non-responsibility of other NATO nations in respect to the non-NATO countries of the Middle East. He touched on the solution of having the Commander of the Middle East wearing two hats and receiving his directives from the Standing Group for NATO matters and from the Middle East Standing Group for purely Middle East matters, the two Standing Groups comprising the same persons.

The Turks having stated that they would present their observations in a Memorandum,⁵ General Bradley stated he would be pleased to take these back and study them carefully during the preparation of the Staff Study.

The Turkish Prime Minister requested clarification on a sentence in the press communiqué with reference to the Athens Conference. The sentence was “Great progress has been made towards the integration of the Greek forces into NATO.” As Turkey is anxious to make progress in the same direction, he raised the question as how the result was obtained.

To refer back to a point raised in the morning, he wished to restate that Turkey considers that they are two separate problems: 1) The entrance of Turkey into NATO, and 2) The creation of a Middle East Command comprising NATO and non-NATO nations. He wished to consider these matters in greater detail as he felt there appeared on the part of the U.S., the U.K., and France a tendency to solve these two problems at the same time, whereas, he considered this should be kept separate.

He recognized the urgency of the defense of the Middle East. He stated that the rights and mutual obligations of Turkey and other countries should be clearly set forth before this organization was set up. He stated that the proposal for a Middle East Command arrangement tended to cause a dispersal of Turkish forces and to cause them to “slide” towards the Middle East. He repeated that he considered the integration of Turkey as the first step. He spoke about the key position of Turkey in the Middle East, which placed her in a position to be able to contribute all the more to the defense of the Middle East. He stated that in all collective military arrangements it should be presupposed that each member country should assure its own defense against aggression before expanding its possible frontiers with what forces might remain available. He stated the anomaly of the existence, in a Middle East Command, of non-belligerent nations, and of the difference in contributions and commitments between Turkey and these countries. He repeated that he had no intentions of trying to prove the uselessness of a Middle East Command and enumerated the general lines along which he thought that such a Command should be based; those nations which have already expressed willingness to join the Middle East Command should, as of now, determine the scope and nature of their contributions with regard to area commands and with regard to mutual obligations. He stated the possibility that Egypt might refuse to participate. If the U.S., the U.K. and France were to guarantee the Middle East, the result of this would be to eliminate the weakness which might exist on the southern flank of Turkey outside of her territory. He insisted especially on a guarantee from the U.S. Apparently, to return to the question of the integration of Turkey in the existing NATO Organization, he stated he believed Turkey should be under the command of SACEUR, because Turkey covers directly and indirectly the approaches to the Mediterranean. Turkey was the only nation in such a position as to be able to serve as a base for a counter-offensive against Russia via the Black Sea and the Danube. He pointed out that the Turko-Russian frontier of 2,200 kilometers was an important aspect, that being a neighbor of Russia, Turkey was at the start of the shortest route toward Russian sources of oil, her industry and her raw materials. He stated that Turkey was an element of the defense of Europe against Russia. He felt that if Turkey was separate from Europe, her position in relationship to Europe would be similar to that of the European Command in relationship to the Atlantic Command and that this was not in conformity with realities.

He then explained that he believed that the shifting of the frontier of SACEUR to include Turkey would not create unwieldiness, in view of the greater improvement of modern communications.

He summed up by repeating the separate nature of the two problems and by stating that he felt that the problem of the integration of Turkey into NATO should take precedence.

He stated that by the rapid solution of this problem Turkey would be in an equal position to that of the other nations desiring to create a Middle East Command.

In connection with the second problem (creation of a Middle East Command) he repeated that the Turkish Government had proved the great importance they attached to this question by declaring formally their agreement in principle to the creation of a Middle East Command in which Turkey would participate as a founding member.

He felt it important to complete these problems separately but felt that time could be saved by broaching the preliminaries of the solution of the second problem at the same time as the first.

General Bradley stated that it was not possible to try to give an answer to all the views that had been expressed. The most important objective had been for us to obtain these views, but would comment briefly on some of these questions.

With reference to the question raised on the communiqué about Athens, General Bradley made the point that he felt that great progress had been accomplished here after this exchange of views. He further stated that he doubted all agree as to the separate nature of the two problems, none of them depended on the ratification by Parliament, which he thought was well under way. (?)

With regard to reference of dispersal of Turkish forces he stated that such a dispersal was not contemplated but that the forces of Turkey in Turkey would need coordination with those of other areas as well as with Naval and Air Force which might have to move in and out of the area.

With reference to the difficulties concerning an additional defense area, he stated that this did not alter in any way the military contributions which the U.S. might make in this area. General Bradley said that both the Departments of State and Defense were agreed that we could operate militarily in this area under a common arrangement as outlined.

The question of the necessity of France, the U.K. and especially the U.S. insuring the security of the Middle East area, he stated that no nation or group of nations could insure the security of other areas, that it was already difficult to insure one’s own defense against air attack. It was necessary for us to study the arguments advanced on Command structure while preparing the document. It was true that Commands are set up on the basis of structural areas but, in all cases, it was necessary to have the closest possible liaison with adjoining Commands. It is true that the North Atlantic area is a large one but it is nearly entirely Naval and it is difficult to separate functional responsibilities in the organization routing and protection of convoys in the Atlantic. He repeated his assurance to the Turks that they should have a fully equal position in any agreed Command structure, stated the preparation of any document of this nature is the mission of the Standing Group which was anxious to get the Turkish views as soon as possible as it takes time to get agreement by 14 people.

General Bradley then repeated and expanded upon General Eisenhower’s Memorandum⁶ and said it would also have to be taken into account in the preparation of the document.

He realized the important of the two legal questions raised in respect to the Middle East Command, i.e.: The responsibility of other NATO nations in the case of a direct attack against Turkey as well as the question of the responsibility of NATO nations in case of attack against non-NATO Middle East countries.

It appeared to General Bradley that we had agreed on two points: 1) the hope of a prompt ratification of the entrance of Greece and Turkey and, 2) a general agreement on the principles of a Middle East Command, this being the object of a necessary and very important study. This study would include the legal questions which had been raised which was partly military and to a large extent political. Progress had been made in this Conference toward the integration of Turkey into NATO.

Field Marshal Slim first assured Turkey it was never the intention of the U.K. that Turkey should be in NATO except as a full, complete and co-equal member, nor was it the idea of having Turkey in the Middle East Command until she were a full member of NATO. He agreed entirely on behalf of his country and his colleagues on the necessity of setting up some Middle East Command as soon as possible. He believed that such an organization would be as much in the interests of Turkey as of the other nations. All efforts of the Standing Group have been directed toward this, in order to see how best Turkey could be fitted into a general defense plan. He quoted from General Eisenhower’s Memorandum, which pointed out the great importance of close coordination between SHAPE and the Middle East. He went on to say with regards to political control of the Middle East Command that Turkey be represented on the Council of the Military Committee of Chiefs of Staff, who would thus participate in the political and military directives to the Standing Group. If it were possible (and he quoted General Bradley) to have the Middle East under the Middle East Standing Group, which is equal to the NATO Standing Group, Turkey would be in full control of the Middle East Command.

He stated that the degree of control exercised by Turkey would be equal to that of the U.S., the U.K. and France, with the exception of the Standing Group. He said we cannot contemplate the Middle East Command without Turkey in the Middle East. If Turkey were in the European Command she would be one of many, but if she were in the Middle East she would be one of the most important nations in NATO. But he agreed with General Bradley that these exchanges of views had been satisfactory.

General Lecheres agreed with the U.S. and U.K. about the important progress accomplished in this Conference. France desires Turkey in NATO as soon as possible, as a full member of the first importance, independent of any Command arangement which might be agreed to. He noted with interest the importance attached to the Middle East Command and stated that this point of view was the same as that of France.

He felt it essential to make use of the proposal advanced by General Bradley as a means of supporting a quick solution, i.e.: The proposal that the Standing Group, plus a Turkish representative, undertake to study the Command of the Middle East, giving to this study the scope that it deserves. The importance of coordinating with SACEUR would allow us to arrive at a solution which could satisfy the legitimate preoccupation expressed by the Prime Minister.

A general discussion ensued in which it was decided to defer the questions of Item 6 until Sunday. With regards to the press communiqué it was decided that the Turkish Government would prepare the communiqué for the approval of the others. It was agreed that the communiqué register the fact that important progress had been realized in connection with the integration of Turkey into NATO.

The meeting was adjourned at 8:35 p. m.

Sunday Morning, 14 October

The meeting was reconvened at 1130 hours.

Present were those listed above.

Item 6—Equipment for Turkey.

General Bradley quoted the Memorandum distributed by Turkey the night before. He stated that supplies to Turkey would be continued on the same basis by the same method and that the Mission would be maintained under NATO regardless of Command arrangements. He referred to the equipment which so far had been supplied to Turkey as “capital”, that is, initial equipment for new forces. The rate of supply we try to maintain depended on: 1) forces available to receive and use, and 2) the ability to get the necessary funds from Congress. As to the rate of production, he touched on certain categories of equipment as being replacement and maintenance rather than initial. He referred to hopes expressed by Congress that all our Allies will soon be able to undertake the problem of maintenance and spare parts, thus relieving our own industries of this burden. He made reference, also, to the ammunition problem, in which Turkey has already begun to implement the facilities of manufacture. He referred to the role of the nation in advising us on Turkey’s requirements. He referred to the 1952–1953 programs, transmitted to Washington, and their objective as being the increase of efficiency of the Turkish Forces. An important point was to assure Turkey the U.S. had no idea of changing its method of supplying equipment.

General Lecheres had little to add. He understood the anxiety of Turkey over external aid, all the more so because France was and still is in the same situation. He referred to General Bradley and stated that the entrance of Turkey will bring clarification, in view of the representation of Turkey on the D.P.B., F.E.B., etc.

Field Marshal Slim stated that the U.K. is already supplying many other nations of the Dominions and others in the world. In the Middle East area they are supplying all the equipment to Iraq, Trans-Jordan and certain quantities to Egypt. When the Middle East Command will have been set up the deliveries will be increased. If Egypt comes in on a cooperation basis deliveries to the Egyptian Army and Air Force will be increased.

With regards to Turkey the important objective is to see to it that full equipment from the U.S. sources go to the Turkish forces as quickly as possible. He felt that Turkish representation in the D.P.B., and F.E.B. and other NATO bodies would receive the full sympathy of the U.K.

The Prime Minister thanked General Bradley for the declarations, as well as Field Marshal Slim, and stated the important advantages derived from receiving arms and equipment for the Forces. He stated his belief that Aid to Turkey has been well placed. He made compliments to General Arnold and the Ambassador. He touched on economic aid from the U.S. and its influence on economic recovery. He referred to General Lecheres and agreed with what he said. He stated Turkey is in the position of cooperating with the U.S., the U.K. and France in the maintenance of democratic ideals and our common civilization. He stated he was slightly embarrassed (his Memorandum) to appear to be asking for so much, but has no wish to appear to be driving a bargain. Quotes “Turkish self-respect is equal to that of all other nations.” Took consolation in the fact that the arming of Turkish forces was in the interest of all nations. Stated then that Turkey has 1½ million fully trained Reserves. Active forces actually in service and also fully trained amount to more than 300,000. The number of officers on active service is 30,000, and Turkey has more than 70,000 Reserve officers. From the above there is, in addition, the geographic situation of Turkey to consider, with great capacity of Turkey to defend the right flank of NATO as well as Arab States and the Middle East, as is obvious. In addition, points out the importance of the strength of Turkey to the defense against possible aggression against the Balkans as well as being a deterrent to aggression against the Balkans. Also points out the possibility of social and political development of the people of Turkey. Points out that Turkey is in a position such as to constitute defense against attack from the north as well as defense against the spreading of aggression to the Mediterranean. As a result of her special situation Turkey has been forced to participate in various wars in this area at the price of many sacrifices. With reference to possible backward aspects of Turkey’s economy, including even aspects of misery and poverty, he stated this was not due to the nature of the Turkish people but to her geographic situation and her history.

He stated that evidence of this was available in the fact that Turkey spent more than 50% of her budget on military expenditures. In clarification of this he stated that the Defense Budget equaled 580 million Turkish Lira. This figure equals 40% of the total budget. One must consider, however, the expenditure of 200 million T.L. by other Government Departments for defense (this position can be given in detail) therefore, total defense expenditures amounted to 780 million T.L., i.e.: 50% of the budget. He did not believe any other country has spent so large a proportion of its budget in this manner. He stated that when all other countries demobilized and went on a peace-time footing, Turkey continued her military expenditures. The above are the reasons for the lack of economic development comparable to that of other countries.

He expressed gratitude for Marshall Aid but stated that Turkey only receives 1.1% of total Marshall Aid.

Expressed the desire to repeat the fact that any aid to Turkey in view of her capacity, her qualifications, and her military potential were more important than aid to be given to any other country. With reference to his Memorandum he believed that 30–35 Divisions completely and fully equipped would place Turkey in the position of being able to alleviate the burden of the G.P. [Great Powers?] nations as well as to be able to contribute materially to the peace of the world.

He said that having discussed the question of peace in the Middle Eastern area and the Arab countries, if one were to suppose that Turkey did not exist, it would be easy to see that these countries would now be behind the Iron Curtain. He stated that Turkey would contribute with great enthusiasm as a founding member of the Middle East Command. If this fully equipped force existed in Turkey today, the security of the Middle East area would be insured. The situation on the eastern flank of Turkey and among the Arab countries in Turkey’s rear is obvious to all. Do not think it necessary to comment on the Iranian situation. Stated that the Arab countries were divided and without unity, and that their total contribution should they get together would be of the order of 2 or 3 Divisions.

In conclusion, a fully armed and equipped Turkey would not only be effective in the defense of the Middle East but would also be an element in the political security of that area. In making a request for equipment and arms to increase the Turkish forces, we do not only wish to strengthen ourselves but try to be in such a position as to make an increase in the contribution to the general security of all. A strong Turkey would always be an important element of consideration, should Russia contemplate aggression.

Only two points remain: (1) Turkey is inhabited by people anxious to defend themselves by force against aggression and to subdue the aggressor, and 2) while anxious to subdue the aggressor, Turkey is very proud to cooperate with NATO where the U.S., the U.K. and France stand for the highest ideals of democracy and the defense of the liberties of nations and peoples.

In closing Item 6 he requested all Generals to take his views into consideration, and repeated the capabilities and talents of Turkey, as well as the contribution to be made to the common cause. He stated that if a little aid, much aid, or no aid at all were forthcoming, Turkey would not falter in her course.

Field Marshal Slim said we appreciate and value the strength, determination, resources and potentialities of Turkey. He expressed welcome to NATO.

General Lecheres stated the importance of the entrance of Turkey into NATO, the fact that we had here been able to define the work which must, most urgently, be undertaken in order to arrive at a decision.

General Bradley said he did not wish to talk further, felt that he had said enough for the Turks to realize the high regard of the U.S. He felt it was a good thing to have the Turks statements in our notes, so that all people working on the study could be apprised of them. The Turkish Prime Minister expressed thanks to the 3 governments for sending their highest military representatives. [Thought] this was a good sign for the security of Turkey.

After this exchange of compliments the meeting was closed and a sub-committee convened to consider the communiqué.⁷

1. The source text does not indicate the author of this document, the date on which it was drafted, whether the minutes were formal or informal, or whether they were the agreed record or simply a U.S. draft.
2. For documentation on bilateral pacts between the United States and the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia, see vol. vi, pt. 1, pp. 132 ff.
3. For documentation on the Inter-American Defense Board, see vol. ii, pp. 970 ff.
4. For documentation on the Canada–U.S. Regional Planning Group, see ibid., pp. 870 ff.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. Not found in Department of State files.
7. On October 15, the Turkish Government issued a communiqué which stated that the conversations had resulted in a “complete identity of views”; that, in view of the fact that the security of the Middle East was a matter of common concern, it had been considered necessary and useful that a Middle East Command be established; that the Turkish Government had “recognized in principle the value of such a Command and had of its own accord intimated its views to the Governments concerned”; and that a Turkish military mission headed by a general would visit Washington. Before departing for Paris that day, Generals Bradley and Lecheres and Field Marshal Slim, issued a statement endorsing the Turkish communiqué. For further information on the conference, see telegram Depto 537 from London, October 31, in vol. iii, pt. 1, p. 602.