480.008/10–1051
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)
| Participants: | M. Jean Pierre Benard, First Secretary of French Embassy |
| Mr. S. K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director of NE | |
| Mr. George Emery, S/ISA |
M. Benard called at his request this afternoon to inform the Department of France’s reactions to the proposals Mr. Lewis Jones had submitted to M. Daridan in mid August regarding arms supplies to the Arab States and Israel.1 M. Benard said that the French Government agreed to the general principles and appreciated the motives of the United States in making the suggestions to enable the countries in the Near East to become stronger. He said that France felt the program should be carried out. Furthermore, France, from its experience in Syria and Lebanon, believed that the well regulated supply of arms in the area contributed to the integrity and independence of the area.
His comments on the specific paragraphs of the August memorandum were as follows:
Para B–5. France agrees to the principle that supplies should be made available on the basis of mutual interest. However, France does not believe political prices should be placed on supplies. Commitments may cause difficulties. France believes that we should be cautious in trying to obtain specific quid pro quos.
Para B–8. Detailed requirements imposed on the supply of arms might provide difficulties.
[Page 208]Para B–13. France concurs. Our individual countries benefits should not be known. Implementation should be on a bilateral basis. It should not appear that shipments of arms are coordinated.
With regard to the tripartite organization, M. Benard said that France believed it should be an advisory group and not an executive board with power to make decisions. The organization should conduct its business with as little disclosure of its business as possible. It should not act as a “red tape” organization which would delay the implementation of arms policies. The organization should be small. It might be composed of three military officers and three political officers. Since it would presumably be located in Washington, the three military officers might well come from the staff of the Standing Group and the political officers from the State Department and British and French Embassies.
With regard to the operation of the organization, M. Benard felt that proposed arms contracts should be placed before the group which would then pass or reject them. The tripartite group should not take any retroactive action except in extreme cases or where political conditions had changed radically.
M. Benard referred to the Anglo-French non-substitution agreement of 1945. Nothing done by the Tripartite arms organization group should give rise to the suspicion that the non-substitution agreement was being changed. I said this was a matter between the United Kingdom and France. We were interested in getting the Tripartite machinery working.