780.5/10–551
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) and the Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Dorsz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)1
Subject: Points for Talks with General Bradley, October 5, 1951, 12:15 p. m.2
1. Would General Bradley be willing for a State Department Representative to Accompany Him?—
The United States Ambassadors at Ankara and Cairo must be the principal political representatives in the talks which will be held with Turkey and which may be held with Egypt. The State Department representative would provide background information and assistance to Ambassador Wadsworth and Ambassador Caffery and might be able to answer questions of General Bradley’s staff. The British are sending to Ankara their Egyptian expert—the head of the African Department of the Foreign Office. The French also contemplate sending advisors from their Foreign Office: we do not know at what level.
2. Visit to Egypt—
The political approach may have to be made to Egypt before or during the visit of the General to Turkey. If the Egyptians respond favorably to the political approaches, it might be most helpful for the three Generals to visit Egypt after Turkey. However, this must [Page 204] depend upon developments in Egypt and upon the recommendations which are made by the Ambassadors in Egypt.
3. Comparison Between Egypt and Iran—
The situation in Egypt on the surface is calm but this calm is illusory. The Egyptians are fully aware of Iran’s success vis-à-vis the British.3 Abrogation of the 1936 Treaty4 could touch off the powder keg in Egypt and the position of the British and other foreigners would become most difficult. There is much comment in the Egyptian press and elsewhere regarding possible measures against the British should the Treaty be abrogated. We must act as soon as possible
4. New Deal for Egypt in MEC—
If MEC is to be accepted by Egypt, the United States, UK and France must make a genuine effort to make the Egyptians feel that they are given a genuinely New Deal and that they will henceforward be treated as equals. Already there is some evidence that the British Chiefs of Staff are thinking in terms of “whittling down” the proposals worked out with Defense and State early last month.5 General Bradley will have to check efforts of this kind on the part of the British and remind them that the New Deal must not be vitiated by wishful thinking.
5. Turkish Preoccupation With Eisenhower Command—
General Bradley should be reminded of the symbolic importance to the Turks of falling under the Eisenhower Command. Under present plans Turkey would be the only NATO country not falling under that Command and it may be very difficult for the Government to accept an important role in the Middle East Command without being able to show to the Turkish people that it is likewise participating in NATO in the same manner as all other NATO countries.
6. NATO Status Unconditional—
The Turkish press and Turkish public opinion are sensitive to suggestions that Turkey’s formal admission to NATO is contingent upon its willingness to participate in the Middle East Command. Extreme care should be taken to make clear that Turkey’s admission to NATO is not conditional, but that the urgency of the Egyptian problem impels the countries interested in the security of the Middle East to move ahead rapidly in setting up a Middle East Command.
[Page 205]7. Turks Collaborators—
The Turks should be made to feel that they are collaborators with us (and the British and French) in working out the details of the Command. They feel that they have considerable to offer, not only militarily but through their own experience in dealing with Middle Eastern countries.
8. Turkey and the Middle East Standing Group—
Turkey will undoubtedly seek membership on the Middle East Standing Group as the one country in that area which is contributing strength to the Command. The presence on the proposed Standing Group of France, which is contributing virtually no strength, will make it difficult for the Turks for internal political reasons to accept a lesser status in the Command. Therefore, good sound practical reasons must be advanced as to why the Middle East Standing Group should comprise only the United States, the United Kingdom and France.
9. British Supreme Commander—
The Turks will not welcome the idea of a British Supreme Commander. They would prefer an American Supreme Commander. Again the problem is one of convincing them of the logic and practicability of a British Commander.
10 Formal Understanding Re MEC Must Await Formal NATO Status—
The Turks will undoubtedly be unwilling to enter into any formal understandings on a Middle East Command until their inclusion in NATO has been formalized.
11. Egypt and Turkey Equal in MEC—
Ancient associations and rivalries will make Egypt unwilling to accept a status inferior to that of Turkey in MEC (see paragraph 8 above). This is a sound reason against British suggestion transmitted to Admiral Wright this morning. EUR has a number of other reasons against the British proposal.
12. Press Release—
A Department of Defense release on Bradley’s visit is now needed in view of press reports from London and Paris. We would like to have this cleared with the Department before it is issued.
- Drafted by Stabler of NE and Moore of GTI.↩
- No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.↩
- Regarding the Iranian situation, see p. 544.↩
- For documentation on the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the 1936 Treaty regarding British rights at Suez, see pp. 343 ff.↩
- The reference proposals are contained in telegram 339, to the Embassy in Egypt, September 8, p. 181.↩