782.5/6–451
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Turkish Affairs (Moore)1
Subject: Conversation with Ambassador Erkin.
| Participants: | Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, Turkish Ambassador. |
| Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA. | |
| Mr. C. Robert Moore, GTI. |
Problem: Report by Ambassador Erkin of his conversations in Ankara on security and other problems of mutual interest.
Action Required: None.
Ambassador Erkin, having returned several days ago from Turkey, called on Mr. McGhee to tell him of his conversations in Ankara with the Turkish President2 and others on several subjects of mutual interest.
[Page 1170]1. Security Commitment Question:
The Ambassador mentioned that his conferences in Ankara had been concluded and he had left for Istanbul before the Turkish Government had been informed that the US Government favored additional security arrangements for Turkey. He expressed pleasure at the development and at the timing inasmuch as he had been predicting such a development to his colleagues only a few days before.3
The Ambassador commented that on the day of his arrival in Ankara he had been received by President Bayar. The President had asked him to relate the international developments which had taken place since 1945 with particular emphasis on security arrangements. This the Ambassador had done in an expose which the President found very satisfactory but which led the latter to the principal point—despite all of these developments Turkey did not have any contractual assurances to protect its own security. The President had then shown the Ambassador a letter he had received from Zekeriya Sertel, who with his wife is very well known for his pro-Communist sympathies. In this letter, which advanced very strong arguments in favor of a policy of neutrality by Turkey, Sertel cleverly avoided an approach to the problem that could be clearly identified with the Communist line. His was the approach of a Turkish patriot, an approach that would inevitably appeal to many segments of public opinion, emphasis being placed on the inability of Turkey to count on its Western allies to protect its security. The President expressed the fear that, unless some definite action were taken soon to remove Turkish suspicions as to the support of the US and the other countries, Turkish public opinion would become more and more susceptible to the Sertel type of propaganda, particularly as it would be propounded on a nationalist basis and not on a pro-Communist basis. The Ambassador reiterated that official government circles would not be swayed by this type of propaganda but that less well informed elements might be impressed by it. The President had thus wanted him, upon his return to Washington, to inform us of this situation and to stress the importance of an early decision being reached on the security commitment question.
The Ambassador, adverting to this Government’s favorable decision on further security arrangements, referred to the unfortunate impression that has been created in Turkey during the past several weeks by press reports from London and particularly by a BBC broadcast to Bulgaria which indicated that the British do not favor the further extension of the North Atlantic Pact. Mr. McGhee warned against drawing conclusions from such reports, stressing that [Page 1171] the final governmental decision is the important factor. The Ambassador commented that even though the decision should be favorable, the Turkish people had lost a great deal of their earlier enthusiasm for inclusion in NATO and emphasized that the longer the uncertainty of inclusion continued the less satisfied they would be with the final outcome. He attributed this to several factors—one, the Turks have no confidence in the strength or determination of the European NATO countries, and, second, their national pride is being wounded by the indications that the other NATO countries are unwilling to admit the Turks to equal partnership in the NATO. He therefore expressed the hope that some decision would be forthcoming very soon and sought at some length to obtain an indication of the present views of the other NATO countries. Mr. McGhee commented that he was very hopeful of the outcome and that he knew the problem was being discussed in the Council of Deputies, although he did not know just where matters stood at the moment. He indicated in addition that it would not be appropriate for him to comment on the views of the other countries. The Ambassador could be assured, however, that we, too, were desirous of an early decision.
2. US Economic and Military Aid:
The Ambassador made clear that the ECA–Turkish Government relationship was not on a very satisfactory basis at the present time. He cited several examples, presumably quoting President Bayar, of ECA actions that had created a very bad impression: (a) a cut in ECA aid to Turkey because the Turkish Government had not imposed taxes on agricultural incomes, (b) ECA insistence that interest rates of Turkish banks not be lowered, a move which President Bayar had favored as a former banker and economist whose views should carry some weight, (c) a demand made by an ECA official that control of the Water Works Organization be transferred to the Eti Bank or ECA funds for irrigation projects would not be forthcoming. When asked by Mr. McGhee if the criticism had been directed at Mr. Dorr specifically or was directed primarily at ECA, the Ambassador said that no names had been mentioned. He had told the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that Mr. Dorr enjoyed the confidence of the State Department and ECA, and the Prime Minister indicated that the Turkish Government would of course work with him. The Ambassador implied, however, that the Government was very much concerned over the control which relatively minor ECA officials appeared to have over the economic life of Turkey and the fact that ECA had the final decision on matters where there was a difference in view between the Turkish Government and ECA.
Mr. McGhee said that he was of course disturbed to learn of this situation, that a program such as the ECA program should produce [Page 1172] good relations between our two countries, rather than have the opposite effect. He would want to look into the matter further. He made quite clear, however, with respect to the volume of ECA aid, that there were many factors that led to the determination of the amount of ECA aid that could be made available to Turkey this year. There was no cut in aid because of the tax situation. There was, naturally, a real concern that all appropriate measures should be taken to avoid a harmful inflation in Turkey. This was a problem which ECA, consistent with its responsibilities under the ECA Act, would undoubtedly feel it should try to work out with the Turkish Government.
The Ambassador then commented on the inadequacy of our military aid to Turkey. Mr. McGhee expressed surprise, indicating he felt that we had been supplying a very substantial amount of equipment to Turkey and that the program had been a very satisfactory one. The Ambassador left with him a report by General Yamut, Turkish Chief of Staff, showing in chart form some of the major deficiencies which Mr. McGhee said he would study with interest.4 The Ambassador referred to a comment by Ambassador Wadsworth that a limiting factor in the volume of military aid to Turkey was Turkey’s ability to absorb the equipment. Turkey, in the event of an aggression, would need to have available the maximum amount of equipment, not just equipment which it was able to put to effective use during the “cold war” period, and Ambassador Erkin urged that we increase and speed up our aid.
In taking his leave, the Ambassador stated that military aid matters had also come under the competence of the Foreign Minister and that he might therefore be discussing various aspects of this program with Mr. McGhee in the future.
- Drafted by Moore, GTI.↩
- Celâl Bayar.↩
- For documentation regarding the admission of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩