711.56386A/1–2351: Telegram
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State
469. Part 1 of 2.1 Wheel of fortune re DAF has spun again and stopped on new number.
Whereas originally had been idea FinMin go personally Riyadh discuss DAF with King, seems he took advantage passage Fuad Hamza through Jidda last week (he had been out of country some 8 months for health reasons) to take strong line re desirability reaching DAF agreement and turned over to Hamza basic documentation which we had furnished at his request (Embtel 441, January 122). His intervention seems to have been effective because on occasion presentation Admiral Carney to King January 193 latter remarked Fuad and Khaliq Gargoni would be available for any discussions and they called on me for final audience that night to discuss situation.
Fuad was friendly and businesslike. He asked me review status negotiations and inquired if there had been “difficulties”. Gave objective account of talks and said present situation was that full report including YY draft had been sent Washington for review. Re “difficulties” negotiations had not been such as result in actual impasse on any one point but trend had been unsatisfactory for 2 principal reasons: first was that YY had insisted on negotiating not on basis of our carefully prepared draft but of hastily improvised suggestions which were subject constant change with result we found ourselves going in circles rather than on road to agreement. Second was that, whereas we had been prepared to do anything reasonable to meet Saudi problem re [Page 1026] sovereignty, Saudi negotiators had taken sufficient cognizance of fact DAF was primarily of interest to US as military installation. This fact had to be faced squarely as basis for productive negotiations.
Fuad said was in entire agreement re necessity recognizing military character of DAF; in fact it was in interest of SAG that US should have military strength in SA. Re sovereignty SA apprehensions re unfavorable repercussions were very real, particularly re neighboring Arab states. In circumstances he expressed view we were in basic accord re substance and that agreement should be reached without undue difficulty.
Re procedure, approach which he would have suggested if he had been here at beginning negotiations would have been use existing agreement as basis and add, delete or modify as required. He felt strongly we should now proceed that manner.
He also recommended agreements should make specific stipulation re rights to be given in time of peace, emergency and war. In time war all SA would be available to US (Khalid Bey confirmed this as having been assured by King himself) but would be preferable avoid seeming become too deeply entrenched in time peace. It should also be made clear that rights given US would not be extended to forces of some other country (he mentioned Israel specifically in this connection).
I replied that, re procedure, our draft had in fact been based on existing agreement and felt should constitute good negotiating basis. Furthermore my instructions were prepared from that angle. However when Fuad (who of course had been Saudi negotiator in drafting existing agreement) insisted strongly on using existing document as basis I did not feel desirable become involved in wrangle and said would submit idea to my government. Furthermore, although I did not so admit to Fuad, there is a certain logic to his suggestion which is difficult refute.
Re distinguishing between peace, emergency and war I noted forseeable difficulty in making determination of state of emergency. This was type of situation which presented problem re definition and which also could present difficulties of political nature in varying situations. As matter of fact state of emergency actually existed at moment as indicated by President’s proclamation. Fuad agreed such was in fact case and suggested that proclamation by President could be taken as factor in defining state of emergency.
Re rights in time war I observed difficult foresee developments with sufficient clarity to make specific provisions but possible some general reference in principle might be made paving way for extension additional rights in time war. Fuad indicated agreement. I felt advisable tread very carefully here since we could easily become involved in discussion leading to renewal of old demand for treaty of alliance or commitment of similar character.
- Part 2 of this telegram, not printed, recommended that the negotiators be authorized to accept the proposal to use the existing agreement as a basis for negotiating and that the Department of State send specific instructions on proposals to differentiate between rights to be given in time of peace, emergency, and war (711.56386A/1–2351).↩
- Ante, p. 1021.↩
- See telegram 452, January 16, from Jidda, supra.↩