711.56386A/1–1251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State

secret

441. Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, FinMin, asked me call on him yesterday re DAF negotiations situation. Said when he was in Riyadh during first part of negotiations1 he was told everything going well but he had recently heard difficulties encountered. Could I tell him what had happened?

I gave him résumé of developments in Riyadh which he frequently interrupted by interjections re short-sightedness of those who did not understand … desirability of US having military stake in SA and harmful advice being given King by foreign “boarders” at court who more interested promoting personal interests than those of SA. In particular FinMin poo-hooed idea of domestic reaction against agreement.

At conclusion of conversation FinMin said he felt so strongly on subject that considered imperative he go Riyadh to discuss personally with King in endeavor effect return more realistic approach. Said it should be frankly acknowledged that US military installation at DAF was in interest both countries and he felt should use his influence to counteract bad advice being given King. Specifically he asked to be given for his information copies of our proposal of YY’s recent counterdraft2 when translation completed, together with compromise [Page 1022] draft of first articles of agreement worked out during earlier phase negotiations.

Despite unorthodox nature this suggestion, I did not feel advisable rebuff FinMin, particularly bearing in mind his personal power second only that of King and that lines of authority here mean relatively little. I accordingly told FinMin would be glad furnish documents in question on understanding that it was at his request and that he would make this clear to King so I would not be placed in position of having acted improperly. FinMin smiled indulgently and said to leave matter entirely to him. He would so arrange that his visit Riyadh would appear to be for other purposes and next thing I could expect to hear on matter would be message from King extending invitation to return Riyadh for further discussion.

I cannot estimate to what extent FinMin’s professions of willingness help may only reflect enthusiasm of moment and well known antipathy for YY but, if he carries through as says he intends, his intervention may facilitate getting back to more practical approach. Translation of YY’s redraft (Dhahran telegram 155, January 5) not yet completed but from what I have seen it appears unacceptable document for use as basis for negotiations and obvious next move would have to be insistence on getting back to fundamentals. If FinMin can turn trick on his own initiative, it may spare us necessity of forcing issue ourselves. Present situation is that translation of YY’s redraft being completed for transmission first available pouch. Will also wire summary and comments.

Hare
  1. For information on the first part of the negotiations, see footnote 4, p. 1017.
  2. In telegram 155 from Dhahran, January 5, Hare informed the Department of State of a redraft of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement given him by Yusef Yassin. He reported that Yassin’s “approach was to disregard practically everything that had been done and said during past three weeks and to dash off new draft articles on the spot.” The Ambassador transmitted a translation of Yassin’s draft as an enclosure to despatch 221 from Jidda, January 13. Despatch 224 from Jidda, January 31, contained Hare’s comments on the Yassin draft. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56386A.