683.84A/12–2751: Telegram
The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State 1
627. Emb finds Deptel 454 of Dec 192 re Huleh controversy very helpful, particularly on fol points:
1. Recommendation that Syrians not react unduly to Israel pronouncements making it appear special understandings have been worked out with Riley. In this connection Emb has lost no opportunity to impress Israel auths with harmful effect on relations with Arab countries of statements in Knesset debates, press and radio to above effect. Eban, Kollek and various influential visitors from US agree Israel Govt and public shld become more sensitive to Arab opinion, and avoid conduct that needlessly worsens relations.
2. Dept’s point that Riley as rep UN auth, and not Israel or Syria, is judge of whether there has been compliance with SC res or other UN mandates. Unilateral interpretations and allegations of noncompliance have contributed to present unsatisfactory state of affairs. [Page 974] Believe it necessary that UN auths call their own score re compliance, and insist that even acknowledged instances of noncompliance still do not justify refusal to participate in MAC mtgs.
3. Importance of encouraging parties to demonstrate sincere desire settle problems at MAC level or through other direct negots.
Advantage is being taken of Eban’s presence to discuss desirability of review of policy toward Arab countries and questions in dispute. He admits that position taken heretofore has been sterile and that new approach is needed to inspire Arab confidence and cooperation. It was mentioned that repeatedly Israel has deprived itself of political advantages from actual or proposed concessions by the manner in which they were announced. Cited as example cessation of work on Huleh project after Knesset debate which rendered stoppage meaningless and served only to increase Syrian irritation.
Also mentioned Syrian reaction to detailed list of reservations which destroyed political effect of otherwise constructive announcement of willingness consider compensation apart from general peace settlement. He readily conceded undesirability of attempting to link compensation of Pal refugees for lands abandoned with any question of claims against Arab Govts.
Eban commented also on matter which has long concerned Emb, namely negative attitude of Israel Govt and public toward important objective of seeking improve Arab-Israel relations by direct negots. Altho he considers lack of interest due more to discouragement than failure to appreciate importance of such improvement, he agrees with Emb that sustained psychological approach by Israel, designed to influence Arab thinking shld be tried. It cld do no harm and might conceivably prepare way for real progress later. At least such effort wld involve avoidance of harmful actions and pronouncements and substitute constructive program. It is believed we shld encourage efforts to change present negative attitude of both sides but at same time avoid pressing for concessions especially during time when govts concerned will not dare enter into direct negots. We shld avoid also encouraging either party to expect unrealistic concessions (see Embtel 2, July 3).3
Seriousness of recent financial crisis has high-lighted for Israelis desirability of improving relations with neighbors, lessening defense burden and reestablishing normal trade. For this reason, and because number of Congressional and other Amer visitors have recently stressed to Israelis importance to Israel and US of improved Arab-Israel relations, direct negots at this time might find Israelis more receptive than heretofore to realistic Arab proposals. Emb does not underestimate depth of feeling behind Arab reluctance negotiate with [Page 975] Israel, but if Eban succeeds in effecting change in Israel tactics, it is hoped Arabs will respond in manner to make some real progress possible.