Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

780.5/9–1151

Position Paper Drafted in the Department of Defense¹

top secret

[Washington, September 1951.]

Three Power Action Regarding an Allied Middle East Command

the problem

To reach agreement with the French and the British prior to the Ottawa Council meeting on the actions to be taken to develop an Allied Command in the Middle East.

united states objectives

1. The Three Powers should reach firm agreement at the tripartite conversations in Washington on the broad principle that they will organize an integrated Allied Command in the Middle East with Turkish participation, and in which they will seek to secure Egyptian participation. Such action to begin upon the invitation to Turkey to join NATO.

2. The United States is basically opposed to establishing any formal political association between the countries participating in an Allied Middle East Command. The United States seeks only the improvement of military defense arrangements. In the event that some political structure in the Middle East might have to be agreed to as a condition to successful arrangements, the development of such a structure, including its relationship to NATO, should not prevent reaching early military recommendations as to the command relationship between NATO and such a Middle East Allied Command.

3. The United States is agreeable to a British officer’s being appointed as the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East.

4. Those aspects of the higher military direction for the Allied Middle East Command which relate to the defense of Turkey will primarily be the concern of NATO.

5. At the Ottawa meeting the Three Powers will simply inform the Council of their intention to seek an harmonious defense arrangement in the Middle East with the countries concerned. There should be no conclusive action on this matter in the Council.

6. Following Ottawa the matter of forming a Middle East Command and its relationship to NATO would be discussed as soon as possible initially with the Turkish and Egyptian Governments, and, at a later stage, with other interested governments. A representative of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting in behalf of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, United Kingdom and France, would carry out the initial discussions as arranged by diplomatic representatives.

7. The United States military representative would also invite representatives of the Turkish and Egyptian Governments to participate in discussions with the North Atlantic Treaty Standing Group on these matters with the objective of agreeing to a Middle East Command and of recommending at the next NATO Military Committee meeting a relationship between NATO and an Allied Middle East Command.

8. As soon as consultations with Turkey and Egypt have reached the stage where public announcement would not be prejudicial to negotiations, a public statement regarding the command structure, including the nationality of SACME, should be made.

9. For reasons of military necessity it is the United States’ objective to appoint SACLANT² by the conclusion of the next Council meeting, now scheduled for the last of October. Prior to this time, if sufficient progress concerning the Allied Middle East Command is not reached so as to receive United Kingdom agreement to the appointment of SACLANT, it is the intent of the United States to propose reconsideration of the North Atlantic Ocean Command.³

1. The source text was sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to a memorandum from Secretary Marshall to Acheson, dated September 11 which read: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the enclosed paper be accepted as the United States position concerning lines of action by the United States, United Kingdom and France to create an Allied Middle East Command. I concur with their recommendation and request your agreement to the actions contemplated. This position paper is considered to be in harmony with recent detailed conversations with United Kingdom representatives concerning Egypt and its relation to a Middle East Command.”
2. For documentation on matters relating to the appointment of a Supreme Commander, Atlantic, see vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.
3. On October 19, G. Lewis Jones informed Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, that the State Department had “carefully considered this paper” and concurred in general with the stated position, adding that the Department was already in touch with Defense “on plans and action connected with the Middle East Command” and that certain steps which the two Departments had agreed upon were “already in progress”. (780.5/9–1151)