683.84A/12–351: Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State 1

secret

319. ReLegtel 286, November 18.2 On three recent visits to all Syro-Israel demilitarized zones with Asst Army Attaché I obtained much clearer picture basic issues involved. My impressions reported in full by despatch3 and illustrated by photographs are as follows:

1.
Drainage project eminently worthwhile and one only wonders why it was not undertaken before.
2.
Equally clear that zone question is by far most important single issue between Syrian mil auths and Israel, and difficult see why Israel [Page 951] has not in spirit of compromise seized this golden opportunity improve prospect of friendly relations with Syria.
3.
Both upper zone and most of Al Hummeh salient 100% Arab and logically fall within Syrian sphere. Nevertheless, they represent smaller compensation than I had imagined for benefits Israel will undoubtedly gain when question of sovereignty is settled.
4.
I am impressed by Syrian fears as to adverse effects on its defensive military position opposite Huleh Lake and Swamu which are now for most part unfortified, but argument for water line as defensive position on Jordan in central zone not impressive. Syrians have persuasive argument, however, that line along Jordan River south of Huleh and through part of Tiberias essential in order prevent incidents from cattle grazing, fishing, and similar activities engaged in by Syrians and formerly covered by bon voisinage agreement with Palestine. Conditions now are vastly different from when mandate line drawn after First World War. Syrians point out if old mandate line becomes final boundary Israel will possess strip of territory ten meters wide along entire Syrian shore on Tiberias north of Nugelb. It seems to us Syrians have valid point this wld entail explosive potentialities.
5.
Major Jaddid, Syrian member MAC who accompanied us, believes settlement meeting all legitimate Israeli needs can be arranged. He says Syria willing enter into agreement perhaps along with Jordan and Lebanon guarantee Arabs will not use more Jordan River water than at present; this consists mainly of irrigation for Buteiha and it would be impracticable for Syrians siphon off Jordan water between Tiberias and Huleh. However, he was equally firm in declaring Syria and Lebanon could greatly diminish flow of Jordan to Israel by manipulating tributaries shld Israelis fail agree on reasonable settlement. Israel thus has vital stake in reaching agreement.
6.
There are many evidences of Israeli fortifications on zone contrary armistice agreement since May 18 especially on hill above Ein Gev. We saw other evidences Israeli non-compliance May 18 resolution only shortly balanced by presence roadblocks below Al Hummeh probably erected with Syrian help.
7.
We talked with 2 of 25 zone Arabs who reportedly escaped from Shaab via Lebanon. They described Israeli practices including physical abuse which if true are shocking revelation as to why Arab evacuees changed their minds about returning to zone (Legtel’s 707, June 74 and 6, July 5).5
8.
Further harm can be done to our RPC UN prestige, US relations with Syria, and prospects future Israeli peace agreement with Syrians if Security Council orders expropriation Arab-owned land for drainage project without Syrian agreement.

I was encouraged to find Jaddid sincerely anxious resolve zone questions, and to hear him say he joined in my wishes. He is highly regarded by De Page of UNRWA who says he is most objective and cooperative of Syrians officials. We concur. It is of interest it was he who first suggested water line to Mazim Qudsi (Legtel 404, February 20).6 He seems close to Shishikli.

[Page 952]

I was at all times careful make clear my visits were solely for my own background and that this question was one for UN to decide.

Dept officials may wish obtain Gen Riley’s comments this tel and if so we wld appreciate hearing his views.

Clark
  1. Repeated for information to Paris, Tel Aviv, the Arab capitals, London, Ankara, Jerusalem, Moscow, and Tripoli.
  2. Ante, p. 933.
  3. Not further identified.
  4. Not printed (683.84A/6–751).
  5. Ante, p. 744.
  6. Telegram 404 from Damascus, February 20, is summarized in footnote 2, p. 591.