Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

320/11–2951: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, November 29, 1951—11 p. m.

Delga 424. Re Palestine: US GADel staff offers for Dept’s consideration fol analysis of situation after discussion with Riley and Blandford (Delga’s 305 and 307).¹

1. Re position paper proposal for transfer general political functions including mediation to Riley and repatriation and compensation to Blandford under resolution such as contained Dept’s position paper (SD/A/C.1/373):²

Riley is agreeable to plan insofar as his functions affected, and we feel that such course is practicable. Lie, Bunche and Cordier also seem favorable. However, Blandford disagrees insofar as his functions wld be affected.

A. In favor transfer repatriation and compensation to Blandford are fol factors:

(1) Consolidation all refugee questions within one agency most effective course from administrative and budgetary standpoint;

(2) Control of UN activities with respect to repatriation and compensation more easily managed by agency with full range of responsibility on refugee problems. Past experience indicates UNRWA has regarded activities by parallel bodies harmful and obstructive. Overlapping wld thus be avoided.

(3) Favorable Congressional appropriations for refugee relief and resettlement might be facilitated if Israel’s compensation obligation is related administratively or at least to UNRWA activity;

(4) Transfer these functions to UNRWA, a body already dealing with major share of refugee problems, might be expected produce less heated political discussion in GA than resort to more transparent shelving device;

(5) Transfer such responsibility to UN body or individual with no other activities to justify existence wld subject such body to opposition now attached to PCC and continue to focus attention on ineffectiveness UN in these problems.

B. Factors against such course:

(1) As pointed out in Delga 305, effectiveness UNRWA work cld be gravely impaired if it were saddled with what Arabs still consider basic political issue;

(2) British have informally indicated they do not favor;

(3) Blandford’s vigorous opposition to transfer any new functions to UNRWA rests on belief;

(a) Compensation payments wld go largely to others than those now on agency relief rolls;

(b) Disputes over issues such as amount of total compensation due and division of available sums between claimants wld lead UNRWA into relationships disastrous to reintegration plans;

(c) Saddling UNRWA with repatriation wld also undermine its prospects success in more practical programs for which it responsible;

(d) Retention within political agency of office for refugee claims wld not prevent administrative linking compensation and reintegration in individual cases when appropriate;

(4) Arabs likely resist transfer of this important political function to a technical, economic agency.

2. Re transfer general political functions plus responsibility for repatriation and compensation to Riley.

A. Fol considerations favor this solution:

(1) Consolidation all political activities in one individual avoids overlapping and simplifies organization and administration;

(2) Maintaining principles of repatriation and compensation within agency having other functions to justify its existence might call less attention to ineffectualness of UN these matters;

(3) Maintenance of recognized political character repatriation and compensation questions wld reassure Arabs.

B. Fol factors against this solution:

(1) Riley’s probable inability to accomplish anything re compensation might easily impair his usefulness in Arab eyes in discharging his TSO functions;

(2) Such course amounts to hand-over present unsatisfactory PCC terms reference to single individual;

(3) Extension Riley’s functions might not prove acceptable to parties;

(4) Riley’s feeling that attribution to him of repatriation and compensation functions wld impair his prospects of effective exercise conciliation function.

3. Fol factors with respect to each of solutions envisaged sections 1 and 2 above must also be considered:

A. Division of PCC functions between Riley and Blandford might lay US open to charges of attempted American domination;

B. French desire remain represented on PCC or successor political body dealing with NE problems likely to lessen prospect their active support for resolution like that Dept proposes. Possibility somewhat similar Turkish attitude must also be born in mind.

4. Re transfer general political role as well as repatriation and compensation to Riley plus an advisory commission to Riley on his new functions only:

A. Fol considerations favor this course over 2 above:

(1) French opposition might be lessened with opportunity for representation on advisory commission;

(2) Objections based on alleged American attempts at domination might be reduced.

B. Fol considerations against this solution;

(1) Does not overcome basic objections to transfer repatriation and compensation to Riley as described under 2–B above;

(2) Creation new advisory commission perpetuates multiplicity UN bodies for Palestine and confusion of responsibility.

5. Further possibility might be creation of new office or commission with hdqtrs in New York whose membership might be slightly expanded beyond present composition PCC. Scope of activity such new body cld range from present over-all political role of PCC to more limited role of technical functions in fields of compensation and repatriation. If such body had over-all political responsibility, including repatriation and compensation Riley’s present functions wld not be enlarged. Alternatively, if technical commission or special office under SYG were vested with sole responsibility in repatriation and compensation fields, Riley cld be given broad political functions not including those two questions.

A. Fol factors favor this solution:

(1) Such a body (particularly if given over-all political role) wld probably appeal to French and Turks;

(2) Such body wld be away from area and cld reduce its activities to a desirable minimum and avoid friction with Riley and Blandford, either of whom cld consult with such body if desired; such body cld be available if and when attitudes of parties warranted active consideration compensation and other questions.

B. Fol factors against such solution:

(1) Creation new body perpetuates multiplicity agencies dealing with problem;

(2) With little likelihood such body cld accomplish anything UN wld remain butt of widespread criticism now directed at PCC.

(3) Real difficulties in drafting terms of reference which parties wld not deem in violation principles established in earlier GA resolutions on question.

6. Re continuation PCC with hdqtrs in New York, but with authority to meet elsewhere as needed, to consider proposals from the parties and to take such action thereon as circumstances permit,

A. Fol factors favor this solution:

(1) Such course can least of all be interpreted as designed to shelve compensation and repatriation issues or to cancel out rights and obligations of parties laid down in previous GA resolutions; hence might minimize debate in GA;

(2) British now seem favor this solution;

(3) French and Turks probably favorable;

(4) Opportunity wld continue exist for any practical steps leading to negots for compensation agreement;

(5) With commission in New York focus of attention Arab states and refugees might shift to practical programs of UNRWA and TSO.

B. Fol factors against this solution:

(1) Cld still elicit Arab charge UN was avoiding coming to grips with repatriation and compensation issues;

(2) PCC’s outmoded terms of reference wld continue be obstacle to any practical results.

7. Comment: On basis foregoing analysis, staff convinced essential to re-examine position in SD/A/C.1/373 since it seems impossible of realization without threatening effective future operations of Blandford and Riley. We are impressed with difficulty devising a separate agency to handle repatriation and compensation problems for which justification convincing to parties can be made. We are also keenly aware of delicate and uncertain status MEC, which may be fundamental to future of security and stability of ME. We feel that, if time is allowed for Arab adjustment to establishment MEC, pieces now causing area instability might fall gradually into place. With specific reference to Palestine question we believe US should be guided by idea of doing nothing at present re MEC which would further complicate the already delicate situation by further arousing Arab sensibilities, which have already been worked up by Moroccan and Egyptian issues.

With full recognition of the disadvantages of continuing PCC on less active basis, we are impressed with possibilities inherent in course outlined in section 6 above. On this basis we wld envisage concentration on improvement of PRA program and leaving Riley’s operation untouched. PCC (based normally at New York) wld operate on standby basis and remain unobtrusively available to assist under more favorable political conditions.

If explorations here shld indicate willingness of parties, especially Arabs, to accept transfer of political functions to Riley without specific mention of repatriation and compensation functions, wld Dept see any objection to this course? This wld mean authority to deal with subject was implicit in Riley’s terms of reference, but he wld not have mandate to take specific action. In evaluating this course it is essential to weigh possibility Arab disappointment over inaction on repatriation and compensation undermining confidence in Riley’s TSO operations.

Austin

1. Both dated November 22, pp. 941 and 942.
2. Dated October 12, p. 892.