780.5/11–1951
Memorandum of Conversation, by Edwin A. Plitt of the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Subject: General Matters of Interest to US and Israel
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| His Excellency M. Moshe Sharett, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs |
Mr. Sharett called on the Secretary at his own request and was received by the Secretary in his office at 3:30 this afternoon. The conversation lasted for nearly an hour and a number of subjects were discussed, principally by Mr. Sharett. The noteworthy part of what he had to say is given in substance as follows:
Mr. Sharett referred first of all to the Secretary’s speech this morning which he described as having been firm in substance and moderate in tone, yet, at the same time revealed an extraordinary concentration of thought on the subject of his address, many points of which the Secretary emphasized effectively by extemporaneous interpolations. Mr. Sharett expressed the hope that the call the Secretary issued would be heeded, which he felt sure could be counted on because of the enlightened exposition which he had made of this very high type of proposal.
Mr. Sharett then expressed some thoughts on where we (the US) and Israel stand in regard to the Middle East defense in which Israel wants to take its part because it would be impractical for it to live in isolation in that area where, as well as elsewhere, preparations [Page 936] have to be made to thwart another world war. If another war should come, Mr. Sharett said Israel would be prepared, not only in its own defense but well beyond its boundaries, to play its part. Israel, he said, was not quite certain as yet what powers will be able to throw their full weight to defend the Middle East effectively. He said he mentioned this because he wanted his talk with the Secretary to be absolutely frank and that the latter, he hoped, would gain thereby a clearer concept of what Mr. Sharett was trying to say.
He pointed out that from a practical point of view the fact must not be lost sight of that the job of the US has become so global that it should be realized that the US can’t be expected to defend everyone and everything. He said it was not a question of the world going up in smoke, which we could not afford to let happen. But, if a conflagration did arise, he assumed that we both would defend ourselves together. He, nevertheless, wanted to apprise the Secretary of the precariousness of Israel’s position should such a conflict englobe the Arab states as well. Israel can’t be expected to disregard the Arabs completely. On the other hand, the United States must do everything possible to have them on the right side, particularly in regard to the facilities they would be in a position to contribute. He pointed out the fact that the Arabs still consider themselves at war with Israel and that Israel, therefore, could not impart vital defense information to the Arabs. Although Mr. Sharett expressed the hope that Egypt might still have a change of heart which would alleviate the entire situation in the Middle East, this could not be counted upon and that, therefore, the US–Israel association would have to assume a very special character. He concluded this theme by saying that this was one point on which he wished the Secretary to know his thinking.
Another subject which Mr. Sharett felt that he was obliged to mention was the Jewish population still in Soviet Russia in connection with which he wanted to emphasize the tragic situation of Soviet Jewry. He said there appeared to be absolutely no hope for improvement of their condition nor for their escape except for so few which he described as only a trickle which occasionally got through to Greece. Not only are there still 1,750,000 Jews in Soviet Russia, but there are also two and a half million in Rumania and possibly 50,000 elsewhere. All of these should in principle find their way to Israel but, even if it were possible for them to get away and immigrate into Israel, it would throw a terrific burden on an impoverished country. He said the problem of taking care of even the trickle that comes from those countries with high hope to re-establish itself in Israel is a major one and that the stopping of all immigration of this kind may even have to be considered. However, so long as it is not absolutely necessary to interfere, Israel does not want to stop these people from coming in. He mentioned that practically all of the Jews from Bulgaria, Poland [Page 937] and Czechoslovakia have been absorbed. Mr. Sharett said that the Secretary is well aware of how the Soviet regime writes off ethnic elements for which it no longer has any use. He explained that in the last world war this savage policy did not affect the Jews in Russia because Russia was fighting Germany, the arch enemy of Jewish people. Now, however, should a new world-war break out, it would not be likely for Russia to have much consideration for the Jews within its borders. Nevertheless, five million Jews will be ready to fight the Russians. What Mr. Sharett said he was trying to convey was that we must do all possible not to hasten the extermination of Jewery in the Soviet Union.
Veering off to another subject, he said that in addition to the problems facing Israel, there is another looming up very fast and that is the Arab world vis-à-vis the West. He said our combined interests naturally favor Israel’s firm association with the West and specifically with the United States. But, because of Israel’s geographic position, it would not be advisable for such association to be too formally established. He said that neither of us wants war and knowing this, he feels certain that the United States must be trying to come to an arrangement with the Arab world, of the value of whose potential help the United States could not be but fully aware. In view of this, Mr. Sharett thought that it would be of particular help to us if it were possible to say that Israel is not part or parcel of MEC. He added that the US would be helping itself best if Israel kept apart, and furthermore explained that if Israel joined, it would only be an additional provocation to the Soviets. He said that he viewed this particularly in the light of the tragic fact that, as he had previously mentioned, there are so many Jews in Russia who would become the victims of Russian ire and who must by every possible means be protected from extermination.
Having outlined the foregoing, Mr. Sharett made the suggestion that continued talks between the heads of states are in order. Mr. Sharett said that he had already suggested to Britain that serious exchange of views should take place with a view to heading off disaster.
Mr. Sharett then expressed his and his country’s appreciation for the assistance it was receiving from the United States which is helping Israel to get stronger and stronger, and then said that even this is not enough; that more concrete help is needed by Israel in order to develop its road system, other public facilities, and more purposefully to expand Israel’s industrial apparatus. He told the Secretary that Israel preferred to take the initiative in these matters and that he was perfectly willing to go to the Departments of State and Defense with a view to developing closer cooperation with the US should any emergency arise. He said that the Israeli Prime Minister had already outlined to Ambassador Davis much of the foregoing but [Page 938] that he felt this program so important that he wished to bring it to the Secretary’s attention personally.
Continuing the conversation, Mr. Sharett once again referred to Israel’s relationship with Soviet Russia. He asked the Secretary not to become concerned if at times Israel feels that it must and consequently takes Soviet Russia into consideration in the carrying out of its policies. He explained that it is all part of the problem of protecting the Jews in Russia, and pointed out that Israel’s talks with Russia could actually prove of help and certainly of use to the United States. He said: “We, of course, intend keeping you informed.”
The Secretary listened attentively to Mr. Sharett and thanked him for speaking so frankly his mind on the various subjects covered. He told him that with this knowledge of Israel’s thinking, it naturally made it easier for us particularly with reference to the developing of our ideas in regard to the Middle East which, because of recent events, called for frequent changes of thought. The Secretary mentioned the Middle East Command with regard to which the planning is going forward with the idea of having a command nucleus available for use when needed and which in such an event would become a central point for Middle East cooperation. Such centralization in time of peace would provide an organization for emergencies to enable countries to take part if they wanted to do so, and that this was being emphasized in present talks between all countries concerned. At this stage the establishing of such a hub would have its advantages over the development of a vast military organization. Mr. Sharett agreed but maintained that Israel preferred to be in direct touch with the United States and British authorities concerned rather than through a combined command at this stage of developments.
Mr. Sharett then took up matters pertaining to the General Assembly agenda with specific reference to the Palestine item, saying that he felt that a certain chapter might now come logically to a close. He seemed to refer to the chapter on conciliation, saying that the PCC might be terminated. He praised highly Ambassadors Davis and Palmer and commended the French representative, Leon Marchal, for the contributions he had made, as well as the Turkish member which he referred to as an elder statesman. Mr. Sharett said that if the PCC had not achieved the results that it may have set out to obtain, it was no fault of its own. He said that nevertheless it had failed in its objective and that this now called for an examination. He said that at this juncture three complexities faced Israel and the United States, listing them as follows:
- (a)
- security—which is covered by armistice agreements, General Riley being backed by the SC. This to be continued;
- (b)
- the human problem of refugees in respect to which the United Nations has universally accepted that this work is to go on. He mentioned [Page 939] that the US had voted $15,000,000* for resettlement and then said that the refugee situation should be taken entirely out of the peace problem and that the resettlement of these people should get under way.
- (c)
- the whole complexity of interstate relations between Israel and the Arab states. Somewhat bitterly, he alluded to the complete cessation of the exchange of goods between them. He mentioned that the United Nations had succeeded only partly in solving this problem; that Mr. Bunche had done everything he possibly could, but that a peace settlement still remained in abeyance.
Mr. Sharett made a point with reference to the foregoing that the mere existence of a UN organization serves to retard results rather than solve the problems. He said: “The Commission talks to Israel and the Commission talks to the Arabs, but nothing comes of it.” He said that in his Government’s opinion it is just a waste of talent and personnel as well as money, besides being harmful. The net result is that Israel holds on to one position and the Arabs hold on to another position and yet both are members of the United Nations. His suggestion is that so long as no war conflagration has to be coped with, both parties to the dispute should be left alone and given time to iron out their difficulties; that the United Nations should refrain from interceding in the existing controversy. He assured the Secretary that he was certain that a peace settlement could be worked out between the contending parties because where there is a will therein bound to be a way. Gen. Riley, he said, should be equipped with full powers.
In commenting toward the end of the conversation on what Mr. Sharett had said, the Secretary agreed that the American analysis of the situation in general did not differ very much from that of the Israelis. Mr. Sharett once again referred to the yearly grants which Israel had received and for which the Government, Parliament and people of Israel were so appreciative. He then reminded the Secretary that application for next year’s grant was being prepared now, and said that at least $125,000,000 would be needed. In this connection he solicited the Secretary’s assistance in having the US administration support the application for the grant. Mr. Acheson made a sympathetic but noncommittal reply.
Mr. Sharett once more referred to Israel as a very poor country ravished by two thousand years of exploitation, where no raw materials to speak of are available, and that consequently everything needed for the development of a nation would have to be poured into it. He referred to Israel’s claims for help from Germany in recognition of the untold damage done to the Jews by the Hitler regime and in referring to Mr. Adenauer having accepted in principle to help, Mr. Sharett tried to solicit US sympathy and particularly action to support German [Page 940] payments in kind to Israel. He mentioned in this connection that negotiations between Israel and Germany were being undertaken and that he wanted American help in order to get help for Israel. The Secretary pointed out to Mr. Sharett that he had been listening with much sympathy to what he had had to say but that in respect to the latter subject the fact had to be taken into consideration that payments, whether in kind or otherwise, to be made by Germany would in a considerable measure and in the last analysis have to be borne by us. This would throw a further burden on our resources, with which the Secretary could not be in sympathy.
Mr. Sharett expressed his disappointment at this response and then took leave.
- Probably meant $50 million. [Footnote in the source text]↩