Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

683.84A/8–2951: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

New York, August 29, 1951—8:58 p. m.

278. Re Syria–Israel dispute. Gross and Ross met this morning with Eban on Huleh case. Jebb, (UK), Ordonneau (France) and Savut (Turkey) represented other co-sponsors of May 18 res.

Gross initiated discussion by indicating mtg was not adversarial, but called to permit informal joint exploration of points that seemed to be at issue. He then outlined these points as set forth in memorandum previously agreed to by the sponsors. (Copy transmitted in next following telegram.) Copy of these informal notes was given to Eban at end of meeting.

Eban’s attitude throughout mtg was conciliatory but firm reflection his govt’s views on points of issue. His comments on these points may be summarized as follows: (Fuller report of meeting will be sent by pouch.)

1. General observations:

a. Stating Israel’s objection to res prior to passage, Eban said that once res had passed Israel’s policy was that of full compliance irrespective of their reservations and apprehensions. He pointed out in this connection that Israel has complied with all requests Riley has made concerning drainage operations.

b. Eban stressed Israeli view that intention of res was only the temporary suspension of drainage operations, that total compliance with the res involves benefits as well as duties and it was hoped that process of implementation would lead to full resumption of drainage project as soon as possible.

c. Israel understood emphasis of para 12A of res as concerning return of Arabs “removed by Govt of Israel” not those who had fled to Syria.

d. Most important factor in Israeli view was that during first week of May aggression had been committed by Syria not only against the demilitarized zone but also against Israeli territory involving primarily Syrian regular forces and also local Arabs mobilized for purpose.

2. Return of Arabs:

Eban seemed assured that arrangements could be worked out with Riley for return of Arabs referring however to para 22 of Riley’s report of August 26. Eban said he did not have instructions and pointed out that return of these Arabs involved question of Israeli security involving status of El Hamma which had become in effect de facto part of Syria through process of annexation.

3. Policing of demilitarized zone:

In this case also, Eban seemed assured, at least hoped, that “practical middle line” solution could be worked out with Riley. He stressed that armistice agreement provided for Israeli and Arab (not Syrian) police in demilitarized zone and predicted that it might be impossible to reach agreement with Riley on juridical status of Israel in zone. He indicated belief Riley seemed to desire change in administrative arrangements which had obtained during last two years based upon 26 June 1949 letter from Bunche to Sharett which was decisive in securing Israeli agreement to armistice agreement, and which, Eban emphasized as one of elements in determining what is right and what wrong, which should not be disregarded by Riley. In this connection Eban talked about the necessity for a new administrative statute for the zone. These considerations, however, should not foreclose reaching practical arrangement with Riley. Israel, Eban said, cannot persist in claiming the right to police the entire zone, but Riley could not deny to Israel the right of administrative linkage with Israeli villages. In summary, Eban indicated that Israel would probably recognize necessity of withdrawing police from Khoury farm permitting Khoury family to return and have access to water, of abolishing restrictions on movement of UN observers and abolishing restrictions on the movement of Arabs who have or who might return.

4. Tel-el-Mutilla:

Referring to para 11b of May 18 res, Eban urged that SC should take seriously Israeli complaint now three months old of what Israelis consider most serious violation of armistice agreement. He hopes sponsors would agree with Riley, in letter to Eban predating last report, that MAC should be convened and that highest priority should be given to an investigation and finding concerning this complaint.

5. MAC:

Eban emphasized that Israel was the party pressing for convening of MAC to consider pending complaints and that prior conditions insisted upon by Syrians were matters that should be brought to MAC if not settled otherwise.

6. Partition demilitarized zone:

Eban saw disturbing signs in paras 18, 19 and 20 of Riley’s last report that Riley favored partition of demilitarized zone; Eban also observed he understood that Riley’s view was shared by some govts among the co-sponsors. Saying that minimal objective of armistice negotiations from Israeli view was that Syria not be brought to water line, Eban observed that removal of all Syrian authority from proximity to water sources was only thing worthwhile in armistice agreement. He said a major Israel objective in any peace settlement would be to keep Syria away from water line. (End summary Eban’s initial comments.)

In response to question by Gross concerning rehabilitation of Arabs dealt with in para 28 of Riley’s last report, Eban said he had received cable from Sharett indicating that Israel would try to make Arabs “as comfortable as possible”. Admitting this was rather vague, Eban observed that question of Israeli liability must be established. The extent to which Israel might or might not be liable involved the question of culpability of local Arabs mobilized by Syrians in aggressive action first week of May. MAC should investigate this question. It was not matter in regard to which Riley could make finding. Eban added he did not wish to indicate either a positive or a negative attitude, but simply that question was one for MAC to consider. With regard to trading rights of Arabs referred to in para 17 of Riley’s report, Eban said in response to question by Gross that there was nothing in armistice agreement (Art 5 in particular) giving Syria economic or political rights in relation to Arab inhabitants of demilitarized zone.

UK, French and Turkish reps agreed with outline of points of issue set forth by Gross. Jebb added a number of comments along following lines with which other co-sponsors indicate agreement.

Emphasizing that members of SC would not support thesis that demilitarized zone belonged to Israel, Jebb observed that if this question were held in abeyance there would be no problem. If, on other hand, Israel behaved as though zone belonged to her we would be “right up against it”. He thought it would be better therefore if Israel behaved on the assumption that the zone did not belong to her. If Israeli police were withdrawn from area where they had no business to be and if there were no further encroachments he thought that measures had to be taken to compensate the Arabs and he thought the matter of letting Arabs trade with Syria was a small one involving no important question of principle. Referring to question of Riley being given authority to expropriate Arab lands, Jebb emphasized that no commitment had been given in SC on May 18 and that action by the council depended upon Riley’s certifying that the May 18 res was being carried out with few if any reservations. Upon receiving such certification from Riley, Jebb believed attitude of Council members would not be unsympathetic. There would be a presumption in favor of pushing ahead with drainage work provided the Council believed that a question of international peace and security were involved. An important question which would have to be determined was whether there would be any adverse effect on the water supply of Jordan and Syria. Gross added that in view of co-sponsors, before referring to SC, Israel should appeal to MAC under Art 7, para 8 of armistice agreement if it disagreed with Riley’s position that chairman did not have authority expropriate lands.

Reps of co-sponsors emphasized purpose of informal discussion was not to cut Riley–Sharett conversations in any way. In our opinion this informal amicable discussion served useful purpose in letting Israelis know in frank and friendly way where co-sponsors stand on important points at issue.

Austin

1. Repeated priority to Beirut, Damascus, and Tel Aviv. The Mission in the best position to do so was requested to convey the substance of this telegram to General Riley.