357.AC/8–1451: Telegram
The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 1
priority
41. Palun 428. Prior my departure on Sat2 from Geneva, Shiloah telephoned from Paris requesting I come here for conversations thought might be important. I therefore made last minute changes my schedule and met Shiloah in Paris Sun morn.3 He told me he had dined with Boisanger Sat even and that Boisanger had informed him of comm’s decision not to discuss conference agenda prior to convening of conf. He said that while he had not been in touch for several days with Tel Aviv, he was reasonably sure Israel Govt wld accept, but in order be prepared make useful contribution to conf discussions, it wld be necessary to know in advance questions we proposed to take up. At same time Israel Govt’s decision wld be affected by SC action on Suez. If Suez res was not passed Egyptians wld interpret council’s action as endorsement their position re state of war with Israel. If Egyptians were so bolstered, there cld be little hope of successful outcome proposed conf.
In this connection I pointed out that shld Suez not be satisfactorily dealt with by SC, there was even more reason for holding conf. Shiloah asked if this meant that PCC intended take up “clarification” of status armistice agreements. I told him, without referring to proposed non-aggression declaration, that such a question certainly wld come within scope of general questions with which we hoped to deal. He seemed pleased this idea. As for his other questions concerning agenda, I told him comm had decided before adjourning that it wld not enter into a discussion with parties of agenda items in order avoid any question of priorities. I said that while we expected Arabs to raise question of priority for repatriation, we hoped avoid this issue prior to conf by recalling that conf wld be based on mandate recd from successive GA’s and that by acceding to Arab States request for mediation we wld be in position make suggestion re order of discussion. Told Shiloah that I wld be prepared to discuss in greater detail various subjects for consideration at later date but that I cld not, in view of comm’s decision, undertake such discussions until after parties acceptances. Shiloah seemed personally to accept my arguments and to favor intended procedure. He was unusually outspoken in saying he expected Israel wld accept, although he reverted several times to ill effects of unsatisfactory SC decision on Suez.
[Page 834]This morn fol tel was forwarded to me from Geneva in Palmer’s absence, who is expected arrive by ship in Haifa end of week:
“Palmer Chairman PCC—I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your cable of 10 Aug inviting the Govt of Israel to participate in mtgs convened by the Conciliation Comm beginning in Paris on 10 Sept 1951.
“The Govt of Israel has consistently pursued a policy of cooperation with the Conciliation Comm and seized every opportunity of discussing problems outstanding between Israel and the Arab States. It wld help the Govt of Israel in considering the invitation conveyed in your behalf of 10 Aug if the comm were to indicate to it whether the intention is to hold mtgs separately between the comm and reps of Israel on the one hand and between the comm and dels of the Arab States on the other, or whether, as suggested by the term “conference”, it is planned to conduct direct mtg between the reps of Israel and of the Arab states. It wld also be helpful if an indication cld be given as to the proposed agenda for the conf or the method by which an agreed agenda might be worked out.
“I shld much appreciate an early reply to this enquiry for the guidance of my govt and meanwhile avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the expression of my highest consideration and personal esteem. Signed Moshe Sharett, Min FonAff of Israel.”
I propose reply to Sharett as follows:
“In reply to your tel of 13 Aug I have the honour to advise that in extending its invitations to meet in Paris on 10 Sept the CCP has been guided by the relevant resolutions of the GA which call upon the parties to seek a solution of all questions outstanding between them by negots conducted either with the Conciliation Comm or directly. The Govt of Israel may be assured that the proposed discussions in Paris will be conducted fully in accordance with the provisions of these resolutions.”
At its last mtg before adjournment PCC agreed that substance above shld be comm’s reply to question similar those raised by Sharett. Inasmuch as such a reply at best is indication comm does not wish discuss with parties questions raised by Sharett, I felt it desirable explain our position personally and to suggest Israel might wish now withdraw its query. I therefore called upon Biran at noon today and reviewed with him my discussion with Shiloah and the position comm had taken, explaining our desire avoid discussion of question of priorities with Arab Govts. I said that if Israel raised question concerning agenda and we entered into discussion these points with Israel, it wld be difficult not do so with Arabs shld they raise similar questions. We felt this wld seriously jeopardize successful outcome PCC’s new efforts and wld lead us back to same situation we had been in for last 2½ years. I said that I had recd impression from Shiloah that Israel was favorably inclined our invitation and that I wondered if Shiloah’s report our conv had not perhaps crossed Sharett’s telegram. In this [Page 835] case, Israel Govt might prefer withdraw tel since reply by comm, which might be regarded as unresponsive, might well make acceptance politically more difficult. I pointed out polit advantage to Israel in unequivocal and prompt acceptance, and that if Israel did ultimately intend accept why not capitalize on such advantages. Biran appeared appreciate latter point and agreed convey my suggestion to Sharett this afternoon. He thought Sharett might want to talk with me later in day. I will follow up with further talks with Shiloah on his arrival Thursday. Comm’s decision not enter into discussion agenda however seems to me proper and expedient.
Re Unpal 281,4 I do not see how comm can consistently in view this decision under-take “major effort” obtain parties acceptance. It was at USDel suggestion comm did not reconvene Jerusalem, in order avoid possibility Aras and Marchal being involved in discussions with govts. Nor do I feel that in interest maximum freedom of action after convening of conf it is tactically desirable now for PCC engage in correspondence govts concerned beyond that indicated by proposed reply to Sharett. I had understood these tactics were approved by Dept prior my departure and had indicated in Palun’s 4225 and 4236 such procedure wld be followed when referred to Fr and Turks being persuaded avoid return to area. In view timetable adopted on necessity extensive preparatory work prior comm’s reconvening Paris 27, I do not feel time permits “major effort” by PCC, which in this case wld mean JCI USDel, and wld probably necessitate tour of area. “Major effort” is obviously necessary and wld be readily undertaken by USDel if circumstances permitted and made it desirable to do so. I believe in present circumstances however efforts by US, Fr, Turk, and UK missions in area will be decisive for convening conf. Signed Barco.7
- Repeated priority to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, London, Paris, and Ankara.↩
- August 11.↩
- August 12.↩
- Dated August 10, p. 827.↩
- Dated August 3, p. 816.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 817.↩
- In telegram 27 to Jerusalem (for Mr. Barco), identified also as telegram Unpal 282, not printed, the Department stated that it approved and commended the action reported in Palun 428 (357.AC/8–1451).↩