974.5301/7–2751: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State
priority
157. Re Suez: Eban (Israel) accompanied by Lourie and Rafael, called at his request on Gross this morning. Ross and Maffitt were present. His stated desire was to exchange views in light of statements at SC table yesterday.
First and probably most important point Eban made was that Fawzi’s statement expounded principle that state of war exists between Israel and Egypt and that Egypt therefore has right to take what measures it feels necessary in interest its own security including high-seas blockade operations. Eban’s conclusions from this statement were two-fold:
- (1)
- Regardless of what may be developed outside of SC looking toward solution this particular case, formal SC action is now unavoidable since Egypt has posed questions of principle. Matter is no longer just between Israel and Egypt, but between UN and Egypt. If UN acquiesces in Egypt’s attitude, basis of armistice agreements system will be undermined. SC cannot “honorably and expediently” avoid facing this issue squarely.
- (2)
- If Egyptian view is allowed to stand, Israel, which has based its policies on theory that hostilities are over and parties are working toward early permanent peaceful settlement, must revise these [Page 803] policies and be prepared take measures corresponding to those taken by Egypt.
Eban said that underlying significance of Suez issue is that there is no disposition in Arab world to work toward peace with Israel. Therefore armistice agreements system must for indefinite period be basis relations Israel with Arab states. Therefore Israel wishes to reinforce system, and Arabs to take advantage of it to wage economic warfare in safety against Israel. Unless UN takes measures, Israel will suffer injustice and must look to protection its own interests.
For our part, Gross said very little doubt our own mind re merits of question and we have no reason to think Dept has altered view that failing successful settlement outside of Council we will move toward res which we are prepared to co-sponsor if agreement reached on it, which would request lifting of restrictions. At moment too early to say whether we will table a res; we have not talked with Fawzi and did not know what, if anything, Egyptian Govt may have in mind to permit desired result be achieved without formal SC request. We did not necessarily envisage passing directly from private talks to Council res since Council could choose from variety of approaches. Gross wondered what ideas Eban might have in mind re next Council action.
Eban said that on past experience it was obvious Egypt would stall if pressure lifted. Tactically therefore res should be tabled Wednesday. At each stage of progress toward final action Egypt had full opportunity correct its position. However, as he had said, it was difficult to see how Council could avoid some formal action to deal with Egyptian claim of existence state of war.
Gross was puzzled how we get desired result. Did Eban assume Egypt would comply with res? Eban replied affirmatively, Rafael adding res would give Egyptian Govt justification before its people for dropping restrictions. Gross thought there might be significance in nature of Fawzi’s speech which avoided controversial elements such as degree Israeli compliance May 18 Res on Huleh. Did Eban think Suez might be settled in connection with solution larger issues?
Eban replied Arabs have ruled out such settlement. Furthermore Israel would deprecate any attempt to take Suez out of its “specific and definite context” and link it up with extraneous matters. He emphasized Suez problem should be faced squarely and settled without giving Egypt chance to delay further.
Gross said we were far from suggesting dilatory program and were simply wondering what action would be most effective. Eban said appearance of res on table would be most effective action.
Gross summed up saying impossible now to foretell what situation will be Wednesday and what action might be indicated. Therefore we wanted to keep position flexible. At appropriate time position could [Page 804] be taken re res or other procedure if indicated. Fact Egypt would know of US disposition to support res would constitute maximum pressure and it was questioned whether public appearance of res would tend to freeze situation.