784A.00/7–1851
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)
US/S/1805
Subject: General Position of Israel.
| Participants: | Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel |
| Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Director, NE, Department of State |
I lunched today with Israel Ambassador Eban at his invitation. Eban was more friendly and relaxed than I have seen him for a long time. He did not appear to have any particular axe to grind and the conversation covered a broad area.
Suez Canal Dispute:
Eban did not seem to have a very easy mind regarding the Suez Canal dispute. He realizes that it may open a Pandora’s Box, involving Anglo-Egyptian relations, Treaty of 1888, etc., etc. He hoped that the debate could be limited strictly to the area of the Israel complaint. Eban appeared to have no doubt that Israel could make a strong case against Egypt in debate. He said that he had been working up the Israeli case and had discovered that Egypt appears to have “secretly declared war” against Israel in early 1950: prior to this time Egypt had stated in writing that there was no need for a peace settlement with Israel since Egypt was not at war with Israel. Eban hoped that the US would help in the job of getting Egypt to lift the restrictions—the main object of the exercise.
[Page 778]I said that the US is still considering what its position will be in the SC but it is well known we object to the Egyptian restrictions as interference with commerce, impractical, etc. I said that I thought the Egyptian restrictions worked against the interests of Egypt since they prevented the British Government from moving towards the Egyptian position in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. The parliamentary situation in the UK with regard to Suez is one of the simple facts of the situation. I said that it seemed to me that the simplest way to obviate the acrimonious debate sure to take place in the SC would be for Egypt quietly to suspend its restrictions before the debate began. I inquired whether, if Egypt did this, Israel would feel impelled to “crow over Egypt”. Eban replied that he thought not: Israel is chiefly interested in having the restrictions lifted; moreover, Israel continues to think that Egypt is the key to a peace settlement with the Arabs and obviously the SC action would not facilitate such a settlement.
Israeli Elections:1
Eban said that the news that he has received from Israel indicates that things are “going pretty well for our side”; i.e., Ben Gurion. He thought that once the elections were over, Israel would be in a better position to make political decisions. He, Rafael and Elath (from London) are returning to Tel Aviv during August to consult. He planned to do his best to remove the idea prevalent in some circles in Tel Aviv that the US has shifted to a pro-Arab policy. He has reported continually that the US is trying to follow the line of being neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel. He thought that the May 18 Resolution was taken far too seriously in Tel Aviv as a pro-Arab move by the United States.
I assured Eban that he would be correct if he reported the US is “neither pro-Arab, nor pro-Israel”. The May 18 Resolution, I said, is based upon firm support of the UN. We called the shots as we saw them. It seemed to me that the reasonable and consistent line would be for us to take the same attitude in connection with the Suez Canal dispute.
Prospects for Peace:
Eban gloomily volunteered, with regard to the prospects for peace with the Arabs, that he regretted that he could see “no light at the end of the tunnel”. He did not feel that time is improving the prospects for peace, since the Arabs did not appear to be interested in peace.
This gave me an opportunity to describe our views on “tissue knitting” and Israel’s “orthodox approach”. With regard to the former, I [Page 779] mentioned the informal trade and other relations which appear to have been worked out between Israel and the Lebanon. I said that I was delighted that the Flight Information Center in Beirut, inaugurated July 5, had announced that it would work with aircraft of any nationality. This was “tissue knitting”. I thought that something would be gained if only a few kilometers, a frontier between Israel and its Arab neighbors, could be settled as boundaries: this might be done through unilateral declarations.
I pointed out to Eban that the “orthodox approach” (i.e., save everything for the final peace bargaining) had been tried for 2½ years and had been unsuccessful. It seemed to me that the alternative, or “unorthodox” approach should now be attempted. In this connection I mentioned (a) Haifa free zone; (b) Arab blocked balances; (c) willingness Israel to sit down and talk with the Arabs (e.g., Syria) on any subject; and (d) Israel’s opening, as a “unilateral act of strength”, road across the Negeb for the free use of anybody wishing to use the road within certain security safeguards. With regard to (d) I hazarded the guess that there would be a good deal of traffic on this road within a very short time and that the Arabs using the road would help create the atmosphere necessary for more formal peace arrangements in the future.
Eban raised the point of the “cultural” lag which now exists between the Arab States and Israel. He said that Israel today has very little knowledge of Arab thoughts and feelings, although under the mandate there was a brisk traffic in ideas between the Arabs and the Jews. He said the tendency in blockaded Israel is to ignore the existence of the Arab World except as something menacing and encircling. He thought this was wrong because “the Arabs represent a powerful and worthwhile culture”.
I commented that it was up to men like Eban, who previously had known the Arab World intimately, to bring home to the Israeli Government and people the importance of their geographic and ethnic surroundings. Eban remarked that Ben Gurion “hardly knows there is an Arab World—Sharett does know”.
Commenting on “tissue knitting”, Eban said that the difficulty with this course is the political one inside Israel where it is extremely hard to explain while Israel is the object of an economic blockade and daily menaces from the Arabs, why Israel should undertake courses of action favorable to the Arabs. He saw the reasoning behind “tissue knitting”, but he was afraid that it called for a special breed of Israeli—a “Super Israeli” who would accept the principle of “unorthodox” acts, in the face of Arab League boasts of plots for his destruction.
- The second general election since the founding of the State of Israel was held on July 30, 1951.↩