Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

IO Files

Memorandum by Edward P. Maffitt of the United States Mission at the United Nations, to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

confidential
US/S/1794

[New York,] July 12, 1951.

Subject: Suez

Yesterday afternoon Denis Laskey, Bob Fowler and Francis Vallat brought in a draft resolution on be Suez matter and discussed the UK views thereon. We talked of the Israelis’ intention to send a request today to the Security Council President for a meeting on Suez, and Fowler said that he understood that the Israelis were suggesting to the Norwegians and the Australians that they ask to be present at the Security Council debate.

The British said they did not yet have instructions whether to hold the Israelis off and thus bring the Suez problem up by calling a meeting to discuss General Eiley’s report. It appeared that John Coulson would rather have the Israelis take the step, in the belief that this would involve the UK less. On the other hand, most of the other members of the UK Delegation felt that it would involve the UK less simply to call a meeting as President to discuss a report provided for in the November 17, 1950 Security Council resolution.

When I asked what the British reasons were for wishing this matter brought up at this time Laskey listed the following in the order of their importance: a) there is much agitation in the House of Commons against a situation prejudicial to British commercial interests, i.e., the Haifa Refinery; b) the UK at all times worries over any obstacle to free and unrestricted use of international waterways; c) the situation shown by Riley’s report of the special committee’s decisions indicates that a situation exists which is likely to endanger peace and security in the Near East; d) the UK would welcome any development which might loosen up the relations between Israel and the Arab states, and it believes that this would come about to a certain extent if Egypt should drop the restrictions, especially on oil (Iraq) but also on general commercial and diplomatic relations (Jordan and possibly others).

We then discussed the form the debate in the Council might take. It was recognized that there were two elements involved, the Canal restrictions which Egypt was maintaining, and other obstacles to trade and communications with Israel. Laskey asked whether “it might help” the United States to have the draft resolution broadened in Paragraphs 9 and 10 to cover restrictions from which we were suffering commercial prejudice. This brought us to a discussion of the role we would play in the debate. I pointed out that the British had learned our instructions on this point, especially with regard to co-sponsorship, and that there had been no change therein. Laskey said that Jebb would be happy if we would report to the Department that the UK Delegation feels that our failure to co-sponsor would greatly weaken the resolution since it would make it appear that we were not wholeheartedly behind the attempt to make Egypt lift the restrictions. I said that our statement at the table would make our views clear enough, but this seemed to make little impression on our British friends. They made some mention of the Tri-Partite Declaration as a factor we should take into consideration, although they realized that this was not the occasion to invoke it. When I asked what co-sponsorship the UK had in mind they replied that the only other SC Member that might be interested in co-sponsoring in addition to the French and ourselves (sic) would be the Dutch, although they did not exclude the possibility that Turkey, for the sake of peace and security in the area, might consider co-sponsoring as it did in the May 18th resolution on the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Vallat cautioned against being led by the Egyptians into an argument based on purely legal issues, since the intricacies of the 1888 Convention might confuse the issues and since the argument might lead to the matter being referred to the ICJ, a move which he thought perhaps would weaken the pressure on Egypt. Laskey was not sure that this latter point was valid.

As for timing of presentation of the British draft resolution, the British felt that it should not be until we had heard what line the Egyptians would take.

[Annex]

Draft Resolution on the Egyptian Restrictions on Shipping Through the Suez Canal

The Security Council:—

1. Recalling that in its resolution of the 11th August 1949 relating to the conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States it drew attention to the pledges in these agreements against further acts of hostility between the parties:

2. Recalling further that in its resolution of 17th November 1950 it reminded the states concerned that the armistice agreements to which they are parties contemplate the return of permanent peace in Palestine, and therefore urged them and other states in the area to take all such steps as will lead to the settlement of the issues between them:

3. Noting that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation in his report to the Security Council of 12th June 1951 considered interference with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel to be a hostile and aggressive act, and contrary to the spirit of the Armistice Agreement, whose effective functioning is thereby jeopardised:

4. Further noting that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation recalled the statement of the senior Egyptian delegate in Rhodes on 13th January 1949 to the effect that his delegation was inspired “with every spirit of cooperation, conciliation, and a sincere desire to restore peace in Palestine”, and that the Egyptian Government has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff that they desist from the present practice of interfering with goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal:

5. Considering that the exercise of the power of search and seizure against international commercial shipping is a right generally recognised only to a power acting in the lawful exercise of belligerent rights:

6. Considering that since the permanent armistice regime has been in uninterrupted existence between Egypt and Israel for more than 2 years and 3 months, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or require to exercise belligerent rights for any legitimate purpose of self-defence:

7. Finds that the maintenance of these blockade measures is inconsistent with the spirit of the Armistice Agreement and an abuse of the exercise of maritime belligerent rights:

8. Further finds that these measures cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the grounds that they are necessary for self-defence:

9. And further considering that the restrictions on the passage of oil tankers through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies of refined oils required for their economic reconstruction:

10. And considering that such restrictions together with the sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent an intolerable restriction of the right of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another and with the Arab states and with Israel:

The Security Council;

11. Calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.^*

1. The UK Delegation has recommended to London omitting Paragraph 5; omitting the bracketed words “since” and “neither … self-defense” in Paragraph 6 and inserting in place of the latter the words “and that in fact there is no present state of hostilities between Israel and Egypt”; omitting “and … rights” in Paragraph 7 and “of refined oil” in Paragraph 9; and replacing “oil tankers” by “goods” in Paragraph 9. Laskey and co. also agreed that “blockade” was possibly not the correct word in Paragraph 7. [Footnote in the source text.]