974.531/7–1151
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)1
Subject: Israel’s Submission of the Suez Canal Case to the Security Council
| Participants: | Ambassador Abba Eban—Israel |
| Mr. Hickerson—Assistant Secretary | |
| Mr. Ludlow—UNP | |
| Mr. Waldo—NE |
Ambassador Eban called upon me today at his request to inform me that the Israeli Government will present a complaint to the Security Council tomorrow against the Egyptian blockade restrictions affecting the Suez Canal.2 In expressing the preliminary views of his Government on the presentation of this case to the Council he stressed three factors which he believed affected not only Israel but other members of the Council and the United Nations.
- 1.
- The restrictions placed on shipping by Egypt were having a seriously detrimental affect not only upon Israel’s economic well being but also upon the shipping interests of all the maritime powers. The Suez Canal represented a point of strangulation to much of the shipping of the world and individuals sending ships through the canal were reluctant to take on cargo which might be subject to interference or controversy over their destination. The blockade, for example, was making the use of the Haifa refineries extremely difficult in that tankers from the Middle East could not pass through the canal to Haifa. As for Israel, it had hopes of trade with Commonwealth and sterling area countries, which trade was made impossible by the inability of ships from East African areas and Commonwealth countries to the east to traverse the canal.
- 2.
- The continuance of the blockade posed a problem to the security of the Middle East. He pointed out that the Commonwealth conference in London had evidenced a concern of countries like Australia and New Zealand over the security of the Near and Middle East and the relationship of the canal to the area’s security. Mr. Eban felt that the United States as well as the British Commonwealth nations, in evidencing concern over the security of this area would undoubtedly wish to see the interference, which the Egyptian blockade represented, ended.
- 3.
- The United Nations aspect of the case was, in Mr. Eban’s opinion most important. In the opinion of his Government the problem of the Suez Canal was but part of the entire problem of the enforcement of the Arab-Israeli Armistice system. General Riley, in his decision of June 12, has indicated that the action of the Egyptian Government in maintaining the blockade was clearly an aggressive and hostile act, [Page 762] not consistent with the intention of the Armistice system, and he had recommended that, since the problem was in essence one too great to be decided by the Egyptian-Israeli Special Committee, Israel should resort to the Security Council for satisfaction. Israel, according to Mr. Eban, believes that the Armistice Agreements should be complied with by all signatories and not just by Israel. He said that there was no other instance where a Government had maintained for so long such an obvious violation of the Armistice system. In submitting its case to the Security Council, Israel was concerned that the allegation of a state of war should be allowed to persist. If such were to be the case, all of Israel’s neighbors were at war with Israel and therefore, perhaps, Israel should undertake to devise hostile action against the surrounding countries as a matter of defense and retaliation. It was Israel’s intention that the Suez Canal case should have as its objective the direction of the countries concerned toward the achievement of a final peace in the area. Mr. Eban felt that Council action against the Egyptian restrictions would have a salutary affect on Egypt’s respect for the United Nations and for those governments which would be calling for the lifting of such restrictions. He felt sure that Egypt would comply with a directive from the Council. Certainly, Israel could hope that Egypt’s compliance would be on the order of Israel’s compliance with the May 18 resolution which, however distasteful to Israel, had been complied with.
I thanked him for the presentation of his views on the Suez case and informed him of our desire to see the restrictions lifted. I stated that I believed that Israel and the United Kingdom were the two countries most concerned with the problem and accordingly should assume the lead. I pointed out to him that we had made numerous representations to Egypt concerning this problem and said that, while I had been a little reluctant to see this case come before the Security Council because of various complicating factors and related problems, I did not now believe there was any basis for opposing Council consideration. I did wish to point out, however, what, I was sure, the Israeli Government had already taken into consideration, namely, that with the Suez case before the Council some of the Arab states might be led to demand a discussion of the extent and willingness of Israel’s compliance with Security Council resolutions. I said that recent reports of General Riley, particularly the one of July 93 concerning the difficulties which he was having over the repatriation of Arab refugees to the demilitarized zone were causing us some concern and we felt that the Government of Israel should consider this matter of their own compliance. I asked him quite candidly, if he felt that Israel would be coming before the Council with clean hands.
In reply Mr. Eban stated that while he was not fully familiar with General Riley’s reports he felt that Israel had complied with the requirements of the May 18 resolution. However, with regard to my suggestion and inquiry, he would look further into the matter. Concerning [Page 763] the repatriation of the Arab refugees to the demilitarized zone he said that it was his understanding that refugees had been presented with an opportunity to decide whether they wished to return to the demilitarized zone, where chaos still reigned, or whether they preferred, as the majority of them did, to remain in the security of Shaab where law and order prevailed. In any event, he thought it was quite clear that it was not in the best interests of the Arab refugees for all of them to return to the demilitarized zone.
The Ambassador closed by saying that in presenting the case to the Council there was much planning yet to do and he assumed that the Israeli and United States delegations would have further consultations. I did not comment on this assumption.