IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the United States Mission at the United Nations

confidential
US/S/1787

Subject: Syrian-Israel Dispute

Jordan and the Huleh Project

Participants: Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Permanent Representative of Syria to the UN
Ambassador Ernest A. Gross—US Mission
John C. Ross, US Mission (later)
Edward P. Maffitt, US Mission

Ambassador Zeineddine called at his request on Ambassador Gross the afternoon of July 3rd. In addition to paying his respects on a colleague, he seemed to have in mind trying to convince the US Government that it should adopt a position which would show Tel Aviv that Israel was “no longer the enfant gâté” of the UN. In pursuing the latter purpose, Zeineddine revealed to us what may turn out to be Syria’s strategy in the next phase of its conflict with Israel over the Demilitarized Zone between the two countries. This will be discussed below.

Ambassador Zeineddine urged the necessity of the US assuming a firm attitude against what it termed Israeli expansionism vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. He said that past support of Israel by the US had brought not only the US but the West in general and the UN to a low point in Arab opinion. Things have got so bad in that respect, he said, that neutralism or even pro-Sovietism is gaining considerable strength among the peoples of the Arab world. As evidence of this he pointed out that Dawalibi, recently elected “Speaker of the House”, the second-ranking official in Syria, last year publicly stated that if Syria had to choose between the West and the Soviet group, he would [Page 747] choose the latter since the Soviets are not pro-Zionist. In other words, the conflict with Israel was the basic factor in Arab thinking today, and anyone assisting Israel was in the Arabs’ black book. Therefore the US should attempt to recover some lost prestige by ceasing to favor Israel. In addition to helping ourselves by such a position, Zeineddine said, we would strengthen the Arabs’ hand in their dealings with the Israelis and create a more propitious condition for their reaching a lasting peace settlement with Israel. Up to now the Israelis had been aggressive and intransigent since they felt they could count on US support in the final analysis for any aspirations they wished to realize. For instance, he felt that a conference under Article VIII of the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Agreement would at the present time achieve nothing since the Israelis would not be reasonable.

At this juncture Zeineddine took occasion to make plain that Syria would not hesitate to take what action it felt necessary, including military, to protect its territorial sovereignty from Israeli expansionism, and, he continued, let any Arab government which failed to back Syria beware of retaliation from its people.

Ross deprecated such talk of war and stressed the extreme importance to all Near Eastern countries of their achieving a lasting peace settlement and removing causes of Near Eastern dissension which could only weaken the area at a very parlous time. He returned to the matter of an Article VIII conference and asked what the Syrian government might hope to achieve if one were called. Zeineddine was careful with his words, but gave the impression that what Syria would like to do at this point would be to propose an alteration of the Armistice Agreement which would do away with the Demilitarized Zone by negotiating a division of it between itself and Israel. Zeineddine complained that the Israelis were establishing a de facto predominance over the Huleh sector of the Zone by deporting all Arabs from it and setting up an armed military force in support of a greatly increased police force. If Israel should be allowed to get away with this, Syria would be in an unfavorable position with regard to dividing up the Zone and Zeineddine wondered whether it might not improve its position by endeavoring to work out an arrangement whereby perhaps the southern sector along the South-east corner of Lake Tiberias would be given to Syria in exchange for the central sector being incorporated in Israel. He seemed to think at least that this would give Syria a bargaining position that it does not at present have, in view of Riley’s failure to have the deported Arabs returned and to clear the excess Israeli police force out of the central sector.

(This guarded speculation by Zeineddine throws light on the Israeli contention voiced several times recently to members of the Mission, that all the Syrians want from an Article VIII conference is to set forth “unacceptable” territorial claims. Apparently the Syrian thinking [Page 748] as indicated above has got to Israeli ears and is not pleasing to Tel Aviv, which holds that all territory formerly in the Mandate automatically became Israeli territory with the termination of the Mandate and the proclamation of Israel’s independence.)

Ambassador Zeineddine also discussed at some length the implication of the Huleh drainage project, not only to Syria, but to Jordan as well. Repeating what the British had informed us he had said to Sir Gladwyn Jebb the previous day, he alleged that the drainage plan would render inoperative the Jordanian irrigation system depending on the Jordan. He alleged that already the saline content of the irrigation water used by Jordan had increased five times, and prophesized that on the southern end of Lake Huleh the salt content would go up so high that Jordon would be deprived of this irrigation. Zeineddine also complained of Riley’s interpretation of Paragraph 3 of the May 18 resolution and, repeating his complaints at Riley’s failure to get the deported Arabs back home and to make Israel withdraw its military forces and extra police from the Zone, reiterated his threat that Syria would not hesitate to initiate military operations it felt necessary to safeguard its security. He said that we had the impression that progress was being made on the two questions of the police and the Arab deportees and that we thought Riley was within his rights in authorizing resumption on drainage operation on lands the Israel owners of which had agreed to permit such operations.