780.5/6–2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee )1

secret

Subject: Visit of Israel Ambassador.

Participants: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel.
Mr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel.
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Waldo

The Ambassador of Israel, accompanied by the Counselor, called at 4 p. m. on June 26 to leave a note2 amplifying earlier Israel proposals on the possibilities of Israel cooperation in Western defense plans for the Near East. The Ambassador said that the note contained three annexes: one on Israel’s industrial potentialities; the second, on the armament industry; and, the third, a logistic estimate on repair facilities for arms and equipment in Israel. The Ambassador said he was presenting these on behalf of his government as a basis for discussion; they represented a genuine and sincere attempt to assess the possibility of cooperation at this stage. The Ambassador admitted that the absolute industrial capacity of Israel was small by American standards, but should be considered in relation to the capacity of the area. An element of strength in Israel’s industrial position was the great volume of technical skill available. The weak spots arose out of supply problems and the need for technical advice. Another shortage in Israel which resulted in a certain disadvantage was a lack of fuel.

I told the Ambassador that we appreciated Israel’s efforts in making this information available. We would give it most careful consideration and would request the appropriate military people in our government to study it from the military point of view. We are very much interested in the security of the Near East. An indication of this is the forty millions which we have recommended for military assistance in the area.

The Ambassador said there were elements of potential strength in the Near East but at present it was too much of a vacuum. I agreed, [Page 735] but expressed the view that in the event of war logistics problems in the area would be very great for both sides. The Russians would probably not be able to send more than a few divisions into the entire area. The Ambassador appeared to concur, remarking that the Korean war had punctured the theory of Communist invincibility.

I inquired whether the information on Israel military potentialities had been given to General Robertson. In view of the British position in the Middle East, I suggested that it might be helpful for Israel to make the information available to the British. The Ambassador said he had asked his Government whether it would be made available to the British. He personally thought it a desirable move. He would let me know what was decided. A factor influencing Israel’s decision in the matter was that some members of the Israel military were still suspicious that the British connections with the Arab Legion might result in the Arabs learning Israel military secrets.

In reply to a query from me on the fuel shortage in Israel, Mr. Keren said that the Haifa refinery was presently operating at 25 percent capacity but production could probably be expanded if more crude oil were made available, possibly from the Near East. The Ambassador said that the Western Powers were the principal losers in this matter. If Haifa were brought into full production without Iraq’s cooperation the Iraqi Government might realize the futility of continuing to blockade the pipeline. I said that in my view there was no reason the refinery could not operate at capacity on Venezuelan crude. A number of European refineries were presently so operating. In terms of the final product, there was not a great difference in price per barrel between Caribbean crude and that from the Near East. If we lost the Abadan refinery, however, it was probable the entire capacity of the Haifa refinery would be utilized.

  1. Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.
  2. Note and annexes not found in Department of State files.