Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: 723 Near and Middle East

Working Paper Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff¹

top secret

Washington, May 23, 1951.

Command Structure in the Middle East the problem

To devise a command set-up for the Middle East which will:

1. Meet pressing U.K. need for participation in command arrangements in Europe and the Middle East.

2. Be consistent with a Mediterranean Command protecting Eisenhower’s southern flank and responsible for all communications through the Mediterranean.

3. Integrate Turkey into Middle East land defense, Turkey being at the same time a full member of NATO with double responsibilities: (a) Balkan, Dardanelles and Aegean defense, and (b) defense of its Eastern frontier.

4. Attract the voluntary support of the Arab States, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and contiguous land areas as a development contributing to area security.

5. Take into account French insistence to be consulted on all Middle East matters and to participate in the affairs of Syria and Lebanon.

6. Take into account the special U.S. training and supply relationship with Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

7. Take into account British treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.

8. Take into account the requirement to keep Middle East oil flowing to the West.

9. Take into account the requirements for bases in the area available for immediate Allied use from D Day.

10. Recognize unlikelihood U.S. ground forces being available for deployment in the area for a considerable period.

11. Make use of the psychological force of a practical display of U.S.–U.K. (and secondarily French) cooperation and unity re Middle East defense problems.

12. Recognize that, while U.S. association with the U.K. and France will expose it to the charges of imperialism based on the records of the U.K. and France in the area, the over-all gain to area defensive capability is worth the risk.

13. Recognize the fact that strengthening the will of the peoples of the Middle East to resist will be primarily a political task until the Western power potential is greater than at present.

14. Recognize that the U.S. is not prepared to give a formal defense commitment at this time to Iran, Pakistan, the Arab States and Israel, but that it is prepared in conjunction with the U.K., France, and these states themselves to help plan and prepare the defense of the area.

15. Take into account the U.S.-U.K.-French Tripartite Declaration re Israel.

16. Recognize the British Commonwealth interest in Middle East defense.

17. Gradually obviate Egyptian and Iraqi difficulties with the U.K. arising out of their treaties.

18. Contribute to the establishment of a practical modus vivendi between the Arab States and Israel.

19. Capitalize upon the new U.S. economic, refugee, and military aid programs for the Middle East as well as other U.S. and U.K. development efforts such as Point IV, etc.

20. Take into account the need for careful time-phasing in developing Middle East security arrangements so that these will not outrun the desire of the inhabitants for the benefit of area-coordinated defense; be provocative to the U.S.S.R.; or involve the Western industrial potential in unfulfillable demands for arms.

timing

As indicated in paragraph 20 above, the establishment of a Middle East command structure must be carefully time-phased. The following three periods are envisaged:

1. The present (announcement, diplomatic support, etc.)

2. Cold war build-up

3. Hot war

the present

There is a need for an early announcement of Allied interest in Middle East defense because:

1. U.K. domestic political pressure for participation in European and Middle East command arrangements.

2. The new U.S. approach to the Arab States and Israel is based on correlation with U.K. efforts and coordination with France; therefore, public emphasis is timely.

3. The Arab League is presently considering inconclusively its own defense structure in light of Syrian–Israeli dispute.

4. A new element might assist in solving current U.K. difficulties in Egypt.

british announcement

The following announcement by the U.K. is suggested:

“The defense of the Middle East^* is an integral part of the world defense problem for which NATO has been instituted to handle the European, Atlantic, and Mediterranean aspects. The U.K. has been in consultation with its NATO allies generally, and the U.S. and France in particular, and announces with their concurrence that, in the event of concerted action under the U.N. to repel aggression against that area, the U.K. is prepared to offer the British Commander in the Middle East to serve as ‘Supreme Allied Commander’ for such Allied land and air forces as can be placed at his disposal to repel the aggressor. He would have similar responsibility for naval operations in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Southeastern Mediterranean. The U.S. and France have stated that they will support this appointment.

“The capability of many countries of the area to defend themselves even with the assistance of outside forces, leaves much to be desired. The U.K. is therefore assigning to the Commander in Chief, British Middle East land forces, the additional title and responsibility of ‘Director, Middle East Cooperative Defense Board’. The CINCMELF will establish a Middle East Cooperative Defense Board to serve the states of the area having an interest in mutual defense and interested in receiving strategic guidance, training and procurement assistance. In this endeavor, the U.K. has been assured of the active support of the Commonwealth countries, Turkey, the U.S., and France. The Middle East Cooperative Defense Board is designed to assist in the creation of adequate resistance capability in the area; The ‘Director, Middle East Cooperative Defense Board’ will have attached to him a special advisory staff representing the states of the area interested in collaboration for area defense as well as representatives of the U.S., France, and members of the British Commonwealth most concerned.”

A declaration of this kind would fit in very well with the new U.S. economic-military approach to the Middle East under NSC 47/5.²

The U.S. Secretary of State would lose no time in publicly concurring in the British announcement; the Turkish, French and Commonwealth governments would take similar action, both publicly and through diplomatic channels.

Underlying this British announcement (the British should take the lead in order to derive the most prestige benefit) would be firm U.S. concurrence in the concept of a British “Supreme Allied Commander” for the period of Hot War. Once this concept is accepted, there should be no difficulty about the U.S. correlating its activities with the U.K. during the period of the “Middle East Cooperative Defense Board”.

The “Middle East Cooperative Defense Board” is conceived as a “new look” for Middle East defense arrangements, which hitherto have rested largely on bilateral British treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. The concept of this “Defense Board” might help to distract attention from the Anglo-Egyptian impasse, particularly if U.S. interest and activity clearly take place under the aegis of the Board.

It is assumed that in a period of Hot War the U.S. would appoint a Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander; there would be no objection, after our economic-military program gets under way, to the U.S. occupying the post of “Deputy Director, Middle East Cooperative Defense Board”. At some stage it might be politically desirable to appoint a Turk or an Arab Deputy Director also. To integrate Israel into the area defense pattern, it would be necessary at the start for the Board to offer Israel a special Israel branch; the ultimate objective would be full Israel participation in the central Cooperative Defense Board.

area of responsibility

The area of responsibility for the “Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East” whether he wears that hat, or his hat as “Director, Middle East Cooperative Defense Board”, should be meshed with the command area for the Mediterranean under NATO. Careful coordination would be required at two points:

1. Mediterranean supply line

2. Turkey

The Middle East theatre is dependent upon the Mediterranean supply route and consequently the NATO Commander in the Mediterranean will have the heavy responsibility for keeping the Middle East theatre supplied, convoy protection, etc.

Turkey (presumed to have become a member of NATO) will be in both the NATO and Middle East camp. The Turks would be asked, with respect to the employment of their forces and operations in relation to the Middle East theatre, to accept the planning guidance and wartime strategic direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, who should have a ‘Turkish Deputy. This is necessary because Turkey is the anchor of the outer defense ring of the Middle East. The NATO part of Turkey’s activity will be the defense of the Dardanelles, European Turkey and activities in the Aegean and Black Sea, under a NATO command organization. It is believed that this philosophy could be sold to the Turks.

Special provision must be made to protect the special U.S. position in Saudi Arabia where we hope to secure the Dhahran air field. It would be disastrous for the Middle East command structure proposed in this paper if the U.S. should insist that Saudi Arabia must be excluded from the Supreme Commander’s purview. Whichever hat the British Commander is wearing, the U.S. should acknowledge his authority so far as plans and the general character of the training program are concerned. We would assume, however, that the commander of U.S. activities in Saudi Arabia would represent the prospective Supreme Allied Commander with the function of supervising the training conducted by all training missions working in that country.

If the French insist on a positive role in the program (they may be content only to kibitz) this could only be in Syria and Lebanon. If these countries do not concur in France having a role comparable to that of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia, the question is dead because we cannot afford to jeopardize the program by forcing the French on either of these countries. If Syria and Lebanon are willing to have the French, arrangements could be made comparable to that of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia.

For obvious reasons, the U.K. would take the lead in Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan.

Nothing in the Middle East Command Structure would change U.S. supply and training responsibilities for Turkey; these two functions had best fall within the ambit of Turkey’s NATO membership.

Iran represents a special problem regarding which little progress appears possible at the present time; our ultimate objective should be to have the Commander of the U.S. training mission hold some form of mandate from the British Supreme Commander. The present political situation in Iran is so critical, however, that any public suggestion of such a relationship would cause strong reaction in Iran and might jeopardize the continuance of the U.S. mission.

Pakistan is deliberately included because of expressed Pakistan interests in the defense of this area, because it is a Moslem country, and because it constitutes a direct link with the British Commonwealth. The British would take the lead in Pakistan.

Where country leadership does not fall into a natural pattern as regards the U.S. or the U.K. (e.g., Libya, Lebanon, Syria) there would be advantages in having joint U.S.–U.K. training and supply missions work in these countries.

1. This paper was drafted the week following the first of the United States-United Kingdom military conversations on questions of regional command, during the course of which General Collins and Admiral Sherman first seriously raised the issue of a separate Middle East Command associated with NATO and including, at a minimum, Turkish and British military units under British command. For information on these meetings, see the editorial note, vol. iii, pt. 1, p. 522. Copies of this paper were sent to Bradley, Nitze, Matthews, Jefferson, Jones, McGhee, Martin, Perkins, General Taylor, Spofford, Knight, Sherman, Hull, Vandenberg, White, Admirals Duncan and Davis, and G. Lewis Jones.
2. Conceived for this purpose as the area comprising Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, the Arab States, Libya, and Israel. The U.K. might wish to leave this vague in order to avoid arousing further Iranian reaction. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Ante, p. 95.