330/5–1751: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations 1

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934. Be Syrian-Israeli dispute. In anticipation Netherlands formal request at next SC meeting for information sponsors views on whether Huleh project can be stopped until after all Arabs affected by engineering operation are satisfied by compensation and removal you may in your discretion point out the following:

1. US believes that any conflict of view over right of Chairman of MAC to authorize continuance of Huleh project in fact of possible solitary Arab opposition is up to MAC pursuant to Art 7, para 8. [Page 689] However, we are of opinion that Chairman of MAC has this right under full implementation clause Art 5, para 5 (c) when taken in consonance with Art 5, para 2 relating to gradual restoration of normal civilian life in zone. Provision for gradual restoration of normal civilian life cld be understood as having same effect as “promotion of the general welfare.”

2. We concur UK view that procedure outlined in Art 8 para 3 might be used by Israelis as means for negotiating resumption Huleh project through specific revision of Armistice Agreement. However, US believes that as result of enactment of pending SC res which directs Chief of Staff TSO “to take the necessary steps to give effect to this res for the purpose of restoring peace in the area and authorizes him to take such measures to restore peace in the area, etc”. Chief of Staff in our opinion cld at any time direct resumption of Huleh project pursuant to this SC Res if in his opinion such step wld contribute to restoration of peace in area.

With regard to possible allegations from either party that SC cannot impose on either party to agreement acceptance of additional powers of MAC Chairman, USDel can point out that, although Chief of Staff of TSO as Chairman of MACs in various armistice agreements is to assist parties to carry out agreements, by Res Aug 11, 1949, he is also agent of SC. As such SC can give him such powers as are necessary to enable him to discharge his mandate even though such powers were not anticipated by the Armistice Agreements, if in opinion of SC they are consistent and necessary SC’s carrying out requirements of UN Charter.

Acheson
  1. Telegram drafted by Mr. Ludlow; transmission approved by Mr. Wainhouse after clearance in NE and L/TJNA.