680.84A/5–1151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State 1

secret

1159. Re Deptel 1097 May 9.2 I agree thoroughly Dept’s estimate key position Egypt in relations between Arab states and Israel, but am not optimistic early Egypt moves towards peace settlement without considerably more incentive than they now believe exists.

As Dept aware, primary concentration Egypt political thinking currently on Anglo-Egypt relations. So far as Israel concerned, I am convinced leaders fed up with the whole question but lack desire or courage to hazard their personal political futures by attempting even initial steps in direction peace settlement. If they cld work for peace without loss of face, they wld probably do so, but none of them see way clear. Popular feeling is less thoughtful, but is roughly comparable to govt’s. Any change last six months either people or govt has been toward greater tiredness with problem, but not toward support constructive course doing something about it.

Conviction on part Egypt that attitude Israel has really changed wld certainly be helpful, but the point has long passed at which more “tact” wld contribute anything. Deeply skeptical of “words,” the only hope of building a background from which progress wld be possible is clear-cut, genuinely helpful, action.

Status refugees and lack confidence UN or West going to do anything materially relieve their situation form the core of the present Egypt discouragement with over-all problem. Accordingly, cooperation of interested major powers to effect a long-term solution of the refugee problem offers the best opportunity to remove the most important obstacle to Israel-Arab understanding. Such cooperation wld have to include large-scale financial assistance for reintegration. Israeli participation at least to extent making financial contribution and giving up part of Negeb (possibly to Jordan) is imperative to success. Egypt willing evacuate Gaza preferably to Jordan.

Lacking such an approach present situation, though onerous, apt to continue indefinitely. Large-scale US financial assistance to Israel in interim cannot fail mean serious deterioration present all-around relations and such assistance without at least commensurate aid to Arab states wld be disastrous blow to any hopes constructive solution.

Caffery
  1. Telegram repeated for information to London, Tel Aviv, and Arab capitals.
  2. In this telegram the Department had in part requested the Embassy to report on the then-present Egyptian attitude towards Israel, to identify any changes in Egyptian popular feeling towards Israel over the preceding six months, and to estimate “… Egypt’s price for settlement with Israel.” (674.84A/5–951)