Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Barrow)

confidential

[Washington,] May 7, 1951.

Subject:

1) The Iraqi Jews

2) The Huleh Controversy and a Final Settlement of the Palestine Problem

3) Grant Aid to the Near East

Participants:	Mr. Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee
	NEA—Mr. McGhee
	NE—Mr. Barrow

Discussion

1) The Iraqi Jews.

Mr. Blaustein had submitted a letter to Mr. McGhee, copy attached,¹ which, while not criticising the general principle of freezing of assets, took exception to a number of the aspects of Iraqi law and practice in this regard.² Mr. McGhee recalled the Department’s previous efforts on behalf of the Iraqi Jews, and assured Mr. Blaustein that the Department had and would continue to go about as far as we reasonably could in endeavoring to secure better treatment for them. He had spoken to the Iraqis about it during his recent trip to Baghdad.³ There were, however, as Mr. Blaustein could appreciate, certain limitations imposed upon any government in involving itself in the details of the internal legislation enacted by another country. Mr. McGhee said that the Indian Government was very much interested in the Negro problem in the United States, but if the Indian Embassy were to endeavor to tell us exactly how we should deal with the problem, we would no doubt resent it.

Moreover, an approach to Iraq on the subject of the frozen assets would invite Iraqi criticisms of the somewhat parallel situation existing in Israeli treatment of not only the assets of Arab refugees but also of Arab inhabitants in Israel.⁴ We did not pretend that these parallels necessarily condone the Iraqi actions, but they were nevertheless a factor to be considered.

Mr. McGhee said that we would bring Mr. Blaustein’s letter and memorandum to the attention of our Embassy at Baghdad and would request that the Embassy go as far as it felt it could in ameliorating the situation, but the limitations of the action we could take in this regard should be borne in mind. It was further agreed that the Department would authorize the Embassy at Baghdad to approach the Iraqi Government regarding an extension of the May 31 deadline of Jewish emigration from Iraq in order that the airlift program could be completed.⁵

Mr. Blaustein then asked Mr. McGhee if he had any objection to his publishing the information contained in his letter and memorandum and mentioning his talk with Mr. McGhee without reporting Mr. McGhee’s reaction or associating the Department with the information in any way. Mr. Blaustein said that members of his organization who were experts on the Near East believed that giving the Iraqi actions the full light of publicity and bringing public opinion to bear would be one of the best means of convincing Iraq to take a more moderate attitude.

Mr. McGhee said that Mr. Blaustein was certainly entitled to publish the information if he wished to, but voiced doubts that publicity of this kind would seriously influence the Iraqi Government, and, even if so, might influence it adversely. He urged Mr. Blaustein to consider the reaction in Iraq very carefully.⁶

2) The Huleh Controversy and a Final Settlement of the Palestine Problem.

Mr. Blaustein said he was greatly concerned over the Huleh controversy and asked if there was any message that Mr. McGhee would like him to relay to the Government of Israel. Mr. McGhee reviewed in general terms the facts of the controversy stating that it appeared to have its origin in the efforts of the Israel Government to undertake the Huleh drainage scheme in spite of the request of the United Nations Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission that work be halted pending negotiations with the Arab land owners whose property was being expropriated under the scheme. Mr. McGhee said the Security Council was meeting on May 8 to consider the question and made no direct response to Mr. Blaustein’s offer to speak with the Israeli authorities.

Mr. Blaustein then said that the Huleh controversy and the situation of the Iraqi Jews were all just symptoms of one fundamental malady, the lack of a final settlement of the Palestine problem. He said that he and his colleagues have been giving a great deal of thought to the question, and it was the consensus that Egypt was the key country to bring to a settlement since all the others would probably fall in line if Egypt was the first to conclude peace. Mr. McGhee agreed that Egypt was logically the key country insofar as the Arab side of the problem was concerned, but he said that during his recent visit to Egypt he saw no signs that the Egyptians were ready to make peace unless substantial concessions were offered by Israel.

Mr. Blaustein said he wondered if there was anything he, as a non-Zionist American in no way associated with the Israel Government, could do to bring Egypt and Israel together. If he or someone like him could only talk with the Egyptians to ascertain their conditions for a peaceful settlement, it might be possible for him to persuade friends in Israel to make an offer along these lines.

Mr. McGhee said that he would try to arrange a meeting between Mr. Blaustein and the Egyptian Ambassador. He did not know how productive the meeting would be but thought that it was worth trying.

3) Grant Aid to the Near East.

Mr. Blaustein said that he had seen the President the previous day and had left with him a letter setting forth the views of his organization on the $150 million grant aid bill for Israel now pending in the Congress. In one part of his letter he implied that the State Department was blocking passage of this bill and that the President should overrule the State Department’s objections.

Mr. Blaustein said that he was aware of our feeling that the question of grant aid should be approached on a regional basis and that impartiality had to be shown to the Arab States and Israel. He feared, however, that if this area approach to grant aid were adopted (a) the voting of the funds by the Congress would be long delayed, and (b) Israel would not receive an adequate sum to meet its urgent requirements.

Mr. McGhee said that the Department sincerely desired to help Israel out of its economic difficulties, but it would simply not be either fair to other countries or orderly from an administrative standpoint to make grant aid to Israel separate from the omnibus aid program which we had been working on for quite some time, indeed even before the Israel grant aid request had been submitted. In fact, as a matter of procedure, grant aid to the Near East had been made a part of the global omnibus aid bill, since Congress quite reasonably wanted to see just how much our foreign aid bill amounted to and whether it was being apportioned throughout the world on an intelligent basis.

Mr. Blaustein said that he did not object to the area approach in principle, but he was still concerned lest Israel not be given an adequate amount to meet its requirements. He said that if the sum being considered was in the vicinity of $20 or $25 million it would be completely inadequate. Mr. McGhee said that the grant to Israel as well as to other countries would have to be considered primarily in the light of how much foreign aid the United States could afford, taking into account the legitimate needs of all countries. Possibly no country would receive all that it wanted or felt it needed; we would just have to do the best we could.

1. Mr. Blaustein’s letter of April 19 to Mr. McGhee is not printed.
2. On March 10, the Iraqi Government had frozen the assets of those Iraqi Jews who had registered for emigration from Iraq to Israel. Previous Iraqi legislation had deprived those Jews who registered of their citizenship. Information on these subjects is in files 357.AC, 784A.00, 884A.1887, and 887.411 for 1951.
3. Mr. McGhee had been in Baghdad during the third week in March. Record has not been found in Department of State files of any representations made to the Iraqi Government on this subject during his visit.

4. On this ground the U.S. Government had refused an Israeli request of March 20 that it intercede with Iraq in the matter of frozen assets. (Despatch 534 from Tel Aviv, March 21, enclosing Israeli aide-mémoire of March 20, 884A.1887/3–2151; telegram 393 to Tel Aviv, March 23, 357.AC/3–2151; airgram 231 to Tel Aviv, April 17, 884A.1887/3–2151)

   The formal reply dated May 1 of the United States to this and other requests of Israel on the subject of Jewish emigration from Iraq forms enclosure 1 to despatch 39, from Tel Aviv, July 12. (884A.1887/7–1251)

5. In telegram 549 to Baghdad, May 9, approved for transmission by Kopper, the Department stated it believed on the basis of recently received information that Iraq might extend this time limit on its own initiative. “However, shld Iraqis not act Emb is authorized discreetly pt out at optimum moment: (1) TJSG believes Israel making max effort complete airlift; (2) inter alia, halt in evacuation process wld impose severe burden upon Iraqi Govt in resolving problem of denationalized Jews left in Iraq.” (884A.1887/5–951)

   No direct reply to this telegram has been found in Department of State files. Telegram 765 from Baghdad, June 2, reads as follows: “NEAT rep states airlift denationalized Jews to Israel will be completed by end of June. Operations continue monthly; no govt action taken re unofficially mentioned May 31 dead-line nor announcement made of future deadline.” (884A.1887/6–251)

6. Joint Weeka 79 from Tel Aviv, July 6, reported in part that the movement of 106,662 Jews from Iraq to Israel would be completed in the near future. (784A.00(W)/7651)