Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

683.84A/4–1551: Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Damascus, April 15, 1951—3 p. m.

536. UN official has discussed with me in strict confidence his views on how UN authority is to be restored in Syro-Israel dispute over demilitarized zone. Summary his remarks follows:

1. Can Israelis bring armed police into the zone? Syrians strongly affirm police may only be recruited from local population pointing to Bunche’s reply dated June 26, 1949² to question raised at last meeting Syrian-Israeli armistice comm June 21,³ heading in part as follows:

“Such civilian administration (referred to in para 5 of armistice agreement) including policing will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of admin, jurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignty.” Israeli place stress however on subsequent passage in same letter stating admin and police in zone wld be “Arab” and “Israeli” respectively. Syrians declare Bunche clearly meant local Jewish population in zone when referring to “Israelis”. Only SC with perhaps Bunche as witness can clear this question up. Up to 250 Israeli police now in central zone and number shld be reduced to Mar 15 level. Arab villages shld be policed by Arabs.

2. Does Israel have sovereignty over zone? Acting Chief Staff Truce Observation Comm, has already informed Israelis their claim to sovereignty is untenable under the Armistice Agreement and that Israeli territory ends where zone begins. However only SC can give ruling that will be respected by Israel. In letter to Sharett also dated June 26, 1949⁴ Bunche stated “questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be dealt within ultimate peace settlement and not in Armistice Agreement”. Israeli official documents before UN asserting zone within Israeli territory should not be allowed to stand in record.

3. Has chairman of MAC authority stopped work on drainage project as MAC asserts it has? Riley’s memo on Lake Huleh project (Jerusalem Contel 165, Mar 7)⁵ ordered work stoppage but Israel is not only refuse obey it but have resorted to subterfuge to offset memo. Thus, two hours after Riley departed for US Colonel Ramati declared Riley had orally agreed withdraw memo but his political adviser denied this. On Mar 14 Ramati succeeded in getting Bossavy to sign two letters drafted by Ramati in English at variance with directive in Riley’s memo. On Apr 12 Shiloah said he had just reed tel from Washington saying Riley had orally concurred in plane set forth in Bossavy’s letter. Political adviser refused accept this statement unless direct from Riley.

4. It is essential that Arabs forcibly removed by Israelis from zone be returned to their homes as MAC insists if its authority and terms of armistice agreement are to be upheld. Only 40 to 50 Arabs are left in central zone out of approx 1100 in mid-March. At least 650 now in Israeli custody and remainder fled to Syria. One killed by Israeli police when he resisted removal.

UN official also said urgent temporary need exists for six more trained observers not below the rank of Captain. He preferred these be American and doubted wisdom of recruiting observers of other nationality. In response my query he emphatically said he did not think armed UN escorts shld be assigned to observers.

In conclusion he said SC session wld be farce if it only resulted in “condemnatory resolution” without making clear cut decisions on above specific issues.⁶

Cannon

1. Repeated for information to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
2. For text, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.542, p. 31.
3. 1949.
4. This message had also been sent to the Syrian Foreign Office. A longer portion is quoted in U.N. Doc. S/PV.542, p. 30.
5. Not printed. (683.84A/3–751) It contains the document quoted in footnote 5, p. 591.
6. In telegram 535 from Damascus, April 15, Minister Cannon had stated in part: “Now that Syrian-Israeli dispute is to be debated before SC it seems to us that for evaluating effectiveness MAC machinery henceforth and consequently for determining US policy it is essential that issue of sovereignty in the demilitarized zone be denned at outset. … Our concern is lest UN might prefer to seek settlement by handing problem back to MAC with some formula designed to strengthen MACs prestige instead of grappling with this fundamental issue of sovereignty.” (683.84A/4–1551)