IO Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs
US/S/1720
Subject:
- 1)
- Egypt Blockade at the Suez Canal
- 2)
- Huleh Crisis
- 3)
- Projected Supplementary Report
- 4)
- Possibility of General Riley’s Replacement as Chief of Staff
| Participants: | General William E. Riley—USMC, Chief of Staff, UN Truce Supervision Organization Mr. James Ludlow—UNP |
1) Egyptian Blockade at the Suez Canal—General Riley briefly outlined to me what he considered must be the nature of the opinion which he will give as Chairman of the Special Committee provided for under Article 10 of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement.1 While this decision is subject to possible revision after consultation with Ralph Bunche and Abe Feller, he contemplates holding that the action by the Egyptian Government in obstructing shipment through the Suez Canal destined for Israel must of necessity be considered as a hostile act, but not necessarily against the General Armistice Agreement because of the limitations imposed on the term “hostile act” in the text of Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement. This paragraph reads “No element of the land, sea or air, military or para-military forces of either party, including non-regular forces shall commit any war-like or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other party or against civilians in territory under the control of that party”. He will add that the imposition of blockade controls through the Suez Canal is an aggressive action, but again not necessarily against Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the General Armistice Agreement, in view of the limitation in the text to “armed forces, land, sea or air of either party”.
The effect of his decision will be that the MAC does not have the right to demand from the Egyptian Government that it not interfere with the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal while at the same time accusing them of violating the spirit of the Agreement. He believes that it is essential that the decision be so constructed as to insure the possibility of continued cooperation of the two parties to the General Armistice Agreement. We discussed the likelihood of the problem being brought before the Security Council and he indicated that he was cognizant of this likelihood, but felt that any decision he rendered would be challenged by one or both of the parties. I told him that it was our understanding that the British were somewhat concerned by the delay in the decision and that they, of their own accord, might raise the matter of the obstruction of the Canal, possibly in the Security Council.
General Riley stated that he had been somewhat embarrassed by the fact that the Israelis knew that he had asked for comments from the legal department of UN, since he felt that the Israelis would ask that the information, which they understood to state that the MAC did have competence in handling the particular issue, should be made a public record. He stated that he understood from the Israelis that the [Page 617] Department of State had indicated to the Israelis that we believe that the MAC had competence. I told him in reply that his use of UN’s legal information was entirely up to him. So far as the Department was concerned, it was our belief that under the November 17, 1950 resolution, the Security Council required a decision from him and that it was implicit in the resolution and in the statements made by the Members of the Council in discussing the resolution, that the MAC had competence to handle the case. However, he should not be concerned with the possibility that his decision would differ with what he understood from the Israelis was the position of this Government with regard to the MAC’s competence. He was an agent of the UN and not of the US and was therefore to make a decision as required by the resolution. The important thing to the US was only that the machinery of the Armistice Agreements continue to function as satisfactorily as possible and receive the backing and support of the Security Council.
I asked General Riley about the timing of his decision and he stated that he had no specific date in mind, but that it would be necessary to call together a special committee before a decision could be rendered and he was not sure when this would be done either by himself or by his Deputy. I told him that we would appreciate any indication he might give concerning the time of such decision.
[Here follow discussions of the Huleh conflict, TSO administrative matters, and a replacement for General Riley.]
- Of February 24, 1949. Text is in U.N. Doc. S/1264/Corr.1 and Add.l.↩