You will note that the Working Group directed attention in Section
VII of the memorandum to the need for the formulation of answers to
several major questions of policy. I hope that it will be possible
for the Department of Defense to consider these questions prior to
discussions with the British.
I believe that it would be desirable for the discussion with the U.K.
to be handled at the same level and with the same security as the
politico-military talks with the U.K. which took place in the
Pentagon on October 26, 1950. In the absence of Ambassador Jessup, we propose to designate Mr.
Paul Nitze and Assistant
Secretary of State McGhee to
represent this Department. I will appreciate knowing your thoughts
on this matter.
[Annex]
Memorandum Prepared by the State–Defense
Working Group Established To Discuss the Implementation of
NSC 47/5
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Assumptions, Criteria and Objectives
of
NSC 47/5, “United States Policy Toward the Arab States and
Israel”
(This memorandum contains the results of
discussions of the State–Defense Working Group on April 26, 1951
set up at the request of the same date from the Secretary of
State to the Secretary of Defense.)
i. area concerned and interests of the U.S
and the U.K. therein
The Arab States and Israel in which the United States and the
United Kingdom have an overall common strategic interest as well
as special interests as follows:
Saudi Arabia: Special U.S. interests in
Dhahran Airfield and oil. Special (secondary) U.K. interests in
training mission in Taif; protection Persian Gulf
Sheikhdoms.
Egypt: Special U.K. interest in
Anglo-Egyptian treaty (bases); Sudan; Suez Canal movement;
Egyptian cotton. Special (secondary) U.S. interest: wartime use
of British bases in Egypt; Suez Canal movement. French interest
in Canal also.
Israel: Shared U.S.–U.K. interests in
land communications via Israel in war; use Israeli manpower;
settlement Arab-Israeli differences; naval facilities Haifa;
Haifa refinery; policy of impartiality between Arabs and
Jews.
Jordan: Special U.K. interest in
Anglo-Jordan treaty (bases); U.K.-supported Arab Legion;
opportunity Arab refugee resettlement. Special (secondary) U.S.
interests similar those U.K.
Iraq: Special U.K. interest in
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (bases); IPC
oil. Special (secondary) U.S. interests similar those U.K.
French interest in IPC.
Syria: Neither U.S. nor U.K. possess
special interests; French special interests: sale of arms;
cultural and economic.
Lebanon: Neither U.S. nor U.K. possess
important special interests but U.S. interested in the pipeline
outlet and refinery at Tripoli, and AUB as cultural center; French special interests
largely cultural and economic.
Recapitulation:
Special US
Interest
|
Special
UK
Interest
|
US–UK
Shared
Interest
|
French
Interest
|
US–UK–France
Interest
|
| Saudi Arabia |
Egypt |
Syria |
Syria |
Implementation of
Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950 |
|
Jordan |
Israel |
Lebanon |
|
Iraq |
Lebanon |
|
[Page 125]
Note: During the early stages of the
development of the program envisaged in NSC 47/5 the area concerned must be carefully
restricted to states named; at a later stage the Persian Gulf
Sheikhdoms, Libya–Yemen and other peripheral areas may be
considered for inclusion.
ii. the nature of the nsc 47/5 program
Program is primarily a political weapon designed to strengthen
the several Arab States and Israel; to improve their political
and economic stability and to increase their will and ability to
resist penetration by the USSR. It follows that political
grounds must be accepted as justification for aid. As plans
develop regarding the defense of Arabian peninsular oil, the
program will take on a more positive aspect for the U.S. in
Saudi Arabia.
iii. form of aid envisaged in nsc
47/5
Aid under the program will have the following forms:
| A. Economic
|
Source
|
| 1. IBRD Loans |
International |
| 2. Exim Bank Loans |
U.S. |
| 3. Point IV and related |
U.S. |
| 4. Grant Aid |
U.S. for all countries |
|
U.K. for Jordan |
| 5. Procurement assistance |
U.S. and U.K. |
| 6. Refugee resettlement |
U.S., U.K. and France within U.N.
(possibly U.S. outside U.N.) |
| 7. Emergency oil
conservation |
U.S. and U.K. |
| B. Propaganda
and Information
|
… |
| … |
|
C. Arms Supply—Cash and
Grant
1. U.S. arms aid must be in accord with statutory requirements;
i.e., President must find arms so furnished contribute to the
security of the U.S.
2. It must be assured that arms will not be used contrary to
Bilateral Agreements with U.S. (i.e., Tripartite Declaration
protected).
3. Impartiality consistent with strategic considerations must be
preserved between the Arab States and Israel.
4. Impartiality will have to be preserved in character of arms
supplied.
5. Arms aid should be associated with political quid pro quos that are of general benefit to the West
in the Cold War; for example, the British effort in Jordan and
the U.S. at DAF must be
conceived as of general benefit to the West.
6. Arms aid must be handled so that the countries of the area
will not neglect expenditures on economic and social
betterment.
[Page 126]
7. Arms aid can be accorded only in response to a governmental
request; i.e., governments must be prepared to back their
military in making requests.
8. Governments receiving U.S. aid must abide by all MDA requirements re inspection and
supervision of end use.
9. Any arms aid will be within the framework of a correlated
program for each country; …
10. Procurement assistance is the most valuable part of the
program since global arms requirements will continue to exceed
availabilities.
11. To conform to U.K. and French practice as well as to save
U.S. funds and effort the rule will be cash reimbursable
assistance; U.S. grant aid will be employed to achieve general
Western political objectives; U.S. Grant arms aid will be a
supplement.
12. Types of existing arms will be important factor in the supply
of new arms.
13. To avoid inter-country jealousies in the area re arms aid,
detailed country programs will be made known only to the
countries receiving the aid and in the U.S.–U.K.–France
correlation process.
14. Arms supply of all kinds from the U.S., U.K. or France should
be susceptible of being shut off at short notice in the event of
developments contrary to the Tripartite Declaration, coups d’états or riots.
iv. correlation of arms supply
Principal suppliers of arms will be the U.K., France and the U.S.
To meet the above criteria (including the criteria imposed by
U.S. legislation) a tripartite system of correlation is
required. This system should not be publicized and should work
so far as possible under cover.
The functions of such a tripartite system would be:
- A.
- A means for sharing information regarding the
armaments of the Arab States and Israel.
- B.
- To provide for consultation on U.S., U.K. and French
plans to fill arms requirements of individual countries
on either a cash or a grant basis. Advance knowledge of plans will:
- 1.
- Avoid embarrassments.
- 2.
- Permit arms supplies to be fitted into
programs of other countries.
- 3.
- Permit consideration re character of
arms.
- 4.
- Help prevent over-expenditures on arms by
individual states.
- C.
- Keep records of arms supplied.
- D.
- Be the system to assure arms are not used contrary to
tripartite declaration.
- E.
- Focal point for emergency shut-off of arms supplies
(see Criterion 13, above).
Such a system would not possess authority to stop arms supply by
any of the three members; would endeavor to operate on the
grounds
[Page 127]
of common
sense and honest dealing between members. Instances of serious
dispute would be referred to governments for diplomatic
handling.
v. u.s.–u.k. correlation on matters other
than the supply of arms
NSC 47/5 indicates a number of
lines of action in which the U.S. and the U.K. should correlate
their activities:
- A.
- In efforts to resolve Arab-Israel differences.
- B.
- To secure base rights.
- C.
- To develop fighting groups and techniques suitable to
local capabilities and terrain.
- D.
- In one of supply supervisory and technical personnel
for Near East military establishments.
- E.
- To make “show-the-flag” visits.
- F.
- To place orders for needed raw materials and
equipment.
- G.
- Expand and intensify U.S. psychological effort to
offset trend towards neutrality.
vi. correlation with france
NSC 47/5 does not specifically
envisage a correlation between the U.S., the U.K. and France on
matters set forth in the preceding paragraph. However, NSC 47/5 supplements NSC 47/2 and NSC 65/3 which envisaged (a) collaboration between the U.S. and
France, where desirable, to obtain basic objectives in the Near
East, and (b) cooperation on regulating the flow of arms to the
area. To what extent collaboration and correlation with France
is feasible and desirable is a matter for early discussion with
the U.K.
vii. u.s.–u.k. respective responsibilities
with regard to the arab states and Israel
Paragraph 3 of the Statement of Policy in NSC 47/5 does not make clear the nature of the
responsibility which the U.S. should have with regard to Saudi
Arabia. This should be clarified prior to U.S.–U.K.
politico-military conversations. There must also be a
clarification of the nature of the respective participation and
responsibilities of the U.S. and the U.K. in strengthening the
several Arab States and Israel. The recent conversations between
the U.S. and the U.K. military leaders at Malta undoubtedly have
some bearing on these questions. The settlement of the
Mediterranean Command question with the British and the French
is tied in closely. The State–Defense Working Group did not
attempt to determine the answers to these questions.
conclusions and recommendations
1. In preparation for politico-military talks with the U.K. in
the near future, answers should be formulated to the unresolved
questions in the immediately preceding paragraph (Section
VII).
[Page 128]
2. Departmental clearance in Defense and State should be sought
for the conclusions of the Working Group as set forth above.
3. State should be asked to approach the British Embassy to
arrange the U.S.–U.K. politico-military talks in the near
future, having in mind the fact that these talks should take
place before the program becomes public knowledge in the Budget
hearings.
4. An important item on the U.S.–U.K. agenda should be discussion
of the role of France in the entire program with a view to the
French Government being advised of appropriate phases of the
program as soon as possible and definitely in advance of it
becoming public knowledge.
