State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417
State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, May 2, 19511
| Participants: | General Bradley | Mr. Matthews |
| General Collins | Mr. Nitze | |
| General Vandenberg | Mr. Perkins | |
| Admiral Sherman | Mr. Ferguson | |
| General Bolte | [Mr. McGhee] | |
| General White | Mr. Tufts | |
| Admiral2 | Mr. Gleason | |
| Admiral Wooldridge | ||
| General2 | ||
| Admiral Lalor | ||
| Colonel Carnes |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Subject:] Report on Mr. McGhee’s Tour
Mr. McGhee: As you know, I have just returned from a meeting of our Ambassadors. Admiral Carney was at this meeting and he was very helpful. The meeting covered a wide range of problems and I would like to report on them briefly. I would like to get your judgment on a number of matters.
The Security of the Area
As a result of my trip I can re-affirm the need for a more positive policy in relation to the Arab States along the lines indicated in NSC 47/5. The basic justification for this is political. The great preoccupation in the area is the problem of security. These countries do [Page 114] not have arms and do not have means of developing strength. For example, Iraq wants arms. It has two divisions in the North and would like to place two more divisions in the North if the arms could be made available. The Syrian Prime Minister also told me that Syria wants arms although Syria has taken a neutralist position. The Lebanese Prime Minister told me that we can use their bases in time of war but that there must be no French involved. The Israelis also want arms. They are disappointed that the attitude of the Arab States will not permit them to play a role outside Israel. The Egyptians also want arms and are aware of the great significance of the present impasse with the British. The Egyptians have just turned down the U.K. proposal regarding the treaty. The problem is in large measure the parliamentary situation in the U.K. Bevin made a reasonable proposal, namely a phased withdrawal by 1956. The British position stiffened because of the parliamentary reaction. Egypt wants the British out in 18 months. The Egyptians are solid on the Sudan problem.3 If the British do not accede to their wishes, the Egyptians are prepared for an impasse and for forcing the British out. They could withdraw the labor employed by the British. They could cut off the water supplies. The King and the Prime Minister do not want an impasse but public sentiment is so high that no Egyptian Government can accept the U.K. proposal. I am not sure that any agreement can be obtained. There is not much possibility of cooperation with Egypt while this problem is unsolved. The lack of cooperation may negate the value of keeping troops in Egypt. The U.K. Command does not attach much importance to keeping a striking force in Egypt. The Command does think it important to keep the headquarters in Egypt and the Command is largely responsible for the stiff British attitude.
Nationalism
There is a rising tide of nationalism throughout the area. We must consider carefully whether we can support British policy in the Middle East. Because Britain is opposed to this nationalist development, the British are increasingly unpopular in the area and are a liability to us. This liability is such that it may exceed the military value of cooperating with them in the area.
Regional Approach
The regional approach to the problem of defense was fully justified by what I found on my visit. I am sure that there should be a small flow of arms to the area. I think we must coordinate our efforts with the British. One problem will be to reconcile our policy of giving arms with the British policy of selling arms. A second problem is [Page 115] what relationship should there be between the U.K. and the U.S. in peacetime in this area. We may as well face the fact that there isn’t a complete meeting of the minds between you and the British Chiefs regarding the division of responsibility in the area. The Turks do not want to accept the idea of U.K. responsibility. The Greeks and the Iranians won’t even discuss it. The British are primarily responsible in the Arab States although Saudi Arabia is our responsibility. However, the U.K. wants, and thinks they have, responsibility in Saudi Arabia. There has been some friction with Robertson4 on this matter. The rest of the Arab States and Israel have been a British sphere of influence. If both we and the British provide arms, who will have responsibility? Some decision is necessary about who is to take the major initiative with Syria, Lebanon and Israel. In the rest of the Arab States the U.K. has to take the initiative. There is a question about how this should be related to the Turkish, Greek and Iranian programs.
Admiral Sherman: There is no question of Greece. Greece is in the Balkans.
Mr. McGhee: I agree. But there is a question about Turkey and Iran.
General Collins: You say that these people are all worked up. Are they worked up to resist Communism or are they worked up about the problem of Israel?
Mr. McGhee: They are worked up about the need to resist Communism. For example, Iraq voted to declare the Chinese Communists an aggressor. They want to build up a defense line against a Soviet attack.
General Collins: You also said that the animosity against the British is such that the British are detrimental to our interests in the Middle East.
Mr. McGhee: I should have said animosity against the West. Our interests are the same as the Western interests in the Middle East. We want to prevent the defection of these countries in the cold war et cetera. The antagonism against the British extends to the West as a whole. If we could solve that problem we would have a plus factor in the Middle East. That would outweigh the present advantages of the British position.
Admiral Sherman: I note that you have not mentioned the French. Is this just a U.S.–U.K. problem or are the French in? My personal view is that the problem is partly the growth of national feelings and partly a shrewd estimate by these countries that the U.K. is no longer a great Power. If the U.K. agrees to one change, then these countries will demand more changes. The question for us is [Page 116] whether we inject ourselves into this situation and try to pick up the pieces so that the Soviet Union won’t be able to pick them up or do we act as a group of nations of whom the French could be one?
Mr. McGhee: Syria and Lebanon will never have French troops. The reactions in the Middle East to the French action in Morocco5 were very severe. The French are a complete liability. There was a half day’s agitation in Pakistan about the Moroccan situation. The French are selling arms on a considerable scale in this area.
General Collins: In that case, why should we give arms?
Mr. McGhee: They cannot obtain arms at the level of shipments which they need. The basic problem is a cold-war problem. They do not feel that they have any support from the French in this problem.
General Collins: They cannot at one and the same time want the French in and want them out.
Mr. McGhee: They do not want the French in.
General Collins: All that you have said this morning indicates to me that you have concluded that we should take over in the Middle East.
Mr. McGhee: That depends on how much we want to do in the area. If we had the necessary forces, it might be desirable for us to take over but I understand we do not have the strength.
Admiral Sherman: In terms of the drain on our economic and financial resources, do we not have to consider whether these grant programs of military assistance are an obstacle to doing something effective militarily? I don’t think we kid the Russians much by these programs. The people who are receiving these weapons are never going to use them. Therefore, we decrease our own military capabilities by these programs.
General Collins: What is the explanation of the low rate of MDAP deliveries which Mr. Nitze mentioned? I take it that the combined drain of our assistance programs and our own defense program exceeds our productive capabilities consistent with the maintenance of a civilian economy. Therefore, we have to ask where this assistance is coming from; what programs will we cut to provide this assistance to the Middle East?
General Bradley: I remember that the Shah of Iran casually asked us for 150 tanks on his visit 18 months ago.6
General Vandenberg: I think that there is a solution but it is one of an old-fashioned kind. It is based on the factor which Admiral Sherman brought out. All these countries are turning to the U.S. as the dominant power. In many respects they understand the use of power better than we do. Our entire history has been opposed to the [Page 117] playing of power politics. When anyone puts pressure on us, we resist because that is our way of life. These other countries are used to pressure. We are trying in effect to achieve our purposes in the area by bribery; bribery will bankrupt us and, furthermore, it will prevent us from exercising power. Perhaps we should get tough and use our power. Perhaps we should tell these countries what to do. We might get farther by using old-fashioned power politics than by using assistance programs. By sending our fleet and by flying our bombers around, we would get more cooperation at less cost.
Admiral Sherman: Another factor is that we supply not only equipment but the best equipment. With the development of these integrated forces and the adoption of the principle of standardization, every little NATO country wants the best equipment there is. We and the British were dominant in the 19th Century because technology was superior to human muscle power.
General Bradley: We have got to recognize that times have changed and that it is no longer wise to play power politics in the old way.
Mr. Matthews: We are in a new era and the forces of nationalism are such that power politics of the old-fashioned variety won’t do the job.
General Bradley: I agree, however, that we cannot equip everyone.
Mr. Matthews: We have got to balance local advantages versus broad disadvantages.
General Collins: I am afraid that we are not getting forward in helping Mr. McGhee.
Mr. McGhee: I fully agree that the basic problem is the strength of the U.S. Once these countries see that we are the most powerful nation, we will be in a much better position to influence developments. Now, however, they see that we are weak. The Iranians attribute their present great difficulties to the fact that we did not provide enough aid.
Turning to Greece and Turkey, I am glad to learn that it has been decided to seek their admission into NATO. I feel very strongly that we need to give a security commitment to Turkey. Turkey is our greatest asset in the Middle East. There is a real danger that the Turks will chose neutrality if they cannot obtain a security commitment. We cannot be sure that we will have Turkey as an ally unless we extend a security commitment. They are ready to build 25 additional divisions if we will help them.
General Collins: With what will we equip them? Where are we going to find the equipment? We could afford to provide additional aid in the form of assistance in training et cetera and we should do this but I don’t know how to solve the equipment problem.
[Page 118]Mr. McGhee: We should at least bring them into NATO.
Saudi Arabia
If we reduce the period for which we want access to Dhahran to 10 years and if we can get about $15,000,000 worth of aid, I think we can get the rights we want in Dhahran. I think everyone is agreed that 25 years is a longer period than we need.
Iran
The situation in Iran is very uncertain. Mossadeq is a violent Nationalist and is against all foreigners, particularly the British but including the Russians and ourselves. He is an unknown quantity. He has been the leader of the opposition party in the Majlis. Ambassador Grady is going to see him for the first time today. The vital question is, of course, the future of AIOC. We could not take the loss of the Abadan refinery. The driving force here is Nationalism. The British could have accommodated themselves to this situation but they did not meet the question when they should. As things now stand, they have lost the concession. I am not even sure that an arrangement can be made under which they would continue to run the property. The law provides and the policy is that the oil should flow to the old customers. I think that much could still be achieved. It might also be possible to get a deal by which the British would operate the property and dispose of the oil in the old markets. Mossadeq is the key to this situation. Razmara, Ala and the Shah have been dominated by the Majlis. The Shah could not run the Majlis as his father did. It is an irresponsible Parliament which could and did stymie the efforts of Razmara and Ala to govern in a constitutional way. Mossadeq, however, is master of the Majlis. He was criticized strongly during the May Day riots. I think we do not need to worry about his attitude toward the Soviet Union. If we can get on a solid basis with him, perhaps we will be able to work with him. If we can’t work with him, we are indeed in a bad situation. I think we must take positive action in this situation and must specifically provide aid. Iran can stand up to the Soviet Union only to the extent that it is backed up by the U.K. and the U.S. Teheran and most of the important cities are north of the mountains. The fact that we have not extended aid to Iran accounts for the tendency to accommodate to the Soviet Union. If this tendency is to be overcome, we must provide physical evidence of aid, both military and economic.
Admiral Sherman: Can you tell us where to take this aid from? I think we have reached the position where it is necessary to budget our total aid program. It is my own view that when we have prepared such a budget we will conclude that the Middle East is a very important area. But right now if we are to provide additional aid to [Page 119] the Middle East, we have got to take it from the Philippine Program or the Indochina Program or from some program.
Mr. McGhee: This is a cold-war problem we are dealing with, not a shooting-war problem. We aren’t asking for very much aid.
General Collins: The basic point on which I part with you is that we have to furnish aid in every such situation. It seems to me that we ought to bring whatever pressure we can on the U.K. Foreign Office so that it will bring pressure on AIOC. I think that is the point at which to apply pressure. If the British had forced the AIOC to make a compromise settlement, we would not be in this difficulty now and the Iranians would have had dollars with which to buy the equipment they want. I disagree with you that the difficulties in Iran are our fault.
Mr. Matthews: We have been trying to do just that. We have brought pressure to bear on the U.K. Foreign Office to do these things.
Mr. McGhee: We have to remember that we are dealing with Britain’s most important economic asset abroad. We cannot effectively bring pressure on the U.K. in this matter. I appeared before the AIOC Board and told them about the dangers of nationalization et cetera. We talked at length with the British Ambassador here in Washington. We told him that the British were not going far enough. I regret to say that what we told him was right. When we seek a positive basis, we find time and again that a positive line on our part turns on the question of aid. Ambassador Wiley, when he was in Iran, always said that he had no tools with which to work. Ambassador Grady has said the same thing. Iran has gone down-hill. The only means I know of stopping this is to provide aid.
General Collins: We can send some aid. Of course the problem is not so much financial as it is a problem of production.
Mr. McGhee: We are only asking for $10,000,000 to $20,000,000. I know that this all adds up to a large sum but Iran is a weak spot.
Admiral Sherman: I agree but we have got to find the place to take it away from.
Mr. McGhee: The Secretary has not yet approved our proposals but I think he will. We are going to ask Congress for a special program of $50,000,000 of economic aid if he approves. I also feel that they need a larger flow of military equipment. Tanks stopped the strike in Abadan.
General Vandenberg: We cannot solve this problem until State determines the allocation of resources.
Mr. McGhee: I understand that. I will have to be a claimant with Mr. Cabot.
[Page 120]Pakistan
Pakistan wants to play a role in the Middle East. Public opinion in Pakistan would demand resistance to an attack on Iran. They would do almost anything if the Kashmir problem could be settled. Liaquat is strongly on our side. He has burned his bridges behind him. Pakistanis are good fighters and they can raise almost any number of men. Again, however, there is an equipment problem to be solved. With Pakistan, the Middle East could be defended; without Pakistan, I don’t see any way to defend the Middle East. Of course it is hard for us to give Pakistan any guaranty against India since India is a friendly country.
General Bradley: Perhaps we should throw civilian production in the ashcan and arm these countries—Pakistan, Turkey and Western Europe.
General Collins: We have not yet taken an overall look at the Middle East in these discussions. I think we have got to do that.
- A note on the source text reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.” There is no indication of the drafter’s identity. McGhee’s report on his tour of the Middle East and South Asia comprises pages 17–29 of the source text. The first half of the meeting (pp. 1–17) was devoted to discussions of Yugoslavia, Atlantic Command, Korea, Iceland, and Israel. For the portion on Israel, see p. 655. The final portion of the meeting (pp. 29–31) was devoted to a brief discussion of the current world situation.↩
- Surname not indicated in the source text.↩
- Surname not indicated in the source text.↩
- For documentation on the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Sudan, see pp. 343 ff.↩
- Sir Brian Robertson, Commander in Chief, British Middle East Land Forces.↩
- For documentation on French activities in Morocco, see pp. 1368 ff.↩
- For documentation on the visit of the Shah of Iran to the United States in November 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, pp. 471 ff.↩