747C.00/8–1351
Memorandum of Conversation, by Ben F. Dixon of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs
| Participants: | Mr. K. D. Jamieson, Second Secretary, British Embassy |
| Mr. J. Jefferson Jones III—UND | |
| Mr. Burton Kitain—BNA | |
| Mr. Ben F. Dixon—GTI |
Mr. Jamieson called on October 1 at 4 p. m., at the request of the Department, to receive an Aide-Mémoire1 in answer to the Aide-Mémoire of the British Embassy dated August 13, 1951,2 relating to Cyprus. A copy of the Department’s Aide-Mémoire is attached.
Mr. Jamieson, after reading the Aide-Mémoire, remarked that US views seemed closely to parallel those of the United Kingdom. He requested some elaboration on the position set forth in the second paragraph of the Aide-Mémoire. Mr. Dixon then gave an oral exposition of this matter based on Section V beginning on page 4 of the position paper for the use of the US Representative to the Anglo-American Colonial Policy Discussion to be held in London on October 9, 1951 (copy attached).3 The exposition given by Mr. Dixon generally covered the two categories: measures which might be taken to isolate certain issues from the Enosis problem in order to strengthen the position of the United States and the United Kingdom at the General Assembly; and, possible steps which might be taken eventually leading towards abatement of the Enosis agitation. Mr. Jamieson expressed interest in this discussion and the suggestions made. He said that these would be related to his Government. He made specific comment with regard to three of the points made.
Reiterating the Offer of Self-Government
Mr. Jamieson said that the Governor of Cyprus believed that making a formal offer of self-government would probably be inadvisable. To world opinion it would seem to occur so close to the meeting of [Page 538] the General Assembly as to be an obvious move to anticipate possible discussions on this score. Internally such a statement might lead to violent response on the part of the Cypriots, which would be contrary to the result to be hoped for. Furthermore, it might cast some doubt upon the sincerity of the original offer. Mr. Jamieson agreed, however, that discreet and timely public announcements or attempts to point up the fact that the offer is open, would be advisable.
Mr. Dixon referred to the fact that the Cypriots constantly maintain that they will not accept self-government because they will only accept Enosis. The Department is of the opinion that this is a fallacious argument, since Enosis is equally precluded under the present form of government as it would be under self-government; therefore, the attainment of self-government actually would have no altered bearing on the Enosis issue.
Anti-Sedition Laws
Mr. Jamieson said that he had only one observation to make with regard to the Department’s suggestion of repealing the anti-sedition laws and replacing them with measures having stricter penalties more stringently enforced but devoid of the element of deprivation of civil liberties. Specifically, such a change in the laws would rule out the possibility of being able to anticipate any nationalist or communist moves. Mr. Dixon replied that from the information available to the Department it did not seem that there were any activities of such a serious nature that anticipation would seem to be a necessary element to maintaining peace. In many cases the process of placing persons under bond not to break the peace could easily be replaced by the use of suspended sentences especially where habitual transgressors of the law were concerned. Mr. Jamieson observed that it is sometimes hard to write a water-tight law. The communists are usually good in finding loopholes and circumventing the purposes of the law. In connection with the anti-sedition laws, Mr. Jamieson remarked that the Cyprus Government was particularly interested in using the anti-sedition laws to try to drive a wedge between the nationalists and the communists and insofar as possible remove the communists as active proponents of Enosis, thus removing the pressure on the Ethnarchy. The rivalry between the two in advocating this issue had in good measure accounted for the present heightened stage of agitation.
Dual Nationality
Mr. Jamieson said this posed two practical difficulties; first, would it be necessary to give the Turkish population in Cyprus the same advantages with regard to Turkish citizenship? second, would Cypriots be liable to Greek conscription? He said such a step would in [Page 539] no way pacify the Greeks unless they would be given some authority in Cyprus, which would be unacceptable to the British Government. Furthermore, Mr. Jamieson said that while his Government was prepared to accept divided sentiment, they could not accept a situation leading to divided allegiance. Such a move, he felt, would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and would simply invite more trouble on the Enosis issue, Mr. Dixon replied that the Department had had no opportunity to explore this question in detail with the British. We realized, however, that the Foreign Office had made an extensive study of this matter. The Department’s view was simply that moves of this nature were helpful and constructive. In thinking of dual-nationality the Department did not have in mind that any far-reaching privileges should be granted to the Cypriots. Rather, the Department’s thinking had been in terms of the psychological effect of purely nominal Greek citizenship for those Cypriots who desired it. In answer to the points made by Mr. Jamieson, he said that Cypriots in Cyprus would owe their allegiance to the Government of Cyprus and would be fully subject to Cypriot laws. Although in Greece the allegiance of such Cypriots would be to the Greek Government and they would be constrained to follow Greek law, this would not affect their responsibilities or status at home. Mr. Dixon said he believed that the sentiment of Greek-ethnic Cypriots in Cyprus could know much greater bounds in their desire for union with Greece. Therefore, simple bestowal of Greek citizenship on those Greeks who desired, would be unlikely further to exacerbate the situation.