Editorial Note

The British Joint Services Mission, in its memorandum of April 6, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the combined letter of March 13 and were in full agreement that it was a matter of the greatest importance that both Pakistan and India should assist in the defense of the Persian-Iraqi Sector of the Middle East. An approach should be made to these two countries to achieve this end as soon as it would be opportune, although the British Chiefs of Staff appreciated that because of the Kashmir dispute, an early approach would almost certainly do more harm than good. The British Chiefs of Staff had asked that their views be furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had requested JCS comments or agreement.

After reviewing the noncommittal draft reply to be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. McGhee, in a memorandum to Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, Director, Joint Staff, dated April 30, urged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff give a more positive response. He explained:

“In doing so, I reflect the views of our chiefs of diplomatic missions in the Near East and South Asia, I recently met with these chiefs of mission at Istanbul and at Nuwara Eliya in Ceylon. Admiral R. B. Carney, Commander-in-Chief, NELM, participated in the Istanbul meeting and Captain Ernest M. Eller, USN, Commander Middle East Force, in the Nuwara Eliya meeting. It was agreed at both meetings that Pakistan, particularly, and India could play an important [Page 110] role in the defense of Iran and the Near East if the Kashmir dispute could be settled or its effects neutralized.”

Mr. McGhee suggested that in the first paragraph of the draft JCS reply the words “of major importance” be substituted for “desirable” or, as a less satisfactory alternative, the word “highly” should be inserted before “desirable”. If the change in wording should present serious difficulties “from the strictly military point of view,” Mr. McGhee suggested that the words “from the military point of view” might be deleted. He expressed concern over the wording of the second paragraph of the draft reply, noting that he did not believe that “we can or should defer so completely to British political judgments in the Near Eastern and South Asian area.” He proposed a new second paragraph:

“The United States Chiefs of Staff also agree that at the present time, owing to the Kashmir dispute, an attempt to enlist Indian and Pakistani support for the defense of Iran and Iraq would be inadvisable. They are of the opinion, however, that the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff should keep the politico-military situation in the subcontinent under continuing review in order that advantage may be taken of any opportunity that may arise to secure the participation of India or Pakistan or both in the defense of Iran and Iraq.” (Secretary’s Letters: Lot 56 D 459: “Middle East Defense”)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 10, 1951, in a memorandum to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, replied as follows:

  • “1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered your memorandum, RDC 1/16, dated 6 April 1951, and its attachment [the combined letter of 13 March], and are in agreement that, from the military point of view, it would be highly desirable for India and Pakistan to contribute forces to the defense of the Middle East.
  • “2. The United States Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that they and the British Chiefs of Staff should each, respectively, advise the appropriate agencies of their governments of the advantages, which from the military view, would result from the participation of India or Pakistan, or both, in the defense of Iran and Iraq in order that every opportunity may be seized by those agencies to further such participation.” (JCS Files)