781.00/9–1551: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State
secret

1266. Post-electoral polit situ may be summarized as fols:

It seems almost certain Papagos cannot have absolute majority though faint possibility exists he might wean sufficient Deps away from other parties.1 It is still possible that Venizelos and Plastiras together may have bare majority. However EPEKLib Govt wld be highly unstable due to slimness majority, distrust between two leaders and violent attacks to be anticipated from Gr Rally which wld feel, as overwhelmingly largest party, it was being cheated of office. Probability is that neither Papagos alone nor EPEKLib combination will have enough strength to form stable govt.

Papagos states categorically that he will not collaborate with any other party (since such party wld hamstring implementation his program) and that only solution is immed new elections under majority system. In discussing question with Marshal, Canelloupoulos and Markezinis, we have cited three disadvantages to immed election:

(1)
Additional two months neglect of pressing econ problems arising from growing inflation, cut in US aid, etc.;
(2)
Prolongation and increased embitterment polit campaign deepening fissure between right and left and perhaps stimulating further unhealthy polit activities in army.
(3)
Uncertainty that results of elections wld be improvement over present chamber in which workable conservative majority though split, does exist. While Rally leaders convinced they wld obtain clear majority in new elections, we pointed, out that on assumption Lib Party wld break up and Papagos receive one-third its recent vote, Plastiras might receive two-thirds as well as significant proportion EDA vote, resulting perhaps in approx even balance between right and left with cooperation between two rendered impossible by character of campaign. Papagos, however, deaf to these arguments claims election six months from now after he had taken unpopular econ measures but before they had had time to produce beneficial effect will be less favorable to him and demands elections now. He wld [Page 509] prefer to conduct them himself but might consent to service govt if its composition had his approval.

King and Venizelos strongly oppose immed elections, latter presumably because he foresees further weakening or dissolution his party, former because he wld thereafter be confronted with choice of Papagos or Plastiras. Palace favors three-party govt but this seems out of question. Venizelos cld perhaps be persuaded to accept coalition with Papagos but latter absolutely refuses. Unless, therefore, EPEK and Libs shld be able to form govt which wld be precarious at best we may be confronted next week with no practicable alternative to new elections.

I lay problem at this stage before Dept in order that if it shld feel effect in US or internationally of immed new elections wld be so unfortunate as to warrant further stronger representations on our party, it may immed instruct me to take such action in case need arises. I am far from sure that even very strong representations wld alter stand of Papagos who is deeply embittered by recent campaign against him, wholly distrustful of Palace and Venizelos and obsessed with somewhat Messianic belief that only if free and untrammeled can he save Greece. Further representations might well be, therefore, futile expenditure our credit. I doubt that any public statement on my part such as that recommended by Venizelos or Vendiris wld affect outcome and wld probably serve only to damage relations with Papagos. On the whole, I am inclined unless Dept feels disposed to put our whole weight behind prevention new elections, to let nature take its course reserving our influence to minimize insofar as possible disadvantages and dangers which we foresee that course will entail.2

Peurifoy
  1. Telegram 1194 from Athens, September 11, reported that “With almost all civilian votes in there is rather widespread feeling that elections have resulted in impasse.” The telegram then reported the election results to that date (781.00/9–1151). The final election returns, as announced by the Greek Ministry of the Interior on September 24 were as follows:

    Votes Seats
    Greek Rally (Papagos) 623,297 114
    National Progressive Union (Plastiras) 399,529 74
    Liberals (Venizelos) 324,482 57
    National Democratic Left 178,325 10
    Populist (Tsaldaris) 113,580 2
    Democratic Socialist (Papandreou) 37,033
    Agrarians 23,186 1
    Others 7,469

    Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1950–1952, p. 11836.

  2. Telegram 1379 to Athens, September 19, stated that the Department generally concurred with the Embassy’s analysis of the Greek political situation and likewise doubted if any public statement by the Embassy could substantially advance U.S. interests. “Dept believes dexterous management Emb’s position during difficult circumstances past weeks has well protected if not actually enhanced US prestige during this period.” The Department added that it was in no way reluctant to commit U.S. influence to any course of action which seemed clearly in the national interests. “However, at this moment in light present delicate, complicated situation and until opportunity presents itself in which US might beneficially and decisively effect developments in Greece, Dept concurs Emb’s recommendation let nature take its course while reserving our influence to minimize dangers which apparent to Emb and Dept.” (781.00/9–1551)