781.00/8–2451: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State
919. King received me yesterday. I told him that speaking both as Amb and personal friend, I was gravely concerned by recent partisan polit activities of Palace which boded ill, particularly if Papagos wins election. His Majesty assured me that he wld “engage no more in such activities,”
[Page 500]King, who apparently had been thoroughly briefed on our views by Venizelos (Embtel 890, August 22),1 was nevertheless obviously perturbed when I told him that if Eleftheria serial story “Papagos Affair” did not cease involving American officials and reporting twisted versions of their activities here during earlier polit crises, I might be forced to issue a statement to set record straight. His Majesty said that he sincerely hoped this wld not be necessary.
King then brought up subj of Queen’s request to Eleni Vlachos that Kathimerini switch its pro-Papagos line (Embtel 859, Aug 20).2 He explained that Queen and Miss Vlachos were old friends, that they met to discuss village relief, and that Queen had merely asked how so close a friend could support an enemy of court. (This inquiry according to Miss Vlachos took four hours.)
I told King that since Papagos was favorite in pre-election betting he shld take into account that he might well have to work with Marshal. He answered that if Marshal led field he wld not hesitate to offer him mandate although he fully realized that there might be certain difficulties between them. He said, for example, that Papagos might insist on certain change in army of which he as Commander-in-Chief wld disapprove. If Papagos controlled Parliament he could, of course, effect these changes by legislation and this wld be embarrassing to throne.
I thereupon suggested that King spare himself all possibility of embarrassment in this matter by ridding himself of this title of C-in-C before elections. His Majesty said that as matter of fact he had intended for some time to make someone else supreme commander of armed forces but had simply neglected to do so.
In this connection I said that we had been upset by Tsakalotos memo (Embtel 870, August 21)3 which was embarrassing not only to King but also to various high army officers. We were even more concerned by current rumors that Grigoropoulos and several others who had openly favored soldier voting were to be eased out of army. This I made clear wld have ill effect both at home and abroad, as wld any measures such as staged maneuvers, to prevent soldiers from exercising right to vote.
King replied that no such moves were contemplated.
I then told His Majesty that I was sure his interest like ours was to give Greece a stable and able govt and consequently if Greek Rally was first party, but did not secure working majority, we hoped he wld use his great influence to persuade other polit groups to cooperate with Papagos and make stable govt possible.
[Page 501]I closed audience by telling King that I not only admired really wonderful work which had made his Queen and himself best loved monarchs in Grk history, but that personally I was deeply grateful to them for their kindness to my family. We parted as we met in a spirit of friendship.
While it cannot be expected that extracurricular Palace activities will wholly cease, I believe that this interview and that with Venizelos will have moderating effect and perhaps forestall even more dangerous steps which might otherwise have been taken. It is worth noting that [George Vendiris], who was yesterday named secretary general to King replacing Pesmazoglou, has requested us earnestly to exercise our influence on King in favor of nonintervention and moderation. For contrary influences at work see my conversation with Levides (Embtel 918, August 24).4
- Supra.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Summarized in footnote 1, supra.↩
- Not printed; it reported on a conversation between Peurifoy and Grand Marshal of the Court Colonel Levides following the Ambassador’s interview with the King discussed in the source text. Levides expressed profound concern “with way things were going at Palace and possible disastrous results to throne and country which might occur therefrom.” (781.11/8–2451)↩