Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

top secret

Washington, July 6, 1951.

Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 103/1, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece.”¹

NSC 103/1 was approved as governmental policy on February 15, 1951. It is requested that this report, as of June 22, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

I Policy Implementation

The United States has continued to manifest publicly its continued support of the Truman doctrine as applied to Greece. The President and other high United States officials have cited Greece as an example of what can be accomplished with United States assistance in the struggle against international communism where the country threatened possesses the will to resist. The Secretary of State has publicly acknowledged that the United States is sympathetic to the desire of Greece (and Turkey) to frame some form of collective security arrangement which would include the United States and that, in the examination of this problem, consideration is being given to the inclusion of Greece (and Turkey) as full members of NATO.

On May 24, 1951 the President approved a revision of the Statement of Policy of NSC 103/1² which provides:

(1) that the United States should press now for the inclusion of Greece as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement, and

(2) that if full membership in NATO would be unacceptably delayed the United States should conclude alternative security arrangements which would include Greece and would not prejudice Greek membership in NATO at the earliest practicable date.

Accordingly, the United States has proposed that Greece (and Turkey) be accepted in NATO as full members. The matter is now under consideration by the Council of Deputies.³

The United States has actively encouraged closer cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia⁴ in recognition of the fact that the security of each country is vitally affected by the security of the other. In response to a Yugoslav inquiry the Greek Government advised Yugoslavia that:

(1) in the event of an attack against Yugoslavia, Greece is prepared to honor her obligations as a member of the United Nations,

(2) Greece presumes that Yugoslavia would do likewise in the event of an attack against Greece,

(3) Greece is prepared to enter into military staff talks with Yugoslavia at the convenience of the Yugoslav Government.

Yugoslavia has not yet made any move to initiate military staff talks with Greece.

Greek-Turkish staff talks have continued at intervals. Although a more cordial atmosphere may be detected, no substantive results are anticipated pending the conclusion of some type of formal security arrangements between Greece and Turkey, on the one hand, and the United States on the other.

The Greek Government has demonstrated an improved willingness to take measures and to enact legislation calculated to improve basic economic and social conditions. In international affairs Greek policy has been unswervingly anti-communist and has accorded unreserved support to the United Nations and particularly to the United States. In some respects the relations between the Government and United States representatives in Athens have been more satisfactory than in any other period since the inception of the aid program. However, the political situation has not attained a desirable degree of stability. The United States has at every opportunity urged Greek leaders to merge political parties and to make changes in the electoral system which would tend to produce a more stable government. Municipal elections were held April 15 for the first time since 1936. These elections, which were the first in which Greek women have participated, failed to disclose any increase in communist political strength. It may be necessary for the United States to take measures to discourage an increase of political intervention in the affairs of the Greek Armed Forces as a result of the resignation of Field Marshal Papagos on May 30, 1951.⁵

The economic program in Greece is, in general, moving from the reconstruction phase into the development phase. The objective of the development phase is to increase Greece’s ability to produce to a level at which foreign assistance will no longer be required. Progress has been made in re-orienting and implementing the economic program to meet changed international and domestic conditions. Emphasis is being placed on an increase in production, particularly foodstuffs, and items of personal equipment required by the Greek Armed Forces. The dangerous inflationary situation generated by menacing international developments has abated somewhat as a result of a drastic restriction of credits, more effective collection of existing taxes and the imposition of new taxes, and a ration program which is now in the process of development. This program is designed to support the standard of living of the population through the supply and rationing of basic essentials at fixed prices.

Cominform propaganda alleging that Greece, along with Yugoslavia and Turkey, is an instrument of aggressive US–UK imperialism in the Balkans has been increasingly virulent. The principal motives for this propaganda appear to be:

(a) to attempt to prepare a moral justification for any eventual aggression by the satellites themselves, and

(b) to divert attention of the Bulgarian and particularly the Albanian people from their increasing hostility to their own Moscow-dominated regimes.

The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), which has been active in Greece since late 1947 and on which the United States has consistently played a leading role, has recently issued statements indicating that charges that Greece is making aggressive preparations are without foundation in fact.

Evidence of a continuing increase in the military potential of Bulgaria is a cause of growing concern. United States military estimates concluded that as of April 1951 Bulgarian forces, equipped with between 500–600 T34 tanks, possessed the capability of occupying a substantial portion of north-central and north-eastern Greece and that unless the Greek forces received major logistical support as well as air and possibly naval support the Bulgarian forces could probably eventually occupy the mainland of Greece. Subsequent unconfirmed reports indicate Bulgarian armored strength may now possibly include more than 900 tanks of the T34 type or heavier. In addition to thousands of Russians strategically placed throughout the Bulgarian Government and armed forces, there are continuing unconfirmed reports of the existence of regular Soviet troop units in the Dobrujda area of northeastern Bulgaria.

There has been no significant increase in the military potential of Albania where internal conditions are deteriorating at a rate which must be genuinely alarming to the communist regime and to the Kremlin.

Nevertheless, the Albanian frontier continues to divert substantial Greek forces not only for defensive purposes, but also in anticipation of an opportunity to move into southern Albania in satisfaction of the longstanding Greek claim to the area of Northern Epirus should international developments permit. Recent open Yugoslav support of an Albanian refugee organization constitutes evidence of Yugoslav intent to bring Albania under Yugoslav hegemony if possible. The United States has, since World War II, consistently and strongly advised the Greek Government to employ a moderate and pacific policy regarding Albania. Nevertheless, Greek determination to realize their own territorial claims in Albania will tend to increase as Yugoslav designs in Albania become more apparent. Accordingly, the United States is presently attempting to evolve a clear policy with regard to Albania because of the close connection between such policy and United States policies toward both Greece and Yugoslavia, and particularly in order to make plans for dealing with any aggression in the Balkan area.

As of April 30, 1951 approximately 167 million dollars worth of military equipment approved under the FY 1950 and FY 1951 MDAP programs remains to be delivered. In light of the increasing military capability of the Soviet satellites, particularly Bulgaria, continuing re-examination of the adequacy of the United States military assistance programs for Greece is required.

II Policy Evaluation

United States policy with respect to Greece has continued slowly to increase military, economic, political, and social stability in Greece.

The Greek Government, while it falls far short of the necessary level of stability and efficiency, has nevertheless demonstrated a greater sense of responsibility than any Greek Government since the inception of the United States aid program. Industrial and agricultural production have continued to rise. Conditions exist under which Greece may be able, in the foreseeable future, to realize the most effective advance in economic development since World War II, provided international tensions do not increase.

Nevertheless, the position of Greece is precarious and will remain so until the struggle between the communist and non-communist worlds is resolved. Evidence points incontrovertibly to the fact that Greece remains a target of primary importance to international communism. The success of United States efforts in Greece has undoubtedly added to the difficulties of maintaining Cominform control in Albania and Bulgaria and provided reassurance to the Titoist defection of Yugoslavia.

United States policy with respect to Greece must continue to make provision for the fact that Greece is, and will remain, acutely sensitive to international developments. While there are no conclusive indications of an intention on the part of the Kremlin to bring about hostilies in the Balkans this year, there is also no assurance that such intentions do not exist, particularly in light of the significant increasing capability of the Soviet satellites to engage in offensive operations. Until some security arrangement is concluded with the participation of the United States, Greek morale will suffer and Greek participation in an effective defense of the Balkan area will not be fully assured or adequately planned. Some of the members of NATO have demonstrated reluctance to include Greece (and Turkey) in NATO. Nevertheless, although final NATO action cannot yet be predicted, vigorous U.S. sponsorship will, we hope, result in the admission of Greece. Consequently, there is no reason to seek an alternative form of security arrangement for Greece at this time, particularly in view of the major advantages inherent in NATO membership.

The provisions of the policy of the United States with respect to Greece set forth in NSC 103/1, as amended, continue to be adequate and timely.

H. Freeman Matthews

1. Dated February 14, p. 463.
2. In a memorandum for the National Security Council, dated May 24, not printed, Lay reported that the President had approved revision of NSC 103/1 on the basis of proposals advanced in NSC 109, The Position of the United States With Respect to Turkey (post, p. 1148), looking to an early adherence of both Greece and Turkey to NATO. The May 24 memorandum from Lay to the NSC is in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series.
3. See footnote 3, p. 465.
4. For documentation on the question of Greek-Yugoslav cooperation, see the compilation on Yugoslavia in volume iv .
5. See editorial note, p. 475.