611.81/6–1151: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State
4396. Ref Deptel 4812 June 8.1 We are at loss to understand Dept’s apparent belief US prestige and influence in Greece weakened by … Papagos affair. … Having returned in this manner, had I not made vigorous effort to find satis solution, US prestige wld indeed have suffered in view gen expectation that our influence wld be exerted in interests of reconciliation universally felt to be in best interests Greece as well as US.
Far from being resented, exercise our influence … was earnestly solicited by mil leaders, most polit leaders and most of press. Even those hostile to Marshal were unwilling to see him go under circumstances which weakened morale of armed forces and reflected on King. Our efforts were generally recognized as friendly and helpful and their failure was received with deep regret and little or no blame. Only resentment engendered was perhaps in palace and even that mitigated by our refraining from pressing matter when King proved unyielding. It is precisely in Palace, moreover, that we consider our action most salutary and necessary since it demonstrated to King extreme seriousness with which we regard tampering with army. …
We are sure Dept shares our concern that Grk Army not suffer in morale and efficiency and this is principal danger raised by Papagos affair. Marshal had done excellent job of eliminating polit and Palace influences and creating tightly-knit organization under staff of aggressive and not wholly harmonious leaders. It is questionable whether any other man or group of men can resist these historic influences so successfully and it is realization this fact which has caused widespread apprehension in officer corps. Further purges under inspiration Potamianos and Gen Ventiris are feared and, if carried out, might cause armed forces to revert to unhappy condition of 1948.
Dept may wish to consult Gen Jenkins on this point. …
Marshal has repeatedly stated during last two weeks that he will not enter politics and we believe he is wholly sincere. We consider only development which might cause him to change his mind wld be precisely [Page 482] gutting of army by external influences. We understand he is at present considering withdrawal to Switz and believe this might be wisest course, allowing time for tempers to cool and permitting friends to pave way for eventual reconciliation with King.
Venizelos has been seriously considering desirability postponing elections until next year and wld probably do so if he cld persuade Plastiras to enter govt now. We consider it very unlikely he can do so. Papandreou and Kanellopoulos are working actively for formation broad natl govt but Tsaldaris Friday issued statement that Populists wld not participate in govt which had not been sanctioned by verdict of people. Fact is that most politicians wld prefer to avoid elections and that mass of population is indifferent and apathetic, [but] momentum toward elections will probably prevail.
We are not inclined to feel at this time that elections wld be dangerous, though there is possibility that Papagos affair and behavior of Palace might become electoral issue and whip up rather than abate ferment. On other hand, we believe we shld be under no illusion that elections at this time wld clarify situation to any appreciable extent. Very little chance exists adoption majority system since apprehensions redoubled it wld be considered invitation to Papagos. Moreover, in present fragmented state polit parties, majority system unlikely to do more than produce unstable electoral alliances. Reconstitution two traditional parties ... is gradual process which cannot be accomplished overnight by adoption any electoral system.
While we agree and have consistently held that any coalition based on present parliament (except in case of critical natl emergency) wld be unstable and unwieldly, we shld not expect that elections under present conditions wld necessary produce marked improvement. Modified proportional system most likely to be adopted will favor three parties, Liberals, Populists and EPEK and probably produce govt formed from combination of two of them. Populist EPEK combination seems implausible. Pop–Lib combination is possible, but wld not provide coherent team and, with EPEK in opposition, wld work against reconstitution enlarged Liberal party. Govt dominated by Plastiras not too attractive since he wld probably attempt reduce size of army and to purge civil service in favor his partisans. Most hopeful prospect is therefore Liberal–EPEK combination dominated by former but there is some question whether even this wld be, except in having parliamentary majority, substantial improvement over present govt. We are inclined to feel therefore that pros and cons re elections this year are sufficiently evenly balanced so that US shld, unless conditions change, continue to maintain that question is one for decision by Greek people and leaders.
In summary, we believe that Papagos affair … involved morale and efficiency of armed forces and hence security of Greece and of [Page 483] West. On other hand, we do not believe question of elections or party alignment is proper cause for vigorous US intervention under present circumstances since we consider advantages to be expected from elections highly problematical and US security interests much less directly involved. … We shall also work energetically, in cooperation with mission, for least possible interruption, attendant upon elections, in basic tasks of rehabilitating Grk economy and society.
I shld appreciate being informed whether Dept agrees with above analysis and with general course of action proposed.2
- Supra.↩
- The same day (June 11) Minister Yost sent a “personal and secret” letter to GTI Director Rountree in which he reaffirmed that telegram 4812 “really did set us back on our heels and I think if you will reread it you will agree some of its comments were rather snide or at least excessively bland.” Yost reassured Rountree that “the reservoir is not drained, that we are still as much loved as any Sugar Daddy ever is, and that we have rarely taken an action which had such general public support. On the other hand, we have to intervene every week on specific instructions from the Department on matters, ranging from yachts to tobacco, which really do create ill-feeling.” After dwelling at some length on current difficulties in dealing with the volatile Greek political situation and on the great patience and competence shown by Ambassador Peurifoy, Yost concluded: “We stand ready to die for dear old Foggy Bottom but we must have our signals straight.” (781.00/6–1151)↩