781.00/3–851: Despatch
The First Secretary of Embassy in Greece (Memminger) to the Department of State
No. 1402
Ref: Embtel 2761 Feb 24, 19511
Subject: The Greek governmental crisis of February 1951
The vote of confidence of 133 to 91 accorded the Venizelos Government on February 22 terminated a crisis which in the eyes of most participants and observers was no crisis at all, and emphasized more than anything else the current negative and regressive factors in Greek political life. No real issues were settled, or even raised, and the governmental solution which emerged was in effect a throwback to that of a year ago, the tri-partite Center coalition which, however, lacked the virtue of the original combination in that it contained no hope of being a productive one.
Origin of Crisis:
Perhaps the most striking feature of the crisis is that it was precipitated by LEK (Populist-Unionist Party), the off-shoot of the Populist Party headed by Stephanopoulos and Kanellopoulos, and which since its inception had been regarded as an almost certain participant in the Government.
At the first major political rally of LEK held in Salonika February 18, both leaders surprised the political world by the viciousness of their attacks on the Government because of its lack of stability and minority character. Kanellopoulos went a step farther than his partner with a controversial statement, later variously interpreted, which was taken by some to mean that LEK favored an extra-parliamentary solution and by others as a warning that the country might be forced to this unless the Government took steps to strengthen its position. [Page 467] The latter interpretation is the one given by Kanellopoulos himself, and may be taken as the correct one since he was its author.
The remark nevertheless caused a storm in Athens and many indignant protests from leaders of other political parties. Two days later Kanellopoulos interrupted his tour of Northern Greece to return to Athens and announce in the Chamber that LEK was withdrawing its support from the Government, at the same time raising the question of a vote of confidence. In the absence of Prime Minister Venizelos then touring at Yannina, the challenge was taken up by Vice Premier Papandreou who condemned the attitude of LEK as an affront to Parliament and the parliamentary system.
The Solution:
The debate on the confidence question touched on no national issues since none had been raised. For a moment there was some doubt as to whether a debate and vote would take place at all, owing to a disposition of some circles to dismiss the incident as never having taken place. What resulted therefore was merely maneuvering for support to forestall a collapse of the Government. Regardless of what disagreements existed in the Parliament there was general agreement among the Right that the Government must be upheld in order to prevent elections, which would have disastrous results for many deputies and possibly some of the parties.
As the principal supposed support of the Government, LEK, had suddenly been transmuted into the principal opposition, most speculators concluded that Tsaldaris would come to the rescue of Venizelos and Papandreou, since his opposition to them had never been complete and the crisis afforded an opportunity for him to return to power, the one goal of every Greek politician. The Embassy has little doubt that he would have done so if necessary even if the Government refused to accept his solution of a broad coalition embracing Maniadakis’ and Sofianopoulos’ groups as well as his own. However, EPEK displayed a surprising amenity to our suggestion that it would be irresponsible to overthrow the Government without some concrete alternative to offer and an equally surprising political ingenuity in getting credit for saving the Government while at the same time securing its own ends. Greece had thus returned to the Center coalition created by the March 12, 1950 protocol, but under conditions really providing for its own dissolution.
EPEK did not agree to participate in the Government but only to support it on certain conditions. These were, first, that municipal elections be held on April 15, second, that a national electoral law be prepared as soon as possible, and third, that shortly thereafter general elections should be held if the international situation did not further deteriorate. A fourth, unpublished, item called for the municipal elections to be held on the basis of the electoral register as it was [Page 468] prior to the recent purge which disenfranchised a considerable number of supposedly leftist voters. It is not known whether the Government will adhere to this particular point.
The expedient accepted by Venizelos took nearly everyone by surprise and evoked practically no enthusiasm. The rightist press denounced the Government leaders for bowing to terms which in effect placed the country at the mercy of EPEK, in its opinion nothing more than a society of fellow-travellers. Only a limited number of Center partisans thought the solution the best one under the circumstances, the balance feeling that the present Parliament was sick beyond any possible cure and should be dissolved at once. This situation might have descended into a genuine crisis had it not been for the Katramatos-Metaxas affair2 a few days later which was much more spectacular by nature and effectively diverted public attention from the real problems the Government faces.
Conclusions:
1. The February crisis provided one further piece of evidence confirming the essential instability of the Venizelos-Papandreou coalition and their inability to create any viable arrangement from the present Parliament. General realization that their Cabinet may be the last step before national elections, and genuine reluctance of all rightist politicians to face the electorate, are again shown to be two dominant factors of the present Greek political world.
2. LEK has emerged from this foray with considerable loss of prestige and as a party with an indecisive leadership and vague program. Kanellopoulos and Stephanopoulos demonstrated distressing irresponsibility and superficiality by provoking a crisis without having any really concrete alternative to offer. A general belief has grown up in political circles that in any genuine test, such as elections, LEK might well collapse and disappear from the political scene.
3. The country has moved closer to national elections. No one believes that EPEK will continue its support for any length of time, even if national elections were postponed indefinitely because of “a deterioration in the international situation” as mentioned in its pledge to support the Cabinet. The Government is apparently going forward with municipal elections in mid-April and many anticipate that the results will provoke a reshuffle or a downfall of the present Government even if the latter should in the meanwhile have adjourned Parliament, a procedure favored by Papandreou. Greek politicians and political memories being what they are, renewal of many of the old [Page 469] combinations may be attempted with temporary success but it is unlikely that any coalition from the present Parliament could long endure.
4. If any one party got some advantage out of the crisis it was EPEK. It was EPEK which cleverly exploited a confused situation and succeeded in forcing the Government to go on record against its will for early elections, which Plastiras has been calling for since the Government fell last August. For the other parties the most that can be concluded is that they emerged from the fray with their armor a little more tarnished.
The Embassy is closely following the current situation in the light of this crisis and the conclusions outlined above, and will soon prepare for the Department’s consideration recommendations on what the Embassy believes to be the best course it should follow in promoting joint Greek and American interests.
- Not printed; it reported on the Greek political situation in light of the governmental crisis.↩
- In telegram 2785 from Athens, February 26, Peurifoy had reported that elements of the extreme right wing press in Athens had charged Col. Aristides Metaxas, Chief of the King’s Political Bureau, of using his official position to secure clemency for industrialist John Katramatos convicted in late 1949 of rendering financial assistance to Greek guerrilla forces (781.00/2–2651).↩