Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

781.5/1–2051

Memorandum by the Minister in Greece (Yost) to the Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy)¹

top secret

Athens, January 20, 1951.

Subject: The Place of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey in Military Planning for the Year 1951

The Problem

The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest a reconsideration of military planning for Greece and Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Turkey, in so far as concerns the calendar year 1951 only.

Alternative Military Situations in Europe in 1951

Any one of three possible military situations may confront the West in Europe in 1951. First, open hostilities may be confined to the Far East and 1951 can be devoted in Europe to building up strength generally in accordance with overall strategic plans. Second, the Soviets, if they achieve a considerable success with indirect satellite aggression in the Far East, may attempt in Europe in 1951 a similar aggression in which they are not overtly involved, with a view both to strengthening their strategic position and to undermining the Western system of alliances before it becomes too strong. Finally, general war involving Europe may break out in 1951.

It is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty which of these alternatives will occur. The state of Soviet atomic and air defense capabilities is probably such that they would prefer to delay general hostilities until after 1951. On the other hand, they may not feel that they can permit the NATO to develop throughout the year without a counterblow which, if successful, could, without general war, shake the confidence and resolution of its European members. Such a blow might be a satellite attack on European states not members of the NAT.

Obviously, the best possible preparations should be made for each of these alternatives mentioned above, but equally obviously, satisfactory preparations cannot be made for all of them in 1951. If general war breaks out this summer, the manpower of Western Europe will still be largely unorganized and unequipped. Indeed, most of the equipment which had been supplied Western Europe would, under these circumstances, probably be lost. On the other hand, if general war does not break out in 1951, arms despatched to Western Europe during that period will be useful only for training and morale. These purposes are, of course, of great importance, but, in setting up priorities for deliveries of military equipment, they should be balanced against other related purposes.

The Position of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey

If the estimate set forth above is correct, there is at least a serious possibility that a satellite attack against a European country may be launched in 1951. If this should occur, Greece or Yugoslavia or both would be the most likely targets.

Only a country adjacent to one of the satellites is exposed to such an attack. Of the countries adjacent, West Germany and Austria are occupied by Western troops so that even a satellite attack would raise the immediate question of general war. Yugoslavia and Greece are both physically and politically exposed, the latter because, while it has been the subject of deep US and UK concern, it is not presently protected by binding commitments as are the NAT members. The Korean experience demonstrated that the Soviets will not necessarily respect an area in which the US has taken a primary interest, as long as there are no US troops in occupation and no clear commitments to defend it. Indeed, the Kremlin may well be aware that the US has no present plans to send troops to Greece in case of war, either general or local.

The strategic and political advantages to the USSR of overrunning Yugoslavia and Greece are so clear as to need no elaboration. There is also in each case an emotional factor which might influence the Kremlin’s calculations, in the case of Yugoslavia, a desire to punish and exterminate Tito; in the case of Greece, a desire to recoup the humiliating failure of the civil war.

The extensive rearmament of Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, which has taken place during the last year, is not an idle gesture. Perhaps it is intended only to prepare for general war. There can be no question, however, that these countries now substantially outclass Yugoslavia and Greece in matériel, particularly tanks and artillery. If these preponderances should be supplemented by adequate Soviet air power (Russian planes could easily be given satellite markings), they might prove decisive in spite of the toughness and spirit of the Greek and Yugoslav armies.

It should also be noted that the organs of Cominform propaganda are at present laying great stress on the theme that the Athens–Belgrade axis, linked to Ankara and Rome and directed by the US, is preparing an early aggression against the peoples’ democracies. Such allegations have in the past frequently provided the excuse for totalitarian aggression. Similarly, Bulgarian papers are playing up the “oppression” to which their compatriots are allegedly being subjected in Greek Macedonia and Thrace, and are demanding that these areas be liberated. The current ejection of Bulgaria’s Turkish minority is another ominous sign. Both the material force and the political case are therefore being zealously prepared.

The Greek, Yugoslav and Turkish Armies

It has been frequently pointed out that, at the moment when we are desperately endeavoring to organize an army for the defense of Western Europe and are confronted by the inescapable fact that this army cannot attain substantial proportions during 1951, there already exist in Southeastern Europe three large armies of tough fighting quality and high morale, the Yugoslav of over 20 divisions, the Greek of 9, and the Turkish of 19, with a large increment of trained reserves mobilizable within a matter of hours.

It it not within the scope of this memo to discuss the role which these armies could play in case of general war. At the least, they would constitute a threat on the Soviet flank which would immobilize a considerable number of Soviet and satellite divisions. It is conceivable that, if properly equipped, they could even temporarily take the offensive in order to relieve the pressure on Western Europe at a critical time.

While this fact constitutes an important reason for hastening the modernization of their equipment, even more pressing perhaps is the necessity of enabling them to do so in order to meet a satellite attack, the serious possibility of which has been discussed above. This is especially important since the extent and speed with which aid could be rendered them after an attack begins is open to serious question.

What is in fact the present state of their armament? The Yugoslavs have a hodgepodge of obsolete equipment, for much of which ammunition and spare parts are in short supply, lacking any substantial antitank or anti-aircraft defense or any effective air power. The Greeks have an army excellently prepared to fight a guerrilla war but very heavily outclassed, by even the Bulgars alone, in artillery, tanks, antitank guns and aviation, and having on hand only a small fraction of the TNT required for the demolitions and mines which play a vital part in their play of battle. Material to fill most of these deficiences, except aviation, is included in the approved 1950 and 1951 MDAP programs, but almost none has in fact arrived in Greece. Both the Yugoslav and Greek armies might therefore, in case of a satellite attack under present condition, either be knocked out by superior power or at least lose rapidly a very substantial proportion of their forces and territory.

This Embassy is not acquainted in detail with the state of equipment of the Turkish army. Turkey would, moreover, be less likely to be subject to a purely satellite attack than would Greece or Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the deterrent value of a strong Turkish army, in conjunction with those of Greece and Yugoslavia, not to mention its role in case of general war, would seem to warrant a high priority for the supply to it of modern equipment.

Aid to Greece and Yugoslavia After a Satellite Attack

The very serious strategic and political effects of a successful satellite attack on Greece and/or Yugoslavia have been referred to above. It is very possible that, with adequate equipment, these two armies could alone defend themselves successfully against a satellite attack. Even in this case, however, at least token forces from outside acting in the name of the UN would be necessary for morale purposes in order to demonstrate concretely to the armed forces and civilian population that the free world stands behind them and that they are not isolated in the face of superior power. It seems highly improbable, moreover, that, even if every practicable effort were made to do so, sufficient equipment to overcome all the indicated deficiencies could be despatched to Yugoslavia and Greece in time to meet an attack this spring. It is believed, therefore, that definite plans should be drawn up and agreed among the Western Powers to supply to Greece and Yugoslavia, in case of satellite attack, at least token ground forces from outside, as well as effective air support.

Conclusions

1. Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey represent the most effective force in being in 1951 on the Soviet periphery in Europe. They serve as a deterrent to aggression at the present time and could play at least an important diversive role in case of general war.

2. On the other hand, they are more vulnerable to purely satellite aggression than are other nations along the periphery in Europe. Substantial military and political preparations, possibly designed for such aggression, are well under way. A successful satellite attack upon Greece and/or Yugoslavia would have most serious strategic consequences and might deal a fatal blow to the morale of Western European countries.

3. A rapid increase, during the next six months, in certain key lines of military equipment of Greece, Yugoslavia, and perhaps Turkey, would multiply their usefulness as deterrents in case of general war, and would enable them to meet a satellite attack with a minimum of direct outside assistance after the attack took place. It is very doubtful whether the same quantity of equipment supplied to other European countries would return equivalent dividends in 1951.

4. Particularly in view of the inadequacy of their present equipment, Greece and Yugoslavia would, in case of satellite attack, need some direct assistance from UN air and, to at least a token extent, ground forces.

5. Consequently, it is recommended that (1) immediate attention be given to according a higher priority to the delivery of key military equipment to Greece, Yugoslavia, and perhaps Turkey, during the first 6–8 months of 1951, and (2) full agreement be reached among the Western Powers as to what direct assistance in the form of air and ground forces could be supplied Greece and Yugoslavia in case of satellite attack during 1951.²

1. Peurifoy transmitted the source text to the Department of State in despatch 1129, January 20. In a covering note, Peurifoy stated, inter alia, “At least from the point of view of the strategic position of Greece, I believe this memo deserves the Department’s careful attention.” (781.5/1–2051) On February 2, Philip H. Watts of the Policy Planning Staff circulated the Yost memorandum to Bonbright of EUR, Byington of WE, Reinhardt and Campbell of EE, and Martin and MacArthur of RA. In a covering memorandum, Watts mentioned, inter alia, that Yost had also sent a copy of his memorandum to Policy Planning Staff Director Paul Nitze. (781.5/2–251)
2. In telegram 3244 to Athens, March 16, Acheson stated that the proposals advanced in the source text had received careful study by the Departments of State and Defense and that at the ISAC meeting of March 9, Defense Department representatives had presented a report urging that there be no change in priorities for delivery of military equipment during the remainder of 1951. According to Defense Department analysis, the global demands for military equipment were of such magnitude that expedited treatment for one country was possible only at the expense of other countries or of U.S. forces. “Greece, Turkey better position now than other countries because recipients mil equip since ’47. To improve that position further during ’51 wld involve revised priorities with major impact on NATO which remains area of desired maximum build-up.” (781.5/1–2051)