Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

641.74/12–751: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State ¹

secret

London, December 7, 1951—6 p. m.

2661. We are concerned by possibility widening difference of opinion between US and UK on how deal with Egypt crisis and believe it wld be helpful set forth what we think is present Brit attitude.

1. Embtels 2489,² 2497³ and 2609³ show that UK is firmly opposed at this juncture to encouraging idea of plebiscite in Sudan, both to avoid feeding Salaheddin’s propaganda and because UK considers any sort of referendum now on Sudan wld be impractical and meaningless. Referendum may come later but now Sudanese must concentrate on program self-govt. In any case, FonOff says UK has had no indication whatsoever from Egypt Govt of any serious intentions to allow Sudanese freely choose own place in internatl community and points to designation Farouk as King Sudan and promulgation constitution as evidence to contrary.

2. FonOff attitude towards Sudan problem influenced by Sudanese opinion, Brit public opinion and fears about Egypt intentions. UK will not bargain fate of Sudanese and they must be allowed determine own future. FonOff is unwilling in present circumstances for UK be party to formula having effect acknowledging Egypts sovereignty over Sudan and it therefore appears doubtful Stevenson will get authority he has requested (last sentence first para Cairo’s 785⁴ to Dept). FonOff says in first place Sudanese won’t have Egypt King as King Sudan. In second place only contractual basis for Egypt’s rights in Sudan 1899 condominium agrmt, which, apart from fact Egypt has denounced it, raises complex legal questions on which opinion divided. Present FonOff view of Bevin-Sidky formula is that it is “incomprehensible” and that 1946 negots broke down precisely because of inability get any common interpretation of formula. UK might in last analysis be persuaded admit theoretical basis for recognizing titular sovereignty King Egypt in Sudan, but wld go on to insist that question can not be divorced from present-day realities, foremost of which is Sudanese opposition to any form of Egypt control. In Brit view, Sudanese have been brought too far along road to self-govt and self-determination for process of history to be reversed and if Sudanese fear Egypt domination Egypt has only itself to blame. Gov-Gen Sudan has within past few days warned of violent reaction there if any sort of exclusive Egypt sovereignty recognized.

3. Embtel 2489 stated Brit objections to UN or internatl commission.

4. On defense proposals FonOff appears to think some flexibility at right time possible. FonOff not yet prepared be specific, but “flexibility” cld mean some combination UK’s earlier proposal for progressive civilianization of base and MEC offer.

5. However, Brit concern about any new offer to Egypt is almost as much one of timing as of substance. Eden believes no dramatic move possible now and Brit policy for present must be one of patience and firmness. We think Brit consider present test of strength has on whole so far proved fairly successful politically and shld be allowed produce its effects little while longer, at least in absence responsible govt leadership in Egypt with which UK can effectively deal. Primary objective is holding on to base and this so far being accomplished Brit tempted think Egypt govt may be having even tougher time than they and that it cld be fatal show any sign of weakness now.

6. FonOff has great doubts govt headed by Nahas can ever agree to satisfactory settlement (whatever Serageddin thinks he can do about Salaheddin, etc). In any event, Egypt Govt must first come to grips with terrorism. Until govt faces this threat squarely (which FonOff has hopes it will in due time), it is unlikely—feel able negotiate with Brit and in fact will probably feel compelled make greater outward show intransigence towards Brit as terrorism increases. FonOff thinks “liberation battalions” in order gain public sympathy for independent existence may well stimulate further violence in canal zone and elsewhere. But Brit likely view this as further justification for taking safety their troops more and more into their own hands and added reason for putting no trust into govt which shows itself so unable or so unwilling to fulfill its responsibilities. As indicated above, Brits are far from despairing about what may on surface appear be indications imminent disaster and have hope that present Egypt authorities are waking up and will eventually take situation in hand. In any event, Brit probably do not at moment consider that it wld necessarily be unmitigated disaster if Nahas swept from office as result public disturbances. Brit also have in mind that there is still one last means of salvation which has not yet been brought to bear on internal situation, the Egypt army.

7. As counterweight to impression foregoing may give, it can be said that UK all feel unsatisfactory and explosive nature present situation and wld be only too glad to find anything that they feel wld work without sacrificing fundamental objectives and principles. On-the-spot reporting and recommendations of Amb Stevenson will undoubtedly carry weight. But on balance it appears likely Brit Cabinet wld feel that any new approach to Egypt at this particular time wld do more harm than good.

This is Brit position as it appears to us as of today. It may of course change with events and we will watch closely for any such change.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Cairo, Paris, Baghdad, Moscow. Jidda. Tel Aviv, Beirut, Amman, Damascus.
2. Dated November 24, p. 425.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed; dated November 29, it reported that on a trip to the Fayid Base at Suez, Stevenson had learned the British generals had prepared two telegrams to London, one suggested drastic military sanctions and the other economic sanctions of far-reaching extent. Stevenson obtained agreement from the generals to defer dispatch of the cables and then telegraphed London himself requesting permission to tell King Farouk that, unless terrorism in the canal zone ceased, British forces would be forced to take drastic countermeasures in self-defense and asking for specific authority to tell Farouk that an effort would be made to find some formula with regard to the Egvptian crown and Sudan. (641.74/11–2951)