Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

Secretary’s Letters: Lot 56 D 459: “Middle East Defense”

CINCNELM and Cs-in-C, Middle East, to the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
Mil/3039/ME

[Malta,] 13 March 1951.

1. During our combined study of Allied capabilities for the defence of the Persian/Iraq Sector of the Outer Ring, we were continually faced with the problems of how we would overcome the weakness in the democratic front in Persia and also of how we could find both the forces required in war to meet the Soviet threat through Persia in the crucial early stages and those required to meet the over-all deficiency as the threat develops later on. Some of these forces are required to be stationed in or near Iraq in peace.

2. We recalled that in the past it had been accepted that the security of the Mesopotamian Valley and of the Persian Gulf directly concerned the safety of the Indian Subcontinent and that Indian troops had fought there at intervals through the last century.

3. It is our view that there has been no change in the strategic importance of this area to India and particularly to Pakistan nor to their mutual interests in it. Both Pakistan and India have strong land forces which are well placed to intervene promptly in this area. Pakistan is a Moslem country and is proposing to adopt the Arab language. The presence of Pakistani troops in Iraq in peace would raise less difficulties than would European troops.

4. We consider that every effort should be made to draw the attention of these two Commonwealth countries to their interests and responsibilities for the maintenance of the stability of this area, with a view to their joining us in arrangements for its defence. It is also for consideration whether Pakistan should be encouraged to enter into a treaty of mutual assistance with Persia and Iraq; from the military point of view this would have great advantages.²

R. B. Carney
J. H. Edelston
B. H. Robertson
J. W. Baker

1. This combined letter was issued on the final day of the second round of the so-called “Malta talks” between British and U.S. military officials. The first round had taken place on January 23–24 and the second, and final, round between March 10–13. It was signed by Adm. Robert B. Carney, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean; Adm. Sir John Hereward Edelston. Commander in Chief of the British Mediterranean Station; Gen. Sir Brian Robertson. Commander in Chief. British Land Forces Middle East; and Air Chief Marshal Sir John Wakeling Baker, Commander in Chief. Royal Middle East Air Force.

   The source text was Enclosure “C” to a memorandum dated April 24 from Col. Edwin H. J. Carns, Deputy Secretary. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Mr. McGhee. Enclosure “B” was a memorandum by the British Joint Services Mission to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated April 6, and entitled “Middle East Defence,” not printed. Enclosure “A” was an undated report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff containing a noncommittal draft reply the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, not printed. For further information regarding the memorandum of April 6 by the British Joint Services Mission, see the editorial note, p. 109.

2. In a memorandum of April 6 entitled “Middle East Defense”, the British Joint Services Mission informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inter alia, that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the combined letter and were in full agreement that it was a matter of the highest importance that both Pakistan and India should assist in the defense of the Persian-Iraqi sector of the Middle East. An approach should be made to these two countries to achieve this end as soon as would be opportune; however, the British Chiefs of Staff were appreciative of the fact that owing to the Kashmir dispute, an early approach would almost certainly do more harm than good (Secretary’s Letters: Lot 56 D 459: “Middle East Defense”).