641.74/11–451: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1
689. 1. Department has carefully studied Embtels 589,2 609,3 6164 which have been most helpful.
2. Department agrees that third alternative (Embtel 616) is only possible course of action and that exaggerated measures against Egyptians such as cutting off fuel supplies can only increase Egyptian frustration and hostility with possibility consequences which you foresee. It will be recommended to Secretary now in Paris that he impress upon Eden our view that if Egyptian situation is not to deteriorate further, military authorities must be kept on close rein. We recognize that certain measures are necessary in connection with maintenance by British their position canal zone and we are prepared to continue our support along lines Secretary’s letter to Morrison October 17.5 We feel that you have done splendid job with Stevenson re British military and Department appreciates his cooperation.
3. Department considers, and will so inform UK, that it would be inappropriate and undesirable under present conditions to regard British troops in Suez base as MEC troops. These troops are in Egypt by virtue 36 treaty and recognition continued validity treaty must extend to both rights and obligations. We strongly believe MEC should not become involved in Anglo-Egyptian controversy.
4. Department agrees that for time being we should pursue moderation and toleration theme and that present Egyptian emotions should run their course. We also agree that it would not be desirable to expect King or others take action now which would be counter to popular sentiments. While we realize certain Egyptian actions against British are inevitable, we hope that Serageddin and others in Egyptian [Page 418] Government will realize grave dangers to their present efforts maintain order if extremist and terrorist activities are permitted.
5. While we do not intend take punitive measures in sense paragraph 3 Embtel 609, we feel that it is necessary to suspend training re Deptel 683 November 26 (and export licenses for military equipment and supplies. Re this, “suspension” is operative word and we would hope that conditions would soon permit at least resumption training.
6. Department believes that we should continue to make clear to Egyptians that door is still open for them to join MEC and that this cooperative defense enterprise is fair, honorable and possibly only way out of present impasse. Obviously MEC will require painstaking explanation as Egyptian press and official comment indicate great lack of comprehension of what MEC means. We recognize that proposals will probably have to be reformulated in form calculated to respond more specifically to Egyptian aspirations and that further efforts may have to be made re Sudan. On latter point Department is considering possible legal and political implications acceptance by US of King’s title as “King of Egypt and of Sudan”. However, there will undoubtedly be considerable difficulty in moving British on Sudan question.
7. Department has in mind suggesting to UK Foreign Office that you and UK, French, and Turk colleagues make recommendations re reformulation defense proposals which might be acceptable to Egypt. Your advice re desirability this requested. We would also appreciate your comments on desirability similar exercises re Sudan.
8. Department considers that contacts which you have had with Serageddin are most useful and should be continued (Embtel 632 November 2)6 with view gradually enlarging them to include King and possibly others who recognize that continuance present situation benefits nobody and only spells trouble for everyone. Department understands that Aeliasandraos may be proceeding Paris shortly. View his close association Palace would any useful purpose be served by its being suggested that his visit to US would be welcome?
9. Department hopes obtain early approval from UK, French, and Turkey for statement of principles underlying MEC in order Arab States including Egypt and Israel will have better understanding what MEC is intended to be. We hope that such principles made known to Arab States in near future will maintain and increase present tendency those states retain freedom of action of MEC vis-à-vis Egypt.
[Page 419]10. Re Embtel 629 November 37 Department is recommending that Secretary talk re MEC with heads Arab delegations prior November 10.8
- Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman.↩
- Dated October 27, p. 411.↩
- Dated October 30, p. 413.↩
- Dated October 31, p. 415.↩
- Ante, p. 404.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Caffery replied in telegram 651 from Cairo, November 5, that he appreciated the Department’s “highly satis telegram” and especially that the Department was recommending to Secretary Acheson, then at Paris for the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, that he impress upon Eden that “Brit mil auths must be kept in hand.” Caffery added that he was not convinced that British military officials in the canal zone “are taking their FonOff admonitions very seriously.” Caffery admitted that the British were in a “most difficult position” in the canal zone and that the Egyptians were “doing everything in their power to be disagreeable.” Caffery concluded by stating that the British must continue to be supported and that moderation should be continued to be urged on the Egyptians. No useful purpose would be served by suggesting a visit of Egyptian officials to Washington. (641.74/11–551)↩