641.74/10–3151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State 1

secret

616. These are my recommendations on where-do-we-go-from-here. In my opinion measures, reprisals, etc., taken by British up to now in Zone, with exception of fuel oil squeeze, have been justified although at times they have gone little far. For instance, on British side there have been no casualties, but on Egypt side allegedly 19 killed and 125 wounded.

There are three choices and only three choices open to us:

First, let matters drift in hands of British military as they are now and end soon in. British re-occupation of Egypt followed by revolution. It is possible that some British military would welcome this.

Second, disassociate our responsibility from operations of British military in the Zone;

Third, agree that Britain shall continue reprisals etc as they have in the past with the exception of the fuel oil squeeze; but takeout of the hands of British military in Zone the power of decision for re-occupation and measures like cutting off fuel oil, which would inevitably lead to re-occupation. Such decisions should be made by higher-ups. At the same time I continue conversations of the kind I have begun with Serageddin in due course bringing in the King in hope of eventual agreement on defense proposals on condition that Brit do something about Sudan. As Department is aware even now Egypt credentials are made out in name of Sovereign of the Sudan and even British admit there is much to be said for the Kind’s right to title King of Sudan. However every day present British military fuel oil tactics continue hope of eventual agreement grows dimmer and dimmer. One very tiny bright spot is that more and more thinking [Page 416] Egyptians are asking themselves “where do we go from here?” and are willing at least to examine defense proposals.

Although eventually we may have to get rid of WAFD Government it would be folly to ask King to do it now, for variety of reasons, primarily because he could not find at this juncture government to take its place. Same holds for Salaheddin; as much as King and Prime Minister and others in Cabinet would like to get rid of him they dare not do it now because of possibility of setting at head of an exceedingly dangerous very leftist movement. We shall have to take it easy for while but not as long perhaps as we now think if only British Government will explain facts of life to British Generals at Fayid. There is no problem with British Embassy. I know Department has in mind situation which could arise when British troops in Fayid under MEC command could by intemperate and/or irresponsible action if not controlled from above lead us into dire difficulty.

I have not seen my French and Turk colleagues this evening but from conversations last night with them I believe safe to say they will go along with me on very word of this.

Department pass Moscow.

Caffery
  1. Repeated to London, Ankara, Moscow, Paris for MacArthur, and Arab capitals.