641.74/10–1251
The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison)1
Personal Message From Mr. Acheson to Mr. Morrison
I have received your message of October 122 regarding recent developments in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the three stages of action by the Egyptian Government and British counter-measures which you believe may be required in certain eventualities.
As you know, we share your deep concern over the deterioration of the situation in Egypt and deplore the action of the Egyptian Government on October 8 for the unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Condominium Agreements of 1899 regarding the Sudan. We have no doubt that the Egyptian action is contrary to these agreements, which do not provide for unilateral abrogation.
You also know that we deeply regret that the Egyptian Government rejected the Four Power proposals3 in such summary fashion. It had been our earnest hope that these proposals would make possible closer and more cooperative relations with Egypt and that a new era [Page 405] of international responsibility would develop in the Middle East area, fully compatible with Egypt’s position as a sovereign and independent nation.
I have already sent word to you through Ambassador Franks4 that we are in full accord with your thinking relating to stages 1 and 2 and we are prepared to render to the United Kingdom full moral support relative thereto. These stages involve Egyptian initiative and we recognize the inherent right of British forces to defend themselves against attacks. The same is true in connection with the protection of British nationals whose lives are placed in jeopardy by Egyptian action.
As you recognize, stage 3 raises more serious problems, including that of world public opinion. The United States believes that the British Government is fully justified in retaining its forces in the Canal Zone under the 1936 Treaty until some substitute is available for this arrangement such as that proposed under MEC. We share your view of the grave consequences to the West of a British withdrawal now from the Suez Base. We also believe that actions which may become necessary to keep open the Suez Canal are justified. We are therefore prepared to give our full political and diplomatic support to measures necessary (but which do not go beyond what is necessary) for the purposes of protecting the Suez Base and keeping the Canal open.
In this connection, I have every confidence that your forces will continue to conduct themselves, even in the face of unreasonable Egyptian actions, with that restraint which is so necessary to retain the support of world opinion. I mention this because of the importance I attach to avoiding the increased difficulties which would face us both if steps should be taken or events occur which would create violent adverse reaction from such opinion.
- A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Handed by Sec. to Burrows British Embassy Counselor at 6:00 p. m. 10/17. Transmitted to London by telegram #2069.” A copy of this telegram is in file 641.74/10–1751.↩
- Ante, p. 398.↩
- Reference is to the proposals for a Middle East Command presented to the Egyptian Government on October 13 and formally rejected on October 15. See editorial note, p. 391.↩
- See memorandum for the files by Matthews, October 15, p. 402.↩