663.001/10–1151: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Austria ( Donnelly) to the Secretary of State 1
1327. Deptel 837, to Vienna Oct 2, rptd 1788 to London, 1941 to Paris, unn Moscow and Frankfort.2 Brit HICOM and I met yesterday with Gruber to ascertain his views on plans for DFM meeting and strategy in connection with the proposed abbreviated treaty.
Caccia stated that his govt had not yet made final decision and before doing so wld wish to know attitude of AusGov. Gruber stated that his personal view, which he thought wld be endorsed by Cabinet, was as follows: He suggested that the powers wait until Nov 15 before fixing time and place for next meeting, in view of Brit elections and possibility of ascertaining Sov intentions by developments in Korea. Whatever our analysis of situation shld be in Nov, Gruber wld recommend meeting of deputies in Dec, where West powers shld make serious effort to conclude treaty on basis of existing draft. Gruber felt West powers shld show readiness to go a long way, if not all the way, to accept Sov text of outstanding articles. He did not of course expect us to reopen already agreed articles. Gruber states that acceptance of Sov text of Articles 42 and 48 wld not constitute concessions to Russians but to AusGov in return for which AusGov was willing to make necessary arrangements on the side with us. This left only Article 16 on which French might have strong feelings, and Art 27, on which he understood US Govt wished to stand firm. Gruber felt if necessary negotiations shld be continued for ten days or fortnight.
If it became obvious that Sovs were determined again to prevent progress Gruber foresaw short recess in order to give deputies opportunity [Page 1154] to report to their govts, and upon resumption of session West powers might present abbreviated text, not as a treaty but as an instrument “for vacuation of Aust.” Gruber felt that latter was desirable for sake of Aust public opinion, which might receive shock if they had impression that moves signified final breaking off of treaty negotiations with little hope of agreement on Aust settlement in near future. If designated as an instrument to secure withdrawal of occupation, it wld be more readily understood and welcomed, and wld avoid imputation by Sovs that we were scrapping present treaty because we did not wish to evacuate country. Gruber stressed importance of coordination in preparing Aust public opinion for change-over from state treaty to this instrument and also insure that Aust and West powers obtain full propaganda advantages from the move.
In view of these considerations Gruber recapitulated his recommendations as follows: (1) In light of our judgment of Sov intentions at the time, take final decision in mid-November about tactics for meeting of deputies in Dec; (2) at meeting of deputies make determined effort to get Sovs to discuss and endorse outstanding articles of present text, in which we shld be ready to accept Sov texts so long as any hope of progress; (3) if no progress after ten days or fortnight adjourn for consultation with govts and preparation of Aust public opinion; (4) upon reconvening, present abbreviated text as instrument for purposes securing immed end of occupation and liberation Aust in accordance with Moscow declaration 1943.
Gruber said we shld not tie ourselves in our planning but retain flexibility, and he wld appreciate our keeping in close touch with Aus Gov throughout. Gruber added that if Sov continued to obstruct negotiation, he favored UN as best forum for bringing question before world opinion. He did not contemplate UN itself reaching agreement over outstanding articles, but that open discussion in this forum might at least lead to general resolution recommending that four powers terminate occupation, which wld be awkward for Sovs.
Caccia is making similar report to FonOff. Gruber stated he wld inform French HICOM of views expressed to us, which we shall also confirm.