663.001/10–1051
The Second Secretary of the Embassy in France ( Herz) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs ( Williamson)
informal
Dear Mr. Williamson: I would like to tell you a bit more about the meeting which produced our 2026 of October 4 [5]1 because I felt rather sick after that meeting and want you above all to know that the abbreviated Treaty received the most earnest, thorough and spirited exposition and defense that I knew how to put forward. I’ve been a little afraid that you might think we let you down, particularly since London seems to have succeeded in budging their opposite members a little. As for me here, the plain fact is that I was addressing an exceedingly hostile jury, on which all my piety and wit seemed to be lost. I know those birds very well by now, and I can recognize it when that hard gleam gets in their eyes. We did not report all the counter-arguments they brought up against the abbreviated Treaty, because it didn’t seem necessary at the time. Meanwhile, however, your kind letter of October 22 has arrived, giving me a welcome occasion to expatiate on this subject. For you ought to know how tough the situation is here.
Among the arguments that Sauvagnargues most persistently adduced, and it is perhaps chiefly a rhetorical argument, is that our abbreviated Treaty is a “Japanese” treaty, that it was possible to sign such a treaty in the case of Japan because the signature of the Soviets was not required, but that in the case of Austria the whole point is to get the Russians to agree to something, and that consequently it is regrettably irrelevant that the present treaty is not in keeping with treaties that we have been able to conclude or revise without the Russians. In fact, he quoted to me M. de la Palice, than which there is little more condescending. (M. de la Palice is the French expert in tautology, who remarked for instance upon the death of a friend that “only one minute before he died, he was still alive.”) Nothing could be truer than that the present treaty draft is much less satisfactory, he said. But isn’t that precisely because we are negotiating with the Russians in this instance, and must produce a document that they are willing to buy?
His argument about the effect which the proposal would produce is that whereas at present we can convince the world that the Russians are using the flimsiest pretexts for not concluding a treaty [Page 1152] (Trieste being the finest example of their flimsiness), if we suddenly withdraw the tender of some $150 million which we had agreed upon as a ransom for Austria, the world and in particular the Austrians cannot help but conclude that we are somewhat less eager at present for agreement with the Russians than we were during the long years when that tender of ours was still extant. He even went so far as to say that no amount of propaganda would prevent the impression in many French and British circles that we had deliberately sabotaged the treaty negotiations by withdrawing our previous approval. The argument that the Russians had already sabotaged the negotiations would not change the propaganda picture, he said, since we would in effect be claiming that since the Russians had refused to sign the treaty when only an inch remained to be traversed, we are thereby justified in widening the distance by a mile. As you can see, Sauvagnargues has a talent for missing the principal point with his colorful statements. He is, incidentally, Schuman’s fair-haired boy and his position papers have a habit of getting more or less automatically approved in the Ministry.
As to the tactics involved, in getting the situation moving again (the Department’s telegram spoke of “maintaining initiative in negotiations and opposing Soviet intransigence”), Sauvagnargues again used very colorful language. I always learn new French colloquial expressions on such occasions (which are, however, fortunately very rare). He said: “Je vous fiche mon dernier billet”—I’ll bet you my bottom dollar—that if that document is introduced, the Russians won’t give you the pleasure of negotiating at all any more. The rest of what he said closely paralleled what I have already written you, about the Russians claiming, in such a case, that the western powers have given proof that they had never meant to conclude a treaty, etc. In other words, the French don’t share Vienna’s view that one could still fall back on the old text. They think that the Soviets would be careful not to let us do that, since they would be in an excellent position to refuse further negotiations.
If you ask me, the chief trouble is that the French do not have the kind of Congress and public opinion to contend with that we have in the United States. Of course, there are some people here who aren’t sure at all that any treaty at all should be concluded (notably the Chairman of the Assembly’s Foreign Relations Committee), but if the present treaty were to be signed I think the general reaction here would be favorable. In any event, if you want me to make another try, please give me the word and I shall go back into the ring with my friend Sauvagnargues—presumably after the French have favored us with their Aide-Mémoire on the subject. I have won battles with them in the past, and they may come [Page 1153] around also in this instance. On the other hand, you should know that this case does not look very promising from where we are sitting. I am sorry to be the bearer of such ill tidings, but this background may be helpful to you in assessing the desirability of pushing further ahead.
When will we have the pleasure of seeing you over here?
Sincerely yours,