Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 569

663.001/10–551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Austria ¹

secret

Washington, October 13, 1951—5:47 p.m.

944. Ref London’s 1690 Oct 5 rptd Paris 646, Vienna 88, Moscow and Frankfort unn² and Paris 2026, Oct 5, rptd London 504, Vienna 52, Frankfort 232.³

In light reftels Dept believes desirable ascertain whether Brit caution and Fr uncertainty due to: (1) objections on secondary issues such as timing, procedure, and concern over pts omitted from abbreviated treaty, (2) growing conviction that Western forces shld not be withdrawn from Aust, (3) unwillingness to disturb status quo on grounds no way exists to break Aust deadlock.

In absence any Brit or Fr substantive objection our proposal, it is hoped they will be in a position indicate agreement in order West reps Vienna may obtain views Aust Govt early date. We believe Gruber’s views (Vienna tel 1327 Oct 11 rptd London 73, Paris 120, Moscow 22, Frankfort 142⁴) not necessarily irreconcilable with ours although presentation of abbreviated text as evacuation instrument rather than treaty not feasible because such an approach wld leave Ger asset question unresolved and wld not allow time for estab security forces through control of ratification date. We believe Aust public opinion can be prepared for switch by white paper and adequate publicity.

No objection selection Nov date for mtg if agreement on program as a whole wld be facilitated but consider undesirable postpone meeting to Dec. Our pt is we feel initiation program shld not be unduly delayed. We think it important take early action in order gain maximum effect by capitalizing Jap, Ger, Ital developments. Aust proposal wld be additional step maintenance dipl pressure on Sovs which if time lag not too great and promptly capitalized cld produce desired result ending present treaty stalemate. We have no thought of issuing proposal as ultimatum as suggested by British but wld anticipate possible Sov counter-proposal as outlined Deptel 1680 to London (Paris 1813, Vienna 780).⁵ If, for example, West proposal shld be announced prior to or during sessions World Peace Council Vienna early Nov, we feel Sovs wld be placed in embarrassing position by receipt serious offer Aust settlement at time they were proclaiming to world their peaceful intentions and desire for peaceful settlements. Consider maximum effectiveness our program will be lost if we allow our indecision provide Sovs opportunity introduce their own proposal for Aust settlement perhaps along lines Grotewohl proposal in Ger or possible suggestion CFM.

London and Paris requested urge Brit and Fr agreement in light foregoing.⁶ We do not insist on US suggestions procedure and tactics but if they agree our analysis and basic conception abbreviated treaty they shld either concur in our recommendation or submit for consideration their own counter-proposals. Vienna inform Aust Govt of above except first para. Emphasize need for treaty and explain that if question referred to UN we wld prefer to do so on basis abbreviated treaty because of simplicity and clear focus on essentials of settlement.⁷

Acheson

1. Drafted by Allen and Rutter and cleared with Higgs, Williamson, and Perkins. Repeated to London and Paris and sent by pouch to Moscow and Frankfurt for Reber.
2. Document 566
3. Document 565.
4. Supra.
5. Document 558.

6. In telegram 2225 from Paris, October 16, Bruce informed the Department of State that French opposition to the idea of proposing the abbreviated treaty had hardened because of their firm belief that the Soviet-created treaty deadlock could only be broken by the Soviets, not by actions on the part of the Western Powers.(663.001/10–1651)

   In telegram 1887 from London, October 17, Gifford told the Department that it would be extremely difficult to get decision on tactics and procedure concerning the Austrian Treaty prior to the elections on October 25. He also noted that the British relied heavily on Gruber’s opinion which favored a more leisurely pace. (663.001/10–1751)

7. In telegram 1383 from Vienna, October 16, Donnelly stated that Gruber was not enthusiastic about the abbreviated treaty except as a tactic to be employed after a breakdown in the deputies’ negotiations on the old text and then primarily as an alternative means to be employed for purposes of pressure. Gruber did not believe the Soviets would agree to the abbreviated treaty. (663.001/10–1651)