663.001/10–551: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Gifford) to the Secretary of State 1
1690. 1. At further mtg with Harrison and Allen Emb offs outlined Dept’s views on procedure and tactics for Aust treaty talks as given in Deptel 1788 Oct 2 (sent Paris 1941, Vienna 837, pouched Moscow, Frankfort).2 FonOff reps appeared more receptive to idea of abbreviated treaty than at previous discussion (Embtel 1565, Sept 283) altho still not willing to commit themselves to it.
2. Harrison said Brit “basic analysis” is that Sovs will not accept treaty in any form at present time and hence there is “no chance” of Sov withdrawal from Aust. Introduction of abbreviated draft wld in effect constitute “decision in principle” to abandon old draft, as he seriously doubted west cld ever get back agreements in present draft once new draft is brought forward. Strongest arguments which he saw for abbreviated draft were:
- (a)
- Present draft is punitive and out-of-date;
- (b)
- Difficulty of obtaining Senate ratification for treaty along lines present draft and possibility Parl objections as well.
3. FonOff reps did not indicate which of alternative plans proposed in Deptel they wld prefer shld UK decide go along with abbreviated [Page 1150] treaty. However, they did point out that it wld be practically impossible issue invitations for deps mtg Oct 15, particularly in view current election campaign which will preoccupy Mins. Also recalled Morrison’s expressed desire to see if Trieste issue cld be settled before proceeding with further negots on Aust treaty. While reiterating Brit desire for fullest consultations with Austs, FonOff reps admitted wld be necessary have tripartite agreement in principle before approaching Austs.
4. Both Harrison and Allen emphasized that Brit are concerned re strategic and security aspects of withdrawal troops from Aust. Views of Brit mil auths are being requested. FonOff legal experts also being consulted re suitability and effects abbreviated draft.
5. Allen asserted that much depends on manner in which abbreviated draft would be presented to Sovs, i.e., whether it wld be as ultimatum on take-it-or-leave-it basis or as one of two possibilities for concluding treaty. This point wld require careful tripartite consideration.
6. Allen thought additional point in favor of new draft was fact that Schoarf told Lord Henderson last year that if present draft were concluded, Austs wld immed seek revision certain arts. Both Harrison and Allen agreed with Emb off that no advantage to be obtained by allowing Aust situation to drift along as at present; in fact this course had positive disadvantages, not least of which might be growing desire for Anschluss with West Ger. Allen agreed that this fall is propitious time for new move on Aust since Sovs are backing Grotewohl proposal in Ger with usual barrage of “peace” and “unity” propaganda. To refuse generous settlement in Aust might be serious embarrassment to Sovs, particularly vis-à-vis West Ger.
7. Emb inclined believe that Brit will come around to acceptance of abbreviated draft after mil and legal aspects fully examined. Anticipate however, that they will not be prepared have deps meet before mid-November, and will probably favor procedure along lines of that given alternative 2 in Deptel.