762A.0221/4–1451: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt1
6943. For McCloy from Byroade. You will have seen Deptel 6922, Apr 13,2 dealing with procedural problem in handling the contractual arrangements papers. This message concerns the problem of substance and timing in achieving the contemplated new political relationship between the Occupying Powers and the Fed Rep.
You will recall my ltr of Mar 193 which advanced for your consideration the thesis of a much fuller “declaration of intentions” than had previously been contemplated. Your response by ltr and cable to this tentative suggestion has greatly encouraged us here.
On reading the majority of the preliminary position papers4 we have received here on the subjects for contractual arrangements, am concerned that even the proposed fuller declaration of intentions may not be sufficient or the best way to handle the situation. I wld like to advance for your consideration therefore the idea of concluding an interim agreement on principles with the Fed Rep. Such an interim agreement wld presumably cover the main principles which will be found to underlie the many points you are now working on.
Among other things, we have in mind the possibility that a quite liberal peace treaty with Japan5 will materialize before long and that any arrangement with the Ger govt which is markedly less favorable will not have the desired political effect in Ger. (Documents on Japan being sent separately.) We fully appreciate that there are a number of compelling reasons why we cannot at this time conclude an arrangement with the Fed Rep which wld in fact be a final peace settlement. Not the least of these reasons is the apparent fact that the Gers [Page 1474] themselves do not want this now since it wld formally recognize the permanent division of Germany. What we do want, however, is an arrangement which will resolve all problems except those which cld only be solved by a final peace settlement with a unified Germany. This wld seem consistent with the language of the Brussels decisions, notwithstanding that the obscure language of Brussels does not necessarily point to such a sweeping settlement as we suggest.
We are impressed by the industry and careful thought that has gone into preparation of HICOG papers. Upon rapid scrutiny of the recommendations first impression is that cumulatively they do not sufficiently reflect the goal of eliminating Allied controls wherever possible. As a whole they perhaps support too strongly the principle of confirming controls in the form of contractual obligations by the Gers rather than to completely eliminate the controls wherever possible. We recognize that certain subjects must be covered by contractual agreements whereby the Gers assume obligations and responsibilities. However, the commitments to be required of the Germans in accordance with the HICOG recommendations seem numerous and complicated in nature. Their negotiation tripartitely and with the Gers wld necessitate long discussions and by the time they wld come into effect, their political value wld probably have been seriously impaired (as in the case of the New York decisions). We hope the number and complexity of the agreements can be kept to an absolute minimum without relinquishing supreme authority entirely at this stage.
If you consider the idea of an interim agreement on principles with the FedRep feasible, it might have certain advantages over the procedure now contemplated. Securing tripartite and then Ger agreement on the numerous and technical points covered in your papers will take many months. During this period we will certainly at some stage find progress on the whole approach being held up by a number of relatively unimportant technical points, such as occurred in the implementation of the New York decisions. The subjects for discussion during this protracted period are of such a nature that German public opinion probably will not grasp the significance of the contemplated package as a whole. The package, even when finally completed, will probably not readily lend itself to simple public relations usage.
Certain other considerations may have a bearing upon the wisest way of proceeding. In the past, in order to finalize any tripartite agreement of significance as regards Ger it has been necessary to hold a meeting of the three ForMins. However it is practically out of the question to require personal discussion and approval by the Ministers of the bulky and detailed package that will result from the consolidated papers on contractual arrangements. You will recall the previous difficulties when the Ministers had to act on the detailed ISG recommendations for the New York agreements.
[Page 1475]The Ministers will probably be together for a considerable period of time this summer at a CFM. If we cld use this opportunity to have them agree upon a relatively simple form of interim agreement which wld contain the principles underlying the contractual arrangements, it may be that the remainder of the work cld be completed with the Gers on a piece-meal basis and without necessity for ForMins consideration.
The question of Bundestag approval of new arrangements may be a factor in favor of relatively simple agreement on principles. Believe we have always considered next phase agreement shld have such approval yet submission entire contractual package to Bundestag wld undoubtedly be time consuming, give unnecessary fodder to opposition parties on details of such matters as civil affairs agreement, etc., and perhaps give unnecessary rigidity to details which may require change in future.
These thoughts have brought us more and more to the conclusion that an agreed statement of mutual objectives at a reasonably early date (perhaps after Bundestag ratification of the Schuman Plan Treaty6) wld be desirable in order to obtain the full political benefit of the fundamental change in relations we contemplate. Have not as yet attempted to draft terms of such an interim agreement. Such a document wld emphasize the common nature (Allied and German) of the objectives and obligations. It might not differ greatly from the terms of a full unilateral declaration of intentions because in such a statement of policy it wld be necessary to list certain things we wld expect the Gers to do on their part. The agreed principles wld have to be treated as an indivisible whole and the manner in which they wld come into effect wld have to be carefully worked out. A single quadrilateral agreement wld seem most effective, but an alternative cld be to negotiate in advance a declaration of intentions to which the Gers wld respond with a statement of willingness of what they were prepared to do. Their answer wld thus complete an agreement to which both sides wld be committed. We, of course, wld expect a declaration of their willingness to join the defense effort to be a major point. Such a document or documents shld put definitive seal of recognition to FedRep’s place in the Western community.
The timing of such an interim agreement in its relation to the CFM and Paris Pleven Plan7 talks wld be difficult and probably wld be a major point with our Allies and perhaps with the Gers. However, even if it became necessary to hold it up until after a CFM it shld provide us with a procedure that shld allow quick consummation subsequent to a CFM.
[Page 1476]Wld greatly appreciate your comments on the above and suggestions you might have as to the form and content of such an agreement if you consider the idea has merit. [Byroade.]
- Repeated to Paris and London.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- None of the HICOG preliminary position papers, which McCloy had begun transmitting in March, is printed.↩
- For documentation on the Treaty of Peace with Japan, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.↩
- For documentation on the negotiations leading to the signing of the treaty setting up a European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, at Paris, see volume iv .↩
- For documentation on the European Army talks (Pleven Plan) at Paris, see pp. 755 ff.↩