762A.0221/4–1951: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State
8483. Reurtel 6943 Apr 14,1 we fully recognize advantages of approach proposed by you, if practical political difficulties can be overcome. We shall thoroughly explore possibility of drafting agreement with Germans on basic principles along lines proposed declaration of intention. Hope to send you draft within few days.
Political possibility of obtaining tripartite and Ger approval for such agreement cannot of course be appraised until we have clear idea of what we want and until study of Japanese peace treaty (not yet received by us) permits estimate of its impact on Ger opinion. Adenauer has expressed view that agreement on basic principles can and should now be reached. We see, however, certain practical difficulties which would affect any such agreement, and particularly one as broad as urtel seems contemplate:
- 1.
- While interim agreement on principles, details to be negotiated later, might be feasible in some fields, these are peripheral areas in which such agreements offer little political advantage. In key fields such as logistical support legal status and security, basic agreement must be sufficiently definite and detailed so that each side knows what it is getting. Experience on debt agreement illustrates this difficulty.2 Allied purpose there was to get acceptance of basic principle of liability. Bundestag Committee, however, refused to approve undefined commitment without extensive negotiations. As this experience showed, such negotiations are likely to be more protracted and difficult to resolve, especially in view of fact they always tend to become public.
- 2.
- Under Brussels decisions, any such agreement would have to include as number one basic principle Ger participation in Western defense. Without Bundestag and Bundesrat approval, such agreement would have neither legal nor political validity. While urtel does not contemplate FonMin’s approval of such agreement before CFM, it will probably be difficult to negotiate matter with responsible Ger Parliamentary circles until fate of CFM is known.
In spite of these reservations, we still agree desirability fully explore feasibility such agreement. As soon as we have draft contemplated para [Page 1477] 1 above will discuss with Brit and French and advise their views. Meanwhile, will push current discussions on contractual relations as hard as possible at tripartite level.