762A.00/1–1251: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt1
4873. Personal for McCloy from Byroade. I wld appreciate it if you cld review Deptel 4585 Dec 282 and Bonn’s 427 Jan 5 to Dept3 in reply. Reply does not seem to me to be consistent with paper approved by FonMins in Brussels or with our conversations there.
As we see it, process of getting agreements which will bring Ger into def arrangements and accomplish changes in status of FedRep which [Page 1450] are necessary to make its political position consistent with its participation in def will probably take many months to work out. End of process will be reached when we have concluded with FedRep a series of agreements or treaties which will associate it with NATO, end Occ Stat, and establish new basis for Gers relations with West. In Deptel 4222, Dec 12,4 we gave you tentative and general outline of arrangements which we thought wld have be made to accomplish this result.
Initiation of steps to create Ger units cannot await completion of all these steps. However, am inclined doubt (and believe this is also your view) that Gers will be prepared take even first steps toward creating units for defense force unless there is firm understanding between them and us that they will be accorded substantial equality in polit, econ and mili matters, and as to manner and time at which this will be done.
If this assumption is correct, it means there will have to be some sort of agreement between occ powers and Gers setting forth basis on which contractual arrangements are to be worked out and indicating matters which are to be subj of contractual arrangements.
Understanding reached at Brussels was that we wld enter into genuine negots with Gers. This does not in my view mean we will formulate our positions only in the negots or solely in response to proposals made by Gers. In great many matters which are of primary concern to us and on which we will be seeking commitments from Gers, it is we rather than they who must formulate proposals. The whole arrangement will be of such a novel character that it will require considerable thought on our part as to how it shld be developed and what subjs will have be dealt with. This means we must, jointly with Brit and Fr, formulate ideas and positions for our discussions.
I am concerned that unless there is clear understanding, at first among us on American side and later on tripartite basis, as to how we are to proceed, the whole development will be far too slow. My staff for instance is now largely stymied in preparation of studies until some overall plan and approach is decided upon.
It may well be that until Gers see what happens as result of our exchanges with Sovs, they will be unwilling to do more than talk in an exploratory fashion. We must be in position, however, to go vigorously ahead once this question is out of way. This means that in addition to giving thought to positions which we wld have to take with Sovs shld there be four-power discussions, we must work ahead on our tripartite arrangements.
Brussels Directive5 lays on HICOM task of working out a general outline of arrangements with Gers for consideration by Govts. I had hoped this wld be done during month of Jan. Directive states that [Page 1451] matters to be considered by ISG are to be identified by HICOM as matter of priority and that ISG is to begin working on them in Jan.6
I do not think that question of where work is done is as important as insuring that it is done somewhere and that we are in agreement as to what needs to be done. Although I appreciate that there are difficulties in dividing up the work, it seems to me that it wld also be difficult for HICOM to attempt to do entire job. I do not think problem of coordinating work done by HICOM and ISG is insuperable one. I shld think it cld be met in large part by device of occasional joint mtgs of HICOM and ISG comites. In any event, it seems to me that some program for dealing with the work must be devised very quickly and decision made as to where work is going to be done. As we have not received your proposals wld like suggest for your consideration some allocation of work along foll lines:
A. Subjs to be considered by HICOM
I. Questions relating to Allied position in Ger.
- a.
- Abolition of HICOM and related problems.
- b.
- Civil Affairs agreement.
- c.
- Basis for continuing reorientation activities.
- d.
- Radio frequencies.
- e.
- Legal problems—war criminals, occ courts, etc.
II. Disposition of Allied programs and controls within Ger.
- a.
- Human rights.
- b.
- Constitutional issues.
- c.
- Problems relating to Ber and Sov Zone.
- d.
- Decartelization and Deconcentration.
B. Subjs to be considered by ISG
I. Matters held over from New York.
- a.
- PLI
- b.
- Debts and claims
- c.
- For interests
- d.
- Restitution
In addition, I believe both HICOM and ISG shld study question
- a.
- International agreements (final action on Reich treaties and clarification of agreements made by Allies binding Ger).
- b.
- FedRep membership in international orgs.
- c.
- Waiver of Claims.
- d.
- Civil Aviation.
In addition, I believe both HICOM and ISG shld study question whether there are any peace treaty type problems not yet specifically identified which can be disposed of under Brussels Directive. We believe there may be a number of problems, the solution to which has [Page 1452] been deferred but which shld now be taken up, such as waiver of claims.
ISG will of course proceed with study of problem referred to it in last para of Brussels Directive.
I shld like make clear that what I am talking about is planning and preparatory work which must be done on Allied side. Question of how to negot all these questions with Gers is separate issue, although very difficult one. To extent that other countries will be involved in negot of multilateral agreements, it does not seem to me that it will be feasible to carry on negots through HICOM. This is problem which will have to be studied but which does not need be answered immediately.
Acheson
- Drafted by Byroade and Reinstein.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 817.↩
- Not printed; in it McCloy stated that he did not believe the division of work proposed in paragraph 4 of telegram 4584 was “practical or desirable since it would convert ISG into agency for negotiations or discussions with Germans and thus confuse lines of responsibility.” (396.1–ISG/1–251)↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 797.↩
- See ibid., vol. iii, pp. 585 ff.↩
- For documentation on the work of the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany (ISG), see pp. 1317 ff.↩