740.5/1–551: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
3378. 1. Dept has welcomed opportunity to examine Brit and Fr views re contractual arrangements with Ger. (London’s 3760 Jan 5, and Paris 3855 Jan 8.)2
2. While Brit have touched on question of Supreme Authority, thinking of Fr FonOff appears to be overly centered on this point. We agree question is of great importance but do not believe its consideration shld be allowed to obstruct thinking on extent to which we are otherwise prepared to readjust relationship to Gers. We agree with Brit that as circumstances now stand we have most to gain “by bringing about the inevitable gracefully and rapidly rather than grudgingly and too late”. Acceptance this premise means broadly surrendering our controls and powers, largely abolishing our machinery of control and thus placing Gers on basis substantial equality.
[Page 1448]3. If this is result we aim at, supreme authority will have little practical meaning in terms of day to day controls, as Brit point out. Decision re its retention will always have to depend on legal considerations and polit necessities, including Ger views, and as of present moment it is not at all clear whether Gers will push us to surrender supreme authority. On balance, however, Dept does believe some formula must be found whereby supreme authority or a right of intervention is retained for two purposes: First, to permit interim control over long-range security arrangements and make sure that defense plans wld not get out of hand and second, to have a basis for future negots with the Russians, always recognizing that we can never expect to enforce any agreement concerning Ger which is not acceptable to Gers themselves.
4. However, Dept finds it difficult to accept all reasons for retention advanced by Fr FonOff. Sovs have contended since Berlin blockade that we have destroyed legal right to remain in Berlin, so seems doubtful if additional step wld change situation as regards Sov attitude. However, we agree with Fr view that our rights there are based on conquest.
5. Also find it difficult agree Fr thesis that peace treaty necessary if sovereignty given up. Distinction between “peace treaty” and other agreements seems increasingly tenuous and important only for psychological purposes. Dept sees no objection to conclusion contractual arrangements in form of treaty if that appears desirable, but at present stage of internatl situation wld certainly not wish to call any arrangements “peace treaty” which did not include Sovs. Giving up sovereignty wld necessitate additional contractual arrangements but not peace treaty. Only points really to be reserved for peace treaty are those which cannot be solved without an understanding with Sovs.
6. Do not understand point 4 of Paris tel.
7. Seems to Dept that loss of supreme authority wld change but not remove legal basis of our presence in Ger which wld then rest on agreement with Gers. This might or might not be serious, from viewpoint possible Ger backsliding, depending on degree of Ger commitment to a European Army, NATO defense arrangements and other western institutions.
8. Dept’s thinking on foregoing is only tentative and point of supreme authority is in any event one of last we shall have to face. Dept believes it is more important to proceed with dispatch to formulate plans for replacing occupation controls by contractual arrangements. Dept does not believe Occ Stat will serve any useful purpose if remaining controls are either handed over to Gers or embodied in agreements freely entered into by both sides, and HICOM as such might well be replaced by Ambassadors to emphasize more equal normal status of relations.
[Page 1449]9. As for relationship between Ger negots and possible four-power talks Dept holds two views strongly.3 First, cardinal principle must be to push unremittingly our policy of integrating Ger with West, including defense plans. This is best means of insuring Ger does not fall under Sov domination, an eventuality which wld be far from ensured against in the event of a unified, demilitarized “neutral” Ger. Dept therefore fully shares views set forth para 1 of Brit tel of Jan 3 to Paris.4
10. Second, Dept concludes that in absence of any basis for hope of overall settlement outstanding tensions with Sov Union, we must proceed with negots with Gers without delay and without regard for possible four-power talks. We wld fall into trap so obviously set by Sov maneuvers if we delayed Ger plans pending outcome our exchange of notes with Sovs. This wld mean possibly indefinite delay and still further opportunity for Ger opinion to swing toward “neutrality” concept.
11. You may discuss problems with FonOff along these lines, showing them this message if you wish.
12. Have just seen Paris’ 3973 Jan 11,5 but do not consider additional observations necessary at present.
- This telegram, drafted by Laukhuff and cleared by Byroade and Perkins, was repeated to Paris and Frankfurt.↩
- Telegram 3760, not printed, but see footnote 2, supra.↩
- For documentation on the exchange of notes between the Soviet Union and the United States, the United Kingdom, and France which led to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris in the spring of 1951, see pp. 1048 ff.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Not printed; it transmitted the substance of a message from the French Foreign Office to François-Poncet which set forth the tentative French views on contractual arrangements along lines similar to those in telegram 3855. (740.5/1–1151)↩