Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

740.5/1–1651: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

Frankfurt, January 16, 1951—2 p. m.

5840. We have had several informal conversations with Blankenhorn in last few days re implementation of Brussels decisions. He has repeatedly emphasized that unless some positive statement outlining a new relationship between allies and Germany could promptly be forthcoming, situation here would continue to deteriorate. In his opinion, and this is confirmed from other sources, drift toward neutralism is becoming more pronounced. Blankenhorn argued Chancellor’s position in face of this drift was becoming increasingly insecure since it was being claimed that he was getting nowhere in his talks with allies.

Blankenhorn insisted that what was now needed was not a review of Occupation Statute paragraph by paragraph striking out certain powers leaving framework intact, which he feared was all that Brussels had decided, but a statement of principle that Germany would be given its sovereignty at an unspecified future date, that present HICOM setup would be liquidated as soon as possible, and that negotiations looking toward a security treaty would be undertaken at once. He said Chancellor felt this was only way in which progress could be made. His speech at Bielefeld Sunday indicated this line.²

We have pointed out that Chancellor’s formula seems very one-sided, that Germany would be receiving substantial concessions without any real commitments on its part with respect to future development of European community. We have suggested that it is far more important now to prepare a program rather than to deal at this time with statement of principles, which would be difficult to negotiate, pointing out that end results of achieving a series of contractual relations would probably be to put Germany in a more favorable position than if we endeavored to solve at this time question of sovereignty. We are urging Germans to study what is meant by a contractual relationship and have said that it will be necessary for allies, for their own security, for defense of Germany as well as of Western Europe obtain definite safeguards concerning status of their troops in Germany and the authority to act in event of an emergency.

Blankenhorn asked whether the two procedures could be adopted concurrently; namely, allies and Germans should work out series of agreements necessary to place their relations on contractual basis and meanwhile allies would negotiate with Chancellor formula along lines of draft contained in our immediately following telegram.³ This formula had been prepared as a very rough draft but Chancellor would like an opportunity to discuss it with High Commissioners if we felt it could serve dual purpose of establishing a future firm basis for our relations with Germany and of giving German public opinion a concrete assurance of progress at this stage.

McCloy

1. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. In his address to a meeting of the CDU at Bielefeld on January 14 Adenauer had stated that the German people adhered to the West, that the Occupation Statute must be replaced by a contractual relationship, that German participation in Western defense must be on an equal footing with other powers, that the Federal Republic needed financial aid from the West, and that the Four-Power Conference must avoid decisions which would injure Germany. HICOG reported on the speech in telegram 5850, January 16 (962A.61/1–1651).
3. Telegram 5841, infra.