460.509/1–851: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State 1
3855. London’s 3760 to Department January 5.2 Apparently before receipt of British views re contractual arrangement with Germany, but evidencing French fears concerning what is believed to be the British attitude, Sauvagnargues has given us informally following indications present Foreign Office thinking on subject.
Schuman has interpreted the Secretary’s remark in Brussels,3 to the effect that we do not expect that a “treaty” will be concluded with Federal Republic, as indicating that US is not contemplating that complete sovereignty should be given to Federal Republic nor that the kind of contractual arrangement should be made that could be interpreted as peace treaty with Federal Republic. Foreign Office thinking, Sauvagnargues said, is that whereas contractual arrangement is necessary and even desirable, western powers must not and cannot divest themselves of supreme authority, which could in any event only be done by peace treaty. He felt distinction must be made between “placing our relations with Germany on a contractual basis” and “placing our presence in Germany on a contractual basis” he expressed fear that British may not be viewing problem entirely in this light.
Present Foreign Office thinking is along lines which distinguish between a “contractual arrangement” which implies continuance of Allied Supreme Authority in Germany and which is desirable, and [Page 1447] “accord de securite” which implies complete equality with Germans, which consequently might be abrogated by Federal Republic at some later time, and which is consequently undesirable.
As reasons why, however much may be granted to Federal Republic under a contractual arrangement, attributes of complete sovereignty must be withheld at this time, Sauvagnargues listed the following:
- (1)
- It would necessitate conclusion of peace treaty, which would open up question of Federal Republic’s eastern boundary.
- (2)
- It would deprive us of legal basis for our presence in Berlin. which is derived from Germany’s status as defeated and occupied country.
- (3)
- It would close door on any future negotiations with Soviets with respect to Germany.
- (4)
- It would undercut the unilateral guarantees which have been worked out at Brussels because even if these were agreed to by Germans, such an agreement on their part could be simply withdrawn at a later time.
- (5)
- It would remove the legal basis of our presence in Germany.
Sauvagnargues emphasized that Foreign Office position still being developed, that above so far represent working level thinking only, and indicated that any information that may be available concerning our own tentative views will be most welcome. We hope to obtain Foreign Office comment regarding the British views (as per reference telegram) after they have been studied here.
- Repeated to London and Frankfurt.↩
- Not printed; it reported that the current thinking of the Foreign Office was that the Allies must contemplate the relinquishment of all reserve powers and their supreme authority for contractual arrangements (keeping controls only in the industrial, research, and military fields) if they wanted to align the Federal Republic with the West in a political and military sense. (740.5/1–551)↩
- For documentation on the discussion of Germany at Brussels, December 18–19, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 585 ff.↩